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IntroduCtion 
SrMPL Y speaking, responsibility is answerability. In a 
higher sense, responsibility seems inseparable from human 
existence, for man's humanity has a deep relationship to 
man's community and the human community is essentially 
dependent upon human answerability. This human capacity 
to be accountable may be fulfilled in response to a ruler or 
to the dictations of a powerful state or to the inner law of 
the "ought" or to the divine imperative of love. 
Responsibility for different kinds of societies-the response 
of the primitive man to his rigid social structure and cus-
toms, the response of the modern man to a dictator, the re-
sponse of a free man to his democratic community-has a 
significant variation in quality. A free society requires a 
large degree of responsiveness on the part of its citizens, 
from whom its direction comes. And for that reason re-
sponsibility in a democratic society, now in an age of tran-
sition, is complicated. 
Education in democracy must be concerned with develop-
ing in man a quality of responsibility characterized by a 
personal inner control: self-rule; the fulfillment of the spirit 
of the law and not the letter only; a holding of oneself ac-
countable to others beyond the requirements of law. A closer 
examination of this notion of responsibility, however, soon 
involves the most difficult concepts of freedom, personality, 
and community, and it becomes evident that the problem of 
responsibility in a free society in transition is a significant 
challenge in contemporary education. 
The depth of the meaning of responsibility is illustrated 
in a negative sense by increasing evidences in modern so-
ciety of irresponsible relationships among men. Pernicious 
trends toward impersonality have come about through the 
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growth of great cities, wars, mass population shifts, radical 
changes in the traditional community, the mechanization of 
daily living, the weakening of family ties, and the question-
able procedures of great corporations and bureaucracies. 
And only too often in the more direct and intimate personal 
relationships in the community there are increasing evi-
dences of disunity in teacher-pupil relationships, in family 
relationships, business partnerships, neighborhood activities, 
and social circles; and there are the continuing divergences 
between rich and poor, manager and laborer, educated and 
uneducated, white man and black man, Occidental and 
Oriental, ad infinitum. Irresponsibility is highlighted in 
divorce, crime, political corruption, juvenile delinquency, 
parental apathy, and overresponsiveness to economic expe-
diencies. 
These tragic realities in our society point up more clearly 
the moral nature of education's task in helping to rebuild 
a disjointed world. Any educational system alive to the 
needs of this generation can hardly escape the obligation to 
renew the intangible, cohesive, constructive ingredients of 
human personality by which men can live in free community. 
If responsibility is not supported in a democratic society, 
the alternative is the ascendancy of a different kind of social 
order which insures compliance through the use of force 
and fear. Thus responsibility becomes a focal point for any 
education fulfilling a constructive role in a society vitally 
concerned with a free way of life. 
The task of developing responsible persons is presented, 
therefore, as one of the basic problems of twentieth century 
education in America. The more intensively the problem is 
examined, the more profoundly it relates to the deep ques-
tions about the nature of man and his destiny. It soon be-
comes evident that there are philosophies of education which 
differ widely in their ideas about the nature of man and 
about the basis of human responsibility and about the means 
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to be used in developing responsible persons. These funda-
mental cleavages bear untoward consequences in educational 
practice, showing over and over again the dangers of an 
educational house divided against itself. That men will 
always have their honest differences is not here a primary 
concern; rather it is the evidences of continuing schisms at 
the base which make the surface conflicts in education 
doubly dangerous. So long as men of varying opinions can 
stand upon a common foundation, they may remain rela-
tively unperturbed by surface tensions; in such a case the 
generous sharing of many divergent views ought to enhance 
rather than impede education in a democracy. But when 
the differences of view involve fundamental presuppositions, 
we have reason to be seriously disturbed. 
The primary task of this study is to compare and to con-
trast some of the outstanding contradictory world views in 
American education today and to examine how these com-
petitive views face the critical problem of developing re-
sponsible persons within the complex and disconcerting in-
fluences of the times. This comparative study bases itself 
upon at least two important presuppositions: First, each of 
the contrasting world views is considered actually a faith 
insofar as it has something to say about education's task of 
improving the community. As the Catholic and the com-
munist imply, all education must ultimately be religious, 
that is to say, based upon some kind of assumption about 
the nature and destiny of man which is a moving faith. 
Furthermore, a consideration of one educational philos-
ophy as secular and another as religious weakens the basis 
for comparison. Nor is this secular-religious dualism either 
necessary or desired. John Dewey the progressive, Theodore 
Brameld the radical, and T. S. Eliot the conservative, for 
example, discover themselves in general agreement with the 
argument that the secular versus the religious is a dualism 
of dualisms which ought to be got rid of as quickly as pos-
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sible. Thus it becomes possible to speak of Dewey's "com-
mon faith" based upon the scientific method, of Brameld's 
radical faith based upon the expansive powers of the com-
mon man, of Robert Hutchins' faith in the divine spark 
of reason which distinguishes man from the animal, and of 
the Christian faith in God, "a Spirit, infinite, and eternal." 
Second, it is proposed that the educational philosophies 
under consideration can best be understood and evaluated 
in terms of their basic concepts of the nature of man. At 
this fundamental level one may understand more clearly 
the "whys" of practice and gain significant insights into the 
reasons for conflicts in practice. In the concept of man's 
nature lies the heart of faith and practice. To become inter-
ested in the aims of education is to ask what education is 
for. If it is agreed that education is for the improvement 
of man, one is immediately involved in metaphysical and 
theological problems: What is the nature of man and what 
is man for? 
Having briefly outlined the nature of the problem of 
responsibility in education and suggested a framework for 
its further consideration, I will undertake in the following 
chapters a fuller investigation of what is understood to be 
the basis of human responsibility, the soil in which it best 
flourishes, and the means of cultivating it. I assume that all 
persons should possess in their souls a deep sense of obliga-
tion and responsibility in their relationships to their neigh-
bors. The real problem is: How are such responsible per-
sons to be developed within the twentieth century setting 
with its disconcerting scientific and technological trends and 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Progressivism in Outline 
IN THE long and tortuous transtuon from medieval to 
modern civilization in Western history the changing concept 
of authority was basic and crucial. In medieval times the 
Christian church was the authority which permeated all 
levels of society. By contrast the modern mind is far re-
moved generally from that medieval faith. Currently a wide 
range of contradictory authorities has supplanted the church 
and its sovereign God. Pragmatism today is one of the faiths 
in revolt against older traditions. 
Pragmatism the theory, which is progressivism in practice 
insofar as education is concerned, is a philosophy peculiarly 
American, a philosophy which appeals to the common man 
of action because it counts experience as the real basis for 
knowing. Three quite uncommon American philosophers-
Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey-supplied 
in the main the intellectual impetus which forged this doc-
trine in its American form out of the revolutionary scientific 
and philosophical developments of the nineteenth century. 
Peirce gave the pragmatic ideal philosophical stature by 
emphasizing that the truth of an idea is to be formulated 
in terms of the sum of its practical consequences and that 
the practical consequences mark the limit of truth. William 
James, one of the most influential of American thinkers and 
an intimate of Charles Peirce, popularized the pragmatic 
idea of Peirce and added radical interpretations with which 
Peirce vigorously disagreed. These new concepts of James 
will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter. 
William James' outline of a universe which was open 
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and novel, free from medieval universals and modern Kan-
tian categories, evolved into a Jamesian concept of relative 
truth based on experience. This concept provided a spring-
board for John Dewey, who became in the twentieth century 
a revolutionary figure in education zealously proclaiming 
the thesis that the learner learns by doing. 
Possibly the briefest and most efficient approach to an 
understanding of the present day implications of pragmatism 
in education is the attempt to understand the pragmatic 
view of the nature of truth. Philosophies throughout the 
ages, observed John Dewey, have been burdened with the 
quest for the transcendental truth, conceived as certainty, 
absoluteness, abiding, immutable, the same yesterday, today, 
and forever.1 This historical concept of truth had a natural 
kind of evolution, according to Dewey. Men have always 
feared uncertainty and thus have fabricated the much needed 
verities in which they found consolation and spiritual pro-
tection in times of stress and danger. This longing for cer-
titude is traceable through the folklores of primitive peoples. 
As they relived their experiences around the campfires, sav-
ages filled their tales with dramatic incidents, using poetic 
license to make their stories more tellable. In this way they 
developed myth, tradition, and religion. 
To the extent that folklore remained in practical relation-
ship with activity it retained an empirical factual content; 
to the extent that it related to the realm of drama and 
imagination it tended to become mythical and religious. 
These tendencies accounted for the emergence of two spheres 
of tradition: the religious and the practical, each more or 
less separated from the other. This emergence of the re-
ligious and the practical provided the early foundations for 
the continuing dualisms of history: the traditional polar 
positions of thought and action, theory and practice, mind 
1 Much of the material in this chapter is based upon four of John Dewey's 
books: The. Quest for Certainty; Reconstruction in Philosophy; Democracy 
and Education; and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. 
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and matter, the spirit and the flesh, the philosopher and the 
artisan. The realm of thought directly related to physical 
activity was considered the baser realm. On the other hand 
the realm of pure thought was conveniently separated from 
the world of practical activity; this realm was rationalized 
into a lofty position by man's quest for what was unchanging 
and eternal. The further the idea was removed from prac-
tice, the more an aura of certainty it attained. 
Whereas the primitives posited their certainties in myths 
and simple religions, wrote Dewey, the later philosophers 
transformed the primitive religions and myths into the king-
dom of metaphysics, supplanting superstition with reason. 
Later, quite profound theologies came into existence, com-
bining faith with reason and giving extended support to a 
belief in the supernatural. It was against this theological and 
philosophical version of truth that pragmatism revolted. 
The substance of this revolt first of all is the denial that 
we can demonstrate the reality of absolutes, theological, 
philosophical, or otherwise. Man can only know through 
experience the interaction between an individual and his 
environment. Since the relationship between the individual 
and his environment is continually changing, there can be 
no absolute knowledge. Meaningful knowledge has to do 
with the relationships of objects and individuals considered 
as organic objects. The traditional concern about the thing 
in itself and all of the other intangible so-called realities 
about which the theological and philosophical experts have 
never been able to agree is considered unnecessary, confusing, 
obsolete, and untenable. 
Knowledge is obtained and conclusions are made in terms 
of experience. These conclusions are then subjected to fur-
ther tests of experience to determine their continuing va-
lidity. In other words, experiences are evaluated in terms of 
consequences. Truth is not a fixed rule by which to measure 
experience, but something continually discovered in the con-
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sequences of experience. Truth is in the future, not in the 
past. Truth is relative, not absolute and eternal. 
According to the pragmatist, laws are not statements of 
absolutes but predictions of probability. Nature is not im-
mutable. We learn nature's ways through experience, and 
this relative knowledge is subjected to further testings in 
experience. Contemplation of "what" in terms of the "thing 
in itself" is labeled a spurious enterprise. 
What are the practical outcomes of this Deweyan prag-
matic revolt against traditional authorities? Simply that all 
so-called absolute truths and dogmatisms which confuse and 
antagonize people are removed from the scene of learning; 
intolerance and fanaticism are likewise dissipated. Philoso-
phy comes down to earth and assumes a practical role: the 
tremendously challenging task of working out the scientific 
method in ever increasingly higher levels of discovery and 
control of the forces of nature-the discovery of truth which 
works. 
As far as the pragmatist can tell, there is no unchanging 
reality above this natural, dynamic universe. Man's hope is 
to adjust to this moving world as he knows it. He who re-
sists is doomed; the plastic organisms survive. Nature deals 
harshly with the individual who has lost his ability to adjust 
and to turn with the blows. Man ought to understand that 
he is a part of the natural flux, not a being who lives above 
it; his nature is continuous with the nature which produced 
him. Man ought not, however, to be considered a passive 
organism in the face of his environment. In fact all living 
organisms not only adapt to the environment, but they also 
do something to the environment in return. Even a clam 
does something to its environment. The savage does much 
more, but he transforms his environment much less than 
the civilized man who has intelligently discovered ways to 
control the environment. Human intelligence is a natural 
capacity by which man can anticipate a favorable outcome 
Progressivism in Outline 7 
and can order his means accordingly, thus making a thou-
sandfold more effective the process of favorably transforming 
the environment. And this is the glory of man in his present 
civilized estate. 
So it seems evident that pragmatism is an optimistic philos-
ophy. Man's world of experience constitutes his only world, 
and a unique human organism has evolved an intelligence 
which can control this world of experience. In other words, 
progress is possible. The gospel of progress is the wellspring 
of hope and determination. Change is inevitable, but there 
is no reason why change cannot be controlled for the better 
by means of human intelligence. Pragmatism is above all 
"the belief in man's ability to face the world with his own 
skills and powers and to solve his problems through his own 
active intelligence."2 Men who are intelligent and able to 
direct their environments need no longer consign them-
selves to determining so-called eternal verities. Intelligent 
men put their faith in a control of the natural experienced 
world, not in the dictates of some faraway spiritual world. 
Given, in education, the philosophy that thinking and 
learning are the human organism in interaction with the 
natural environment and that human intelligence is a prod-
uct of this interaction, one has a graphic outline for revolu-
tionary developments in the traditional schoolroom. Activity 
becomes the theme. The pupil learns by doing. 
In the light of pragmatic doctrines the older traditional 
formal educational procedures stand in judgment. Older 
doctrines are considered sterile because they deny meaning-
ful activity. Pragmatically, education is valid and effective 
to the extent that it involves the enriching dynamic inter-
action of the organism with its environment. According to 
John Dewey, educational activity should be essentially free, 
expanding, moving, stimulating. Life is growth, and educa-
2 Theodore Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy: A Democratic 
Interpretation (Yonkers-on-Hudson, N. Y., 1950), 97. 
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tion is the assistance of growth: vigorous, responsive, for-
ward looking, unhampered. Life is development and de-
velopment is life. Education for the child is "living." The 
educational activity is its own end. There need not be, in 
education, preordained ends, but simply growth, the recon-
struction of experience in terms of new experience. Educa-
tion aims at continuous reconstruction of experience as 
contrasted with preparation for a remote future or a formal 
recapitulation of the past. 
Education does not have set aims according to these views. 
The object of education is continuing successful activity in 
order that the individual may achieve the art of adjustment 
to and control of his environment. Temporary ends are 
primarily stimuli to action; when they are reached they 
become steppingstones for further tern porary ends. The 
suspense which is engendered by the immediate temporary 
goal substitutes for formal discipline. The pragmatic disci-
pline does not artificially restrain the learner but confronts 
him with the stimulating call of "interest."3 
One final summary observation ought to be made before 
proceeding to a more detailed and careful examination of 
the pragmatic doctrine of the nature of man. Throughout 
the works of John Dewey and some of his illustrious disciples 
there is the recurring theme of education and democracy. 
For the progressive, education is indeed the hope of democ-
racy. Education through activity makes possible an enrich-
ment for all kinds of persons, the rich, the poor, the elite, 
the worker. The collective strength of all the citizens con-
stitutes a vigorous democracy. Enriching interaction re-
moves artificial barriers between all classes. Increased so-
cialization between races, classes, and colors is the lifeblood 
of a strong democracy. Interactivity involving all kinds of 
children from all kinds of groups and levels in the public 
s This and the preceding paragraph outline one of the outstanding theses 
of John Dewey's Democracy and Education. 
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school is the best possible insurance for an enlightened and 
vigorous democratic way of life. Pragmatism is progressi-
vism's faith. Democracy is its faith in action, whether in the 
schoolroom or in the community. 
CHAPTER Two 
A Pragmatic Concept of 
the Nature of Man 
IN THE best pragmatic tradition men are not sons of God 
but sons of earth. Man is a child of nature and is continuous 
with nature; nature is his origin, his home. 
In philosophy naturalism, the basis for a pragmatic inter-
pretation of man's constitution, is not the naive or literary 
admiration of nature as opposed to the artificialities of civi-
lization, but the metaphysical basis for explaining the origin 
and destiny of man. Naturalistic philosophy assumes that 
"the universe requires no supernatural cause or government, 
but is self-existent, self-explanatory, self-operating, and self-
directing."1 The idea of a self-sufficient universe seems dom-
inant today in the sciences-particularly biology, psychology, 
and sociology-considered basic these days to the formulation 
of educational theory. Darwinian evolution, the doctrine of 
progress within the natural continuum, and the hypothesis 
that eventually all phenomena may be explained in nat-
uralistic terms all imply that higher human nature too is 
subject to a natural and evolutionary explanation. Sidney 
Hook, an educational experimentalist, contends that there 
is really no genuine evidence which supports the idea that 
man may claim a nature qualitatively distinct from the 
natural environment which supports him. Man, insisted 
Ingersoll, is part and parcel of nature. "Nature 'produces 
man without purpose and obliterates him without regret.' 
1 B. A. G. Fuller, in Dagobert Runes (ed.), The Dictionary of Philosophy 
(New York, 1942), 205. 
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... Man is the highest intelligence."2 Revolutionary as-
sumptions such as these about man and his nature have 
given fresh vigor to philosophical views dedicated to the 
eventual emancipation of man from the stubborn grasp of 
traditional, supernatural, and rational concepts of his nature 
which are believed to have impeded immeasurably the prog-
ress of the human race. 
Against the naturalistic world picture the traditional con-
victions about man are labeled incompatible, out of order, 
out of date. A synthesis of the old and the new seems un-
attainable. Any suggestion of a supernatural element neces-
sary to man's progress destroys the evolutionary framework 
of the naturalistic faith which postulates the orderly step-by-
step progression of nature from the simple to the more 
complex. Possibly the most challenging task of the naturalist 
is to explain the complexity of the evolutionary process 
which connects man's higher moral and intellectual nature 
with his physical nature so that finally human progress may 
be charted to include man's spiritual capacities as well as his 
physical capacities. 
To explain "naturally" the complex nature of the human 
being necessitates a radical revision of the traditional con-
cepts of man's higher faculties: his intelligence, mind, will, 
esthetic appreciations, moral capacities-all of which dis-
tinguish him so notably from the lower creatures. The task 
of the naturalist is to dignify the natural process and to 
make it consonant with the loftiest of human expressions, 
to show that supposed transcendent characteristics in man 
are after all the fulfillments of nature operating at its higher 
levels. It must be shown that man is not a citizen of two 
worlds; he is a creature of one world-this world. He is not 
a dualism of mind and body, but a single creation of the 
natural world. It must be demonstrated that in the final 
2 Ralph H. Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought (New 
York, 1940), 180. 
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analysis the "mind" is not a spiritual entity, but a natural 
functional expression of the whole organism, however com-
plex it may be. 
For the progressivist, man's mind, like his body, is con-
tinuous with nature. Progressivism is much indebted to 
William James, who finally effected at least a philosophical 
emancipation from the traditional concept of man's mind 
as a spiritual entity. Preceding James, a long line of emi-
nent Western philosophers had seriously concerned them-
selves with epistemological problems, the problems of how 
we know. In the nineteenth century, with a kind of snow-
balling accumulation of scientific evidence bolstering the 
naturalistic interpretation of man and his universe, the pace 
of philosophical speculation also quickened. Auguste Comte 
and Herbert Spencer particularly committed themselves to 
the philosophical assignment of naturalizing the mind, mak-
ing it continuous with the natural process in order that 
mind the spiritual entity should no longer pose itself as a 
barrier to a thoroughgoing scientific understanding of the 
nature of man. 
An essay written by ·william James toward the end of his 
career, entitled "Does Consciousness Exist?"3 may be con-
sidered a climactic philosophical treatise serving finally to 
remove the traditional mind-body dualism which had griev-
ously perplexed the earlier philosophers. William James in 
his essay concluded, in summary, that thoughts are made of 
the same stuff things are. 
In the first place William James argued that the mind is 
not a kind of intangible driver which sits on the mental 
platform of the brain and directs the movements of the body. 
The mind is really not an entity at all, but a function or 
quality of interaction involving the organism and the en-
vironment. Herein can be noted the shift of interest from 
3 William James, Essays on Radical Empiricism (New York, 1922). 
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"product" to "process." Mind is a process, not a substance. 
But how can this be? 
The new interpretation of human consciousness can be 
understood "if we start with the supposition that there is 
only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of 
which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure 
experience' then knowing can easily be explained as a par-
ticular sort of relation. . . . The relation itself is a part of 
pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes the subject ... 
the knower, the other becomes the object known."4 
This basic "stuff," whatever it is, which constitutes the 
universe is involved in an endless variety of relationships. 
The relationships themselves constitute experiences. All 
objects (dogs, chairs, water) are stuffs of experience in 
unique relationships, and these relationships constitute the 
experience of dogs, chairs, water. 
Possibly this idea can be somewhat more simply described 
with the use of an elementary example from the field of 
chemistry, an illustration which James did not himself use 
but which seems to follow from his technical treatise on the 
subject of consciousness. Suppose the substance "water" is 
considered as an example of the significance of relationships 
and how these relationships are themselves experiences. Hy-
drogen is one of the stuffs of experience, and likewise oxygen. 
When in nature these two stuffs come into peculiar relation-
ship the result is a new stuff of experience called water. 
With this illustration in mind let us turn to James' ex-
planation of the nature of consciousness. The example of 
hydrogen and oxygen in a peculiar relationship resulting 
in the experience of water points up in a elemental way, 
perhaps, the significance of the relationship of the human 
organism to the environment resulting in a new experience 
called consciousness. As the hydrogen in relation to the 
4 James, 4. 
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oxygen produces a new quality of experience called water, 
so the organism in relation to the environment results in a 
new quality of experience called consciousness. To carry 
the analogy a step further: When the relationship between 
hydrogen and oxygen is broken, the experience of water 
vanishes. When the relationship between the organism and 
the environment is broken, the mind vanishes. Organismic-
environmental interaction equals mind or consciousness. On 
the other hand, no interaction-no mind. Possibly this 
illustration points out in a dim sense, for after all it is the 
mysterious fact of consciousness which is here being dealt 
with, the implications of "externalization" of the mind in 
the Jamesian sense. The mind is no more "inside" the body 
than water is inside either the hydrogen or the oxygen. 
Water is the product of the hydrogen-oxygen relationship. 
Consciousness is the product of organism in relationship to 
environment. Consciousness or "mind" is not to be discov-
ered through abstraction but by addition. 
In one respect, at least, the illustration of water as an 
example of relationship does not satisfactorily represent the 
quality of consciousness in the sense that consciousness is 
actually an activity and not a product. Possibly the simple 
example of oxygen combining with carbon which results in 
"burning" would more accurately accent the concept of mind 
as a process of "thinking." 
The reduction of all reality to experience strikes out of 
the philosophical agenda some of the dualisms which have 
plagued the intelligentsia of previous centuries. If all reality 
is experience, the philosopher can bypass such problems as 
the physical and the spiritual, thought and action (or more 
specifically, mind and matter). It is in reference to the 
critical problem of mind and matter that William James 
comes to the conclusion that thoughts are made of the same 
stuff things are. 
Consider the illustration which James uses in showing 
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how this dilemma has been eliminated in the new concept 
of mind. One may suppose himself looking at a book. 
Actually there seem to be two books involved. First, there 
is the book on the table, and second, there is the same book 
in the mind. The problem: Are there really two books or 
only one book? If there is one book, which is the real book, 
the copy on the table or the copy in the mind? James insists 
that there is only one book, or rather only one experience 
of a book. Keeping in mind the previously illustrated idea 
of what is consciousness, namely the organism in relation 
with the environment, one could assume in this case that 
the human organism is one stuff of experience interacting 
with a particular set of relationships in the environment 
(the book) resulting in consciousness of a book, which is a 
new experience. Consciousness of a book is an experience, 
a single unified phenomenon, which has two aspects: the 
thought of book in the objective sense and the book thought 
of in the subjective sense. The "book" is neither a material 
substance nor a copy of a material substance in the mind, 
but the "book" is an experience, one experience, one book, 
having its objective and subjective sides of the coin of "ex-
perience." 
In this way William James reduced all realities not to 
mind, not to matter, but experience. Consciousness is not 
mind in the traditional sense, but a phenomenon of relation-
ships, and relationships are experience. Since relationships 
exist "between" objects and have no inner reality, conscious-
ness understood as a relationship is external. This is Wil-
liam James' philosophical externalization of the mind. If 
the mind therefore is not an inner reality, it need not be 
considered as a further obstacle to the naturalization of the 
human individual. The complete removal of the human 
mind as a spiritual entity clears the way for a consistent 
evolutionary naturalistic formulation of the nature of man's 
higher capacities and moral proclivities. 
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The biological organism of man is understood as an ex-
tremely complex and sensitive mechanism, itself the product 
of a natural evolutionary process. The emergence of the 
"mind" late in the evolutionary series signifies nature in a 
new dimension, possibly involving new and higher laws be-
coming aware of ends and values. The continuing scientific 
investigations of the higher capacities of the human organism 
accent two significant aspects of human life even in its most 
primitive forms, namely, the bent toward association and 
the invention of language, which provide the basis for the 
development of the "human" out of the man. 
George Mead, one of the lesser known but important 
pragmatic philosophers, outlined in detail how it happened 
that man became self-conscious and human. 5 Man in his 
subhuman existence learned to live in groups. One of the 
requirements of group living was some form of communica-
tion, which is even now in evidence among many animal 
groups. Man, possessing an unusually highly developed nerv-
ous system, eventually became aware of the possibilities of 
utilizing natural signs and gestures. He realized after a long 
time that the choice of a certain sign could evoke from his 
associates a preferred response. A growing preoccupation 
with the relationships between lingual stimulus and response 
provided the basis for man's eventual arrival at self-con-
sciousness. In other words, the evolution of the use of lan-
guage and the evolution of human self-consciousness exem-
plify a basic interrelationship. 
The meaningful conscious communication by bodily ges-
tures was a cumulative affair which resulted finally in a vocal-
cord refinement of gestures known as language. "Language 
is thus the bridge between the unconscious course of things 
in 'nature' and the self-conscious life of man."6 And this 
concept coincides with George Mead's ideas about the social 
5 George Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago, 1934), Part II. 
6 John L. Childs, Education and Morals (New York, 1950), 71. 
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basis for the development of consciousness and mind in the 
human organism. The substitution of symbols for the more 
or less cumbersome acts was indescribably significant, giving 
the human animal a new leverage on his environment and 
new relationships with fellow creatures which made possible 
the formation of what is now called human culture. Man 
is born into the present cultural environment as an animal 
organism. The culture which surrounds him, itself a natural 
evolutionary formation, transforms the animal baby into 
the human person. Man is not human in his own right but 
by virtue of his relationship to his cultural environment. 
"Selfhood is ... a self-other product."7 Men are all mem-
bers one of another. Selfhood is formed in terms of "other-
hood" relationships. 
A far-reaching and all important conclusion follows from 
this understanding of the nature of man: Human nature is 
plastic and mutable, subject to change. The human organ-
ism, being the product of aeons of interaction with its nat-
ural environment, has reached the present high estate 
progressively, and scientific evidence indicates that this pro-
gression should continue. There is no scientific basis for 
assuming that human nature cannot change. 
With man the prospect of change is an exciting outlook 
because the emergence of a new factor "intelligence" means 
that nature can be controlled and changes for the better can 
be stepped up a thousandfold. Think of the breathtaking 
implications for modern man who has within his grasp the 
means of self-creation, literally self-promoting and self-di-
recting his progress toward ever higher levels of knowing 
and being. 
Basically the crowning glory of the self-realizing pragmatic 
person is his intelligence, by means of which moral progress 
is possible as well as the progressive control of the physical 
environment. Man's intelligence, too, is a completely natural 
7 William Heard Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education (New York, 1951), 40. 
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phenomenon supplanting the older concept of reason-that 
supposed immaterial faculty which qualitatively distin-
guishes him from animals. Intelligence is ability developed 
through organismic-environmental interaction, just as the 
human organism itself from the beginning developed 
through interaction with the natural environment. With the 
development of language, experience became symbols, and 
symbols made possible a shorthand high-speed projection 
of causes and effects, which is thinking. 
Thinking in a truly reflective sense does not occur until 
the organism is blocked by some kind of obstacle in the path 
of desire. Removing the obstacle through the process of 
reflection results in the formulation of a hypothesis. Testing 
this hypothesis by experience is commonly called problem 
solving. When intelligence is increased in depth as a result 
of broad, enriching, successful encounters of organism with 
environment, the individual gains extra leverage and control 
over the environment for future encounters. Intelligence 
is knowing through experience, and "knowing marks the 
conversion of the undirected changes into changes directed 
toward an intended conclusion."8 This naturally evolved 
human consciousness is the finest attribute of man in con-
trast with the lower animal organisms. Intelligence is nature 
distinguishing itself at the highest levels. 
In conclusion it should be noted that this pragmatic con-
cept of man is primarily individualistic. There are no uni-
versal laws; there is no universal being. The universe is 
pluralistic, and each individual in this kind of universe 
works out the quality of his own existence in his relations 
with the environment. 
Pragmatism in its understanding of man does not disso-
ciate itself from the individualizing trend begun by the 
Renaissance and the Reformation. The Reformation in-
sistence upon the infinite worth of the individual soul and 
8 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York, 1929), 205. 
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the right of every man to be his own priest in the working 
out of his own salvation is clearly a part of the pragmatic 
ideal. The pragmatic man fundamentally is a superprotes-
tant, who not only protests against ecclesiasticism but against 
all authorities, religious or secular. This characteristic in-
dividualism in pragmatism will later be emphasized as a 
distinguishing feature in a contrast between the pragmatic 
and the social reconstructionist concepts of man's nature. 
CHAPTER THREE 
A Progressive Solution to the Problem 
of Developing Responsibility 
T.m DEVELOPMENT of responsibility is without question 
a basic and serious problem for the pragmatist. The morale 
of youth in the face of twentieth century social and moral 
schism presents a disturbing picture. The democratic ideal 
in action is shaken to the foundations because of a tendency 
of the youth in America to be more taken up with the rights 
of freedom than with its obligations. A recent survey of 
more than 2,000 high school students discovered that "over 
two-thirds [of the students] defined democracy solely in 
terms of rights and liberties without reference to responsi-
bilities."1 It hardly seems possible that the situation should 
be otherwise, since our whole society is confused and erratic, 
and the conduct of elders and leaders often irresponsible. 
Even so, a democracy cannot long endure if the youth which 
is its hope does not learn effectively its lessons of responsi-
bility. Democracy, which is a majority way of life, cannot 
hope to function successfully if the majority is not composed 
of responsible self-governing persons. 
For the pragmatist the moral problem must find its solu-
tion within the natural continuum, since the validities of 
divine absolutes and rational postulates are denied. Roughly 
speaking, it may be anticipated that the progressivist and 
the educational reconstructionist will deal with the problem 
of responsibility in terms of organismic-environmental re-
. lationships within the natural flux defined as "experience." 
1 Educational Policies Commission, Learning the Ways of Democracy 
(Washington, 1940), 47. 
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The classical humanist by contrast will attack the problem in 
terms of a human nature distinct from and above the natural 
flux, while the Christian viewpoint will be taken up pri-
marily with the existence of God, infinite and eternal, as 
the ground for responsible relationships between man. 
With the progressivist, man by nature is not depraved or 
deprived, not good or bad actually, but a morally neutral 
dynamic organism possessing drives and energies which are 
neither wholesome nor unwholesome. The growing organ-
ism's basic need is direction and refinement, and this is the 
task of the surrounding culture which humanizes him. Man's 
conscience, as it develops, is not the echo of a divine com-
mand but the integration of the customs of the culture. 
Man in his biological and spiritual development is con-
tinuous with the rest of nature. The twin oracles of psy-
chology and sociology, overflowing with scientific evidence 
relating to every facet of man's nature and activity, provide 
a considerably enlarged basis for the theory of a natural 
morality. 
Although the pragmatic solution to the problem of re-
sponsibility appears to be modern, its primary theme is 
evident in the influential writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, 
Charles Darwin, and Herbert Spencer, each in turn being 
indebted to some extent to David Hume. During the period 
when these men were making a significant contribution to 
the new ethics, there was a parallel trend toward disintegra-
tion of older ethical foundations. Possibly a few references 
should be made first to the negativistic trend: the revolt 
against traditional ethical supports. 
Particularly during the last half of the nineteenth century 
in America there was a significant turning away from theo-
logical faith as the basis of moral conduct. Morality was 
more and more divorced from theology, especially in its 
puritanical expressions. Many intellectual leaders assumed 
that theology was more to be associated with moral con-
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fusion than with moral virtue in society; that religions 
which propagated the concept of sin were perverting the 
wholesomeness of personality, distorting men's souls, dissi-
pating their vitalities; that a devotion to fixed ends demon-
strated a timidity to face the world; that persons theologically 
oriented simply wanted a guarantee of success in advance 
of action. Fixed principles were condemned as a refuge for 
the timid. 
During this critical half of the nineteenth century many 
intellectuals revolted against the idea of an autocratic God 
holding over the heads of men the threat of hell and the 
incentive of heaven in order to promote moral conduct. 
There was the accusation that the Christian religion claimed 
men's loyalties for another world, thus attenuating their zeal 
and energies to solve the immediate problems at hand in 
this world; that this kind of doctrine led naive people to a 
faith in false values, beclouding the challenge toward the 
good life here and now. In addition, men advanced the 
argument that the traditional emphasis upon theological 
doctrine fomented religious wars and built up great walls 
of separation between peoples. Too, the naive superstitions 
of the simple were taken advantage of, in the name of re-
ligion, by unscrupulous vested interests. In this revolt of 
the intelligentsia, serious effort was made to eliminate as 
efficiently as possible that which was considered opiate, that 
which neutralized the vitalities of men in action. 
This attack on traditional Christian faith was paralleled 
with an energetic dedication to the task of substituting an 
experimental scientific basis for conduct, adaptable and ad-
justable to the changing social patterns. This new morality, 
as would be expected, was related to the concept of a nat-
uralized man completely capable of ordering his life and 
society without extranatural assistance. This new office to 
which man elected himself, that of fulfilling his own destiny 
with the power of his own science, was in itself a new con-
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cept of human responsibility quite different from the timid 
disposal of the fate of men at the hands of the Almighty. 
It should be mentioned at this point that the truly difficult 
feature of a naturalistic ethics is a scientifically and philo-
sophically plausible development of that sense of "ought" 
within the natural continuum, especially in the face of scien-
tific insistence that the natural continuum is a mechanistic 
system of cause and effect. Yet nineteenth century thinkers 
such as Auguste Comte, Charles Darwin, Thomas Huxley, 
and Herbert Spencer worked out a scientific evolutionary 
scheme which has been generally acceptable to many con-
temporary philosophers. 
The naturalistic seeds of moral responsibility are to be 
discovered in Darwinian and Spencerian descriptions of 
"sympathy" as a common characteristic of higher animals, 
underlying the progression toward a social or herd life. In 
the element of sympathy is seen the evolutionary germ of a 
human moral conscience. Love and sympathy are instinc-
tive feelings already evident in social animals. Morally good 
actions are motivated by instinctive social feelings, and these 
social feelings evolve to higher levels through the process 
of natural selection. In the experience of the race there has 
developed an awareness of the fact that long range results 
are more to be sought after than immediate gratification of 
desire. This, specifically, is the basis of responsible action. 
The dispositions toward responsibility are evolved from the 
culture, which is itself unaffected by any supposed super-
natural influence. 
·with Rousseau the same theme is enlarged upon. Natural 
pity is the forerunner of those humane characteristics which 
supply the basis for responsible conduct such as generosity, 
benevolence, and friendship. Naturalism discovers the pos-
sibility of developing a "new evangel" which in terms of 
sympathetic emotions finally expresses itself as love. The 
evolutionary process produces a kind of charity in action 
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not supported by any kind of divine influence but simply 
founded upon the scientific gospel of man the son of nature 
and evolution. 
This scientific approach was subscribed to by John Dewey 
in his early years, and later he seemed more convinced than 
ever that moral values arise in organic evolution, that nat-
ural-born intelligence is the key to the formulation of these 
values. This Deweyan juxtaposition of intelligence and 
morality is a significant sign of things to come-a pragmatic 
clue to the problem of how to develop responsible persons. 
There are at least four important planks in the pragmatic 
platform which support a twentieth century progressive pro-
gram for developing responsibility in the learner. The first 
is the assumption that satisfaction is the final goal of the 
human organism. Whereas some of the older traditions em-
phasized happiness as a kind of satisfaction derived through 
the exercise of reason, the pragmatist follows the lead of the 
Epicurean and the utilitarian who emphasize the hedonistic 
idea of pleasure as the end. ·whereas some of the philoso-
phers like Kant emphasized duty rationally understood, the 
pragmatist considers man a goal-seeking animal, and in this 
sense sensual satisfaction seems necessarily the only scien-
tifically understandable end for man, particularly since the 
whole significance of man's existence is to be found within 
the natural continuum. It is nothing less than a utilitarian 
assumption that basically all conduct is determined by the 
expectation of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. In the 
final analysis satisfaction must be the basis of ethical formu-
lations. There is no absolute moral code, and the problem 
of morals must essentially be a matter of taste. 
All organisms are goal-seeking. The natural bent toward 
satisfaction of desires is normal and good. The moral prob-
lem arises when there is a conflict between goals. The strong 
impulses of the organism toward gratification of wants are 
intense natural drives toward the fulfillment of what seems 
important, what gives the greatest satisfaction. Man, how-
A Progressive Solution 25 
ever, is not to capitulate to a crude kind of satisfaction, thus 
inviting dire consequences. Nature has provided a way of 
escape from a gross hedonism in the development of human 
intelligence. By intelligence it is possible for a man to eval-
uate consequences and to choose the long term rather than 
the short term satisfaction. 
The relationship between satisfaction and the develop-
ment of responsibility is more direct than might be supposed, 
according to the pragmatic interpretation. To phrase it in 
the graphic terms of William Clayton Bower, it is when 
you get the "feel" of a value that it grips you, and you are 
motivated by your desire (autonomous motivation) to close 
the gap between that which is and that which ought to be.2 
Laurence Sears, in accord with the pragmatic tradition of 
experimentation, has actually made empirical studies of the 
relationship between satisfaction and responsibility. Sears 
came to the conclusion, based upon a number of case studies, 
that persons tend to develop responsibility in higher levels 
of conduct when they discover satisfaction accruing from it. 
Satisfaction derived from intelligent activity is a spur toward 
responsible activity. Actually, intelligent activity is respon-
sible activity, and the satisfaction derived from it develops 
the habit of responsibility. The final test is living-whether 
it is more satisfactory. The more satisfactory life as a conse-
quence of action is the guide for further responsible activity. 
A second basic theme which is central in the pragmatic 
solution to the problem of developing responsibility is the 
concept of experience-the conscious interaction of the or-
ganism with its environment. Experience is interaction, and 
interaction is synonymous with activity. Activity in the pro-
gressive sense is the foundation of the good life. Indeed, 
"the kingdom of God cometh not with observation."3 Moral 
virtue comes not from divine authority, or laws rationally 
2 William Clayton Bower in a class discussion at the University of Ken-
tucky, Summer, 1951. 
3Luke 17:20. 
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supported, or law enforcement based upon enlightened self-
interest, or deification of state, but from social interaction, 
meaningful activity, experience. The problem of responsi-
bility centers not in the person or in law, but in the environ-
ment, or more technically, in organismic-environmental in-
teractions. The significant task involved is environmental 
conversion rather than personal conversion. 
The long history of the evolution of an individual is a 
story about the interaction of organism with environment, 
and the history of the development of moral responsibility 
is logically a continuation of the same process. If the con-
tinuing evolution of man demonstrates anything at all, it 
points up the fact that even genuine knowledge and fruitful 
understanding have their origin in experience, interaction, 
doing. "If, as Mead has pointed out, the self is a social 
product, and, as Henry Churchill King once suggested, the 
richness and quality of one's life consists of the number of 
relations one discerns and fulfills, the interaction of the 
growing person with his social world is a most fertile source 
of moral and spiritual values."4 
When learning from life situations becomes the basis of 
education, it becomes inquiry, investigation, and choosing 
between available courses of action. This kind of education 
with its ever present emphasis upon the element of decision-
choices between options and their relationships to conse-
quences-involves the essence of responsible activity. 
John Dewey contends with remarkable consistency that 
one cannot divorce the good or bad person from the environ-
ment. The development of the good persons depends upon 
a good environment. As the flower seed in the desert cannot 
fulfill its destiny except someone change its arid environ-
ment, so the human individual cannot fulfill his moral 
capacities except his environment is modified accordingly. 
A miracle is not necessary to grow a flower in the desert or 
4 William Clayton Bower, Moral and Spiritual Values in Education (Lex-
ington, 1952), 51. 
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to develop an individual who is morally responsible, but 
both require, primarily, the intelligent reconstruction of the 
environment. 
The concept of the "good" itself is the product of experi-
ence, and being experientially derived, it is relative, varying 
with the situation. Rather than a unified law of the "good" 
there are "goods" or values, and these values reside in ex-
perience. They do not inhere in an external or supernal 
authority but grow out of experience and re-enter experi-
ence. 
This dominant emphasis on experience constitutes the 
theoretical framework of the widely publicized "Kentucky 
Movement" fathered philosophically by William Clayton 
Bower, professor emeritus of The University of Chicago 
Theological School. This movement has clearly recognized 
the desperate need in public education for a means of de-
veloping values to substitute for the older value supports 
which have to some extent crumbled. In a sense there is in 
the public schools, according to the pragmatists, a kind of 
moral vacuum existing during this transition from the earlier 
age supported ethically by a divine authority and the coming 
age which requires a new kind of moral support more in 
harmony with the scientific spirit. 
The Kentucky Movement, realistically appraising the 
breakdown of traditional moral supports, proceeds on the 
basis of a new assumption, namely, that value can be dis-
covered in the routine experience of the school community. 
Values are potentially present in all experience. Where a 
situation is evaluated and decided upon, there values ap-
pear. These values are ethically significant, but they do not 
necessarily derive their significance from theological sup-
port. Rather they are discovered and validated intelligently, 
always subject to the test of experience. Any virtue can be 
validated only by trying it out intelligently. When a learner 
in activity faces an alternative choice, which is continually 
the case in an ideal pragmatic educational setting, he de-
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cides (ideally speaking) in terms of his fullest intelligence, 
and it is the decision in terms of intelligence which is the 
basis for the development of the responsible individual. 
Actually, any other understanding of the basis of morality 
is in itself immoral, since it fails to consider the individual 
as an end in himself possessing within himself the right of 
freedom of choice. An attempt at indoctrination, for ex-
ample, disregards the freedom of choosing and eventually 
weakens the habit of "responsibly" making choices and re-
sponsibly acting in terms of those choices. The richer the 
program of educational activities, the more intelligent the 
learner becomes. The higher the intelligence, resulting from 
meaningful interactions with the environment, the more 
satisfactory the choices are. The more satisfactory these 
choices, the more moral they are. The greater the exercise 
in moral choices, as a result of an activity program in edu-
cation, the more developed is the learner's habit of being 
responsible. Thus, through intelligence developed and re-
constructed continually through activity which is meaningful 
interaction with the environment, it becomes possible for 
persons to learn more and more what "ought" to be. Intel-
ligence becomes the dynamic support of responsible conduct. 
Intelligence is the "essence of virtue, as it is of responsi-
bility."5 
As was mentioned previously, John Dewey early in his 
writings identified morals with intelligence, classifying both 
as products of experience-interaction with the environment. 
Education conceived as guided experience is therefore basi-
cally moral activity, developing in the learner a natural kind 
of conscience holding him accountable to his society. Dewey's 
book Reconstruction in Philosophy is dedicated to the theme 
that intelligence realized as the scientific method has revo-
lutionized man's physical world, and in like manner intel-
ligence realized ethically should result in a moral revolution 
5 Laurence Sears, Responsibility: Its Development Through Punishment 
and Reward (New York, 1932), 191. 
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providing the outstanding scientific advancement m the 
twentieth century. 
This progressive persuasion that values are resident in 
experience (that is to say, experience within the natural 
continuum) is the contemporary scientific basis for a new 
education fulfilling requirements for modern man in the 
new age. Youth nurtured in experimental methods will re-
ject authoritarianism and supernaturalism in favor of the 
assumption that "to be moral you must be intelligent, and 
. . . in order to be intelligent you have to take critical ac-
count of actual alternatives."6 Natural intelligence and the 
scientific method become the modern supplanters of the 
older ethical authorities. Natural intelligence operating in 
the field of experience takes on a religious aspect as choices 
between options involve choices between values. Things 
are not good or bad in themselves but as they are of value 
in satisf]'ing the wants of individuals. When a want is dis-
covered to have worth, it becomes a value. Each individual 
should choose between possible courses of action so as to 
promote the good life for all persons, and such choices are 
moral. The intelligent choice is made in terms of conse-
quences, and to act in the light of an understanding of con-
sequences fundamentally involves the principle of responsi-
bility. The intelligent understanding of consequences is the 
best insurance for responsible action. This concept dignifies 
and deepens the meaning of responsibility as compared to 
the naive choice between alternatives based upon some au-
thoritative decree. 
Consequences cannot be separated from conditions. J udg-
ments about values cannot be separated from judgments 
about facts. Intelligence and moral judgment are united in 
common embrace, committed to the development of the 
responsible individual. Growth in intelligence implies a 
concomitant growth in moral perspicuity. 
6 Childs, Education and Morals, 168-69. 
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A third feature of the pragmatic ideal intimately related 
to the problem of developing responsible persons is the 
progressivist explanation of the will, or more explicitly, the 
freedom of the will. This is an essential problem in the 
light of the pragmatic insistence that intelligent choices are 
basically important in the development of responsibility. 
The human will in the modern sense is not understood 
as a special kind of entity which enables a person to decide 
on a certain course of action, but rather as an intelligent 
response to the particular alternative path which exerts the 
most "pull" on the person because it offers the best conse-
quences. Hence the idea of the will as a "push" within the 
person is supplanted with an emphasis on the "pull" of the 
environment and the response of the organism to this pull. 
The moral exercise of the will is really an intellectually con-
trolled response to one of several possible choices. 
"Freedom" of the will appears at that point where intel-
ligence assumes control. The pragmatic universe, open and 
dynamic, allows for an infinite variety of new relationships 
within the natural flux. Anything can happen. There are 
no universal laws or foreordained guiding principles or 
supernatural providences. As intelligence emerges in this 
kind of a world, it becomes possible to fore-evaluate the 
results of new relationships and new interactions in the 
environment. Intelligence with its prognosticating faculty 
can foresee; foreseeing, it controls and regulates interactions 
in favor of preferred consequences. 
This is human freedom based upon human intelligence 
controlling the environment. Men acquire freedom from 
disease not by praying to an unseen power but through the 
intellectual control of the environment. Men acquire free-
dom from poverty and slavish conditions not by singing 
spirituals but through the intellectually guided revision of 
the environment, producing scientifically the methods and 
the machinery which dissipate these evils. Nature in her 
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unregulated course tends to enslave man. Intelligence re-
verses the process and enslaves nature, making man free. 
Human intelligence is the foundation of human freedom. 
Freedom has its source in nature, or rather in intelligence, 
which is nature's highest purposive expression. "Our acts 
are free ... because they are becoming intelligent . ... We 
become free as we learn to think."1 
The naive organism through natural desire seeks after 
satisfaction. The intelligent organism contemplates the con-
sequences of its desired ends and controls the movement of 
the organism toward the fulfillment of its desires. The more 
complete the intellectual control, the greater are the divi-
dends in human freedom. The greater the consciousness of 
human freedom, the greater the sense of responsibility for 
the choice of consequences. Intellectually man becomes 
aware of his free control of means toward new ends, and 
intellectually he realizes his responsibility for those ends. 
The exercise of intelligence naturally develops the habit 
of responsibility. 
And finally there is the pragmatic ideal of fellowship 
which lies at the heart of the progressive solution to the 
problem of community, which is in turn inseparably related 
to the problem of responsibility: the relationship of the one 
to the many-the ideal relationship of the citizen to his 
neighbors. 
For the pragmatist the narrow, unactive life is the sinful 
life. The interactive, responsive life is the good life. Given 
the element of "sympathy" in human nature which supports 
the bent toward community, it follows that the emphasis of 
a never ending variety of enriching interactive experiences 
exercising and intellectualizing the inherent "sympathy" in 
man should provide the natural basis for human fellowship. 
An active life involving all manner of contacts with all man-
ner and conditions of men should deepen a man's sympa-
7 Childs, 151. 
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thetic understanding of his neighbor and his neighbor's 
views on life. A truly broadened understanding of other 
men through a life of activity and association with other 
men should prove a most effective and natural antidote to 
intolerance and human conflict. It is ignorance which sep-
arates men and causes them to act irresponsibly one toward 
another. By contrast, the self in continuous formation 
through its choices and interactions with persons and things 
becomes a wider and larger self, which implies the inclusion 
rather than the denial of enriching relationships. 
The pragmatic concept of the democratic way of life pro-
vides the richest ground for the development of the ideal 
of fellowship. With democracy in action every person shares 
in the experiences, purposes, and responsibilities of the 
group. Group activity places a premium upon the inter-
action of persons as they are engaged in the accomplishment 
of a common goal. Every person in a democracy is a re-
sponsible sharer with others in the whole venture. An in-
dividual grows in personal responsibility as he realizes in a 
concrete manner the approval and the disapproval of the 
group in regard to his actions. Irresponsible action incurs 
group disapproval. Responsible action receives group ap-
proval. The sense of satisfaction which results from group 
approval develops the habit of acting responsibly. In this 
way the learner discovers through experience that his "deeds 
are imputed to him as their owner, not merely their creator. 
That he cannot disown them when the moment of their 
occurrence passes is the root of responsibility, moral as well 
as legal."8 
As a final observation it seems practical to pose the ques-
tion: How does this solution actually work in practice? 
What is a practical example of the pragmatic solution to 
the problem of developing responsibility actually taking 
place in the educative process? 
8 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1922), 117. 
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Possibly no more realistic and critical problem could be 
suggested than that of irresponsible race relationships which 
are notoriously evident in many segments of contemporary 
American society. ·what in this instance is the pragmatic 
solution? How are irresponsible relationships supplanted 
with the desired responsible associations between two un-
harmoniously related classes of individuals in a community, 
separated often by high walls of prejudice and misunder-
standing? 
Pragmatists believe that the school constitutes the medium 
in which the solution may best take place. Certainly the 
church as a social institution has seriously faltered in the 
face of this problem. In fact the church often is reactionary 
and impedes the progress toward better race relationships. 
Since, therefore, theological dicta are generally disqualified 
by the evidence of the poor works which flow from them, 
the pragmatist has a strong incentive to look elsewhere. And 
of course the "elsewhere" for the pragmatist is "experience." 
Proper experiences, as the basis, are the first requirement. 
The school provides a deliberate field of experiences which 
bear upon the problem. Since one cannot have experience 
without experiences, the actual guided interactions between 
races must take place within the school community. At least 
it is at this point that the start must be made. The multipli-
cation of interracial experiences results in an expansion of 
intelligence which includes the intellectual appreciation of 
the other race. As children become more racially intelligent, 
they become more racially understanding-their sympathies 
are multiplied and refined. On the other hand, the multi-
plication of experiences and the expansion of intelligence 
for the so-called inferior group results in a freedom from 
ignorance which previously narrowed and enslaved them. 
The growth on their part in freer participation in the school 
community activity adds to the breadth of understanding 
and appreciation of all. Experience and intelligence are the 
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basis of a genuine fellowship which can literally transcend 
the prejudicial ignorance-supported barriers of race. The 
foundation and the means to the solution of proper rela-
tionships between classes are actually to be found in the 
school environment where the young may grow naturally 
and wholesomely into attitudes of responsiveness toward, 
rather than divisiveness among, different kinds of peoples. 
Of course, pragmatically this is a hypothesis until it has been 
tested in actual experience. Yet, a widely developed intelli-
gence suggests that this hypothesis is a good risk. Should the 
assumption prove valid in practice, the community will have 
moved one definite step forward in its moral venture, where-
upon it proceeds to fulfill even greater responsibilities in 
the light of its reconstructed understanding of moral obli-
gations. 
In the final analysis it seems that the prime recurring em-
phasis of the pragmatist is the doctrine that the individual 
educated in a democratized and socialized environment is 
thereby enhanced with a natural intelligence which has the 
capacity of taking into account the consequences of acts, and 
this capacity provides the genuine basis of all responsible 
activity. To fulfill the pragmatic ideal of the intelligent 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Classical Humanism in Outline 
Is THERE or is there not a realm of law above the natural 
continuum discoverable to man? Does the law already exist, 
or does man make his own laws? The conflicting answers to 
these questions by the pragmatists and the classical humanists 
result in seemingly irreconcilable deadlocks involving basic 
cleavages concerning the nature of man's mind and the 
nature of the universe. 
Outstanding in this controversial area is the question of 
ends. The Dewey philosophy strikes the classical humanist 
as comparable to a beautiful ship which sets out to sea piloted 
by an intelligent skipper who is unusually capable of steer-
ing the vessel into pleasurable waters and keeping it off reefs 
and shoals, but who is seemingly free from the obligation 
of docking at any specific port. He just sails hither and 
thither through the trackless seas without any goal. The 
main weakness of the pragmatist, says Jacques Maritain, is 
the exaltation of means over ends. Actually the pragmatic 
means are generally much better than those of the old peda-
gogues. The misfortune is that the pragmatist has lost sight 
of the end of education, and this is cause for great alarm. 
These basic discords in education so intense today are 
really a continuation of a similar conflict which had already 
plagued the ancient Greeks. This sharp difference in think-
ing is highlighted by the debate between Socrates and the 
sophists. The main question: Is truth universal or relative? 
The sophists held that moral values are dependent largely 
upon the subjective reaction of the individual and that the 
utilitarian motive should be considered by the philosopher. 
These views the classic philosophers set themselves to refute, 
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and so came into existence the matchless philosophical doc-
trines of Plato and Aristotle. 
Classical humanism today considers its task analogous to 
that of Plato and Aristotle, responding to the contemporary 
call to rescue civilization from the same relativism which 
engulfed the ancients. Once again it is urgently necessary 
to discover those eternal principles which objectively sub-
stantiate the nature of the universe and of man, because as 
it is now, men "measuring themselves by themselves and 
comparing themselves among themselves are not wise."1 
Humanity cannot save itself without the rediscovery of the 
universal principles which undergird it. "As a fact," wrote 
Josiah Royce, "what you and I .really most need and desire 
is not the new, not yet the old. It is the eternal."2 
The times are critical, says Robert M. Hutchins, because 
men are no longer prepared to defend principles. Intellec-
tual leaders, in fact, deny principles. Hardly anything re-
mains but opinion, and everyone feels he is entitled to his 
own. There is no difference between good and bad, only 
between expediency and inexpediency. There are no morals, 
only folkways. Men are not different from animals, and it 
seems that the main aim of men today, as with animals, is 
subsistence and material comfort. "The only common prin-
ciple is that there are no principles at all."3 
The pragmatist in the twentieth century like the sophist 
in the fifth century B.c. (with a scientific evolutionary and 
biological support which the ancient sophist did not have) 
claims again that there is nothing settled in the universe and 
that uncertainty is the only certainty, that nature is constant 
flux and man himself is a natural product of this flux. The 
classical humanist today like the classical philosopher of 
antiquity flies directly into the teeth of such beliefs about 
the nature of the universe and the nature of man. The clas-
1 II Corinthians 10:12. 
2 Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought, 270. 
3 Robert M. Hutchins, Education for Freedom (Baton Rouge, 1943), 90-93. 
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sicist argues that although nature is constantly changing on 
the surface, there is an inner immaterial reality which is 
eternal and unchanging, that above the world of sense there 
are eternal laws governing the universe. The order of the 
universe is discovered, not created, by man. Truth is there-
fore always the same, yesterday, today, and forever. It is 
within man's province to apprehend it, and this he does 
through the exercise of his reason. 
Man's reasoning ability is not a product of biological evo-
lution but the expression of the divine spark within man; 
it is the divine in him which exists above the natural flux, 
is "supernatural" even though immanent. By virtue of this 
immanent spiritual faculty a man may pursue intellectually 
the quest for the true, the good, the beautiful, the eternal 
and unchanging principles of the universe. It follows that 
education must primarily be concerned with the reasoning 
powers of man because these powers are what distinguish 
him from brutes. The mind of man is an immaterial reason-
ing faculty, and it is the major task of education to strengthen 
and to discipline this faculty. 
For the classical humanist, the discoverable order in the 
universe gives man access to an authority which is clear-cut 
and unwavering. It is an authority which has developed 
through man's use of his reason, perennially searching for 
the principles of truth and dealing with the recurring prob-
lems of man throughout his history. This quest for truth 
has uncovered many principles which today as always are 
applicable and authoritative. 
In the processes of education, therefore, it is not necessary 
to substitute the elusive element of pragmatic "interest" in 
place of traditional discipline and authority. The wisdom 
of the ages, in addition to its own intrinsic values, is. an ever 
fresh form of discipline which sharpens the reasoning pow-
ers of the learner. In fact the pragmatic revolt against all 
manner of traditional authority is in essence the crisis in 
education today. The modern movement is the assertion 
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that one attains the more abundant life by getting rid of the 
"don'ts." It is the peculiar responsibility of the classical 
humanist to reinsert into the educational realm a rational and 
proper authority which forestalls an otherwise inevitable 
chaos. Reason must counteract the present easy habit of 
adaptation to the influences of the changing environment by 
reassuring men that there are in the universe dependable 
and eternal laws by which they may govern and discipline 
themselves. The alternative is anarchy, which is the breed-
ing ground of totalitarianisms. 
That is why authority in the classical humanist view as-
sumes such an important part of the educational program. 
Human nature insists upon some kind of authoritative in-
gredient in human society so that it may hold together. The 
classical concept of authority is the proper authority be-
cause it is truth in the form of principles rationally discov-
ered. The subject matter is properly authoritative because 
it is the wisdom of the ages. The teacher is properly authori-
tative because he is disciplined in the wisdom of the ages. 
It is the aim of education, in this setting, "to see the vision 
of excellence ... to get at least a glimpse of unchanging 
values of the eternal world."4 
The classical humanist is gravely concerned with the prag-
matic disregard for traditional authorities, especially in the 
light of the question to what authority do those in greatest 
power obligate themselves. (And today this question be-
comes more acute than ever, since men are endowed with 
greater power than heretofore known.) If men with power 
find themselves subject to no law higher than themselves, 
what is to happen? The parallel progression of an increasing 
power in the hands of men and an increasing relativistic 
concept about the control of such power leads to serious 
dangers, not the least of which is the eventual denial of the 
rights of minorities and individuals. 
4 Richard W. Livingstone, Some Tasks for Education (London, 1946), 50. 
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To speak of law and power easily involves the question 
of government. Both the pragmatist and the classical hu-
manist are stanch advocates of the democratic form of gov-
ernment. But again their concepts of democracy separate 
along the same lines of disagreement about basic principles 
and ends. The concept of democracy which is supported by 
the pragmatist is of a Rousseauistic bent, equalitarian, where-
in sovereignty resides clearly in the will of the people. It is 
this form of democracy which has become to some extent a 
pragmatic religion in support of some of the modern recon-
structionist educational methods. Democracy in this sense 
is primarily a sharing principle involving all persons in all 
institutions, including the schools. 
In contradistinction to this equalitarian concept of democ-
racy the classical humanists subscribe to a form of democratic 
government, and an ordering of the whole of society, which 
specifically acknowledges the hierarchical element. Plato, 
Aristotle, and even Thomas 1 efferson seem to share in the 
common conviction that a pure equalitarian radical form 
of democracy can only disintegrate into mediocrity, cor-
ruption, anarchy, tyranny. Society, according to the human-
ist conviction, even in its most democratic forms needs the 
guidance and direction of the elite. A progressive society 
needs a creative minority. Arnold J. Toynbee, the eminent 
British historian, refers continually to the creative element 
in growing societies which sets the pace for the masses which 
mimic. 1 efferson, democratic though he was, insisted that 
leadership should be constituted of the natural aristoi who 
are best able to govern wisely and well. A democratically 
organized group does not by any means imply that just any-
body governs, or that everybody equally shares in the process 
of governing. The intellectually elite should be assigned to 
the responsibilities of leadership, accountable, of course, to 
all of the people. In the final analysis the reason of the elite 
is judged more trustworthy than the general will of the 
people. 
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This same principle applies for the humanist in the edu-
cational scheme. Equalitarianism here too can only result 
in mediocrity. Therefore, the element of quality must be 
properly acknowledged in educational procedure. A proper 
understanding of the nature of man clearly shows him relat-
ed hierarchically to the environment which surrounds him. 
Furthermore, his nature reveals within itself an ordered 
arrangement with the rational standing above the appetitive 
impulses. This description of the nature of man can hardly 
imply anything less than a hierarchical arrangement of his 
educational setup, in contrast with the equalitarian, radical 
form of democracy which seems logically to lead to a com-
plete leveling of education. When this leveling trend be-
comes too widespread, it is the state which usurps the control 
and the power to make decisions as to what is good, politi-
cally and educationally, for the people. This kind of control 
by the state heralds the decline of any way of life dedicated 
to the principles of individual freedoms and rights. 
Another area of sharp disagreement between the classical 
humanist and the pragmatist has to do with the emphasis 
on contemplation and activity. The pragmatist interprets 
activity as significant only as it involves the whole person, 
and the classical humanist interprets rational activity quite 
different. Since rational activity or contemplation is the 
highest activity of the educated man, the classical humanist 
considers the preservation of the cloister against the deluge 
of physical activity one of the most important tasks of edu-
cation.5 
One has only to look at the Middle Ages, says the human-
ist, to discover the tremendous spiritual power which was 
generated by persons who were interested in "being" even 
to the exclusion of "doing." Those groups cultivated monas-
ticism and discovered hidden sources of spiritual power. 
Activity is obviously important, but activity can find its 
5 T. S. Eliot, Essays Ancient and Modern (London, 1947), 184. 
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proper aim and meaning much more effectively if it is cor-
related with times of withdrawal. The present danger is 
the trend toward unexamined activity, and it is the task of 
the classical humanist to reiterate the age-old knowledge that 
activity in the grosser sense must be balanced with the higher 
activity of the soul. Interaction with the environment and 
group activity are all worthy ingredients of the good life, 
but there is also the need for contemplation. 
For the classical humanist it is important to outline a 
program of education which properly recognizes the need 
for "withdrawal" as well as "return."6 An educational pro-
gram should recognize the importance of activity in the 
pragmatic sense of the word, but it must lay even greater 
stress on the higher activity of reason lest action becomes 
shallow of meaning. Those who would be most effective in 
the world of action must first submit themselves to disciplines 
which develop the reasoning powers of the young. 
The approach of the classical humanist to education is 
based on universal basic principles and ends, which supply 
the guidance necessary for the proper choices of means. 
Education must be concerned with activity, of course, but 
this activity requires knowledge of ends to be sought and 
means to be used. To discover the ends of education we 
must learn what constitutes the educated man. All education 
of immature persons must be subordinated to this end, be-
cause educational ends are concerned with the actualization 
of man's capacities. The primary factor involved in the 
educational fulfillment of man's end is the formation of 
good habits. Good habits lead to happiness, which is the 
final end of man. Good habits conform to the natural tend-
ency of the human power they develop. Good habits are 
virtues. Virtues are the means to the ultimate-happiness.7 
"Education is the process by which those powers (abili-
6 Phrase borrowed from Arnold J. Toynbee. 
7 Greek point of view emphasized by Mortimer Adler. 
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ties, capacities) of men that are susceptible to habituation 
are perfected by good habits through means artistically con-
trived and emphasized by any man to help another, or him-
self achieve the end in view."8 There are certain truths, 
either self-evident or capable of demonstration, about man. 
One of these truths is that man is always everywhere the 
same, and consequently the ultimate end of all men is always 
everywhere the same. Therefore, good habits (the virtues) 
are the same for all men, and education (the formation of 
these good habits) is always the same everywhere for all men. 
8 Mortimer Adler, "In Defence of the Philosophy of Education," in National 
Society for the Study of Education, Philosophies of Education (Chicago, 1942), 
209. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
A Greek Concept of the Nature of Man 
How CAN we consider man's destiny unless we ask what 
he is? asks the classical humanist. For him more than for any 
other educator, perhaps, the nature of man is consistently 
a primary theme, because the purposes of education are 
fixed by the nature of man. Of course the classical humanist 
is by no means singular in his preoccupation with man's 
nature, for this problem is also central with men of sociologi-
cal, psychological, and anthropological bent. For the classi-
cal humanist the safest way of escape from this contemporary 
whirl of intellectual and scientific crosscurrents is a return 
to the ancients, appropriating their wisdom as a foundation 
for understanding. To try to fathom man's nature is in any 
case a difficult task, and often philosophers have been lured 
into romantic or positivistic aberrations which lead to em-
phasizing some particular aspect of human nature. But 
again and again there is the return to the wisdom of the 
ancients with their time-tested approaches to this funda-
mental problem. 
The pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, although they were 
primarily concerned with the discovery of general under-
lying principles in the physical world, provided important 
groundwork for an eventual Greek discovery of the signifi-
cance of the individual. This new emphasis upon the im-
portance of the individual appears remarkable against the 
backdrop of a widespread primitive viewpoint which under-
stood the individual primarily in terms of the collective-
the tribe or the community. 
Following the pre-Socratic philosophers with their con-
cern about cosmology, Greek philosophy moved toward a 
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deeper concern about man himself. This concern was al-
ready being felt in many fields: in literature, in the new 
democratic political order, and surely in the influential 
teaching of a new group of philosophers called sophists. But 
the sophists made man "the measure of all things," and this 
relativistic outlook finally began to endanger the religious 
and social conventions of Greek society. 
At this point Plato and Aristotle appeared to lead the 
attack upon the disruptive relativism of the sophists. Sophis-
tic relativism assumed that all is flux and process, and that 
any God whatsoever to be found in that process is in it and 
not above it. The earlier myths in their naivete were unable 
to withstand the deteriorating skepticisms of the sophists, 
and Plato set himself to the task of renewing the religious 
support of his society by refining its theological foundations 
through the discovery of the divine Universal. 
Here is raised the question of whether the Greek humanis-
tic concept of man was fundamentally anthropocentric or 
theocentric. It was Plato's purpose to rescue his civilization 
from the man-measure-minded sophists and to provide his 
culture with the highest end which was unchanging-God. 
But many men have held that in the end man himself-or 
rather man's reason-still remained the measure. 
To make "God the measure" not only dignified man, since 
it gave a divine aspect to his nature, but also dignified edu-
cation, because education (paideia) was cast for the role of 
developing man into the image of the divine. The true 
education was the path toward the fulfillment of the divine 
ideal-assimilation toward God. The Greek ideal founded 
education upon "God as the measurement." 
This interpretation of the Greek concept of man relates 
closely, at first glance, to the Christian idea of man's creation 
in the image of God. Certainly it seems that both the Bibli-
cal and the Greek Logos stand opposed to sophistic rela-
tivism. Undoubtedly, however, there are radical differences 
in the Greek theology and Biblical theology. In the first 
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place, with the Greeks man's reason is the basic means for 
the discovery of God, while in the Christian sense God dis-
covers himself to man through revelation. In the second 
place, the God of the Greeks was a kind of "unpersonalized 
Logos" in comparison to the personal God of Christianity 
made manifest in the flesh through Jesus Christ. But in 
either case, man in the image of God, Greek or Christian, 
possesses a humanity which is not the essence of the natural 
world but of a supernatural order. Plato plainly states that 
the human race naturally partakes of immortality,1 and Aris-
totle comments that "of all animals man alone stands erect, in 
accordance with his god-like nature and essence."2 To this 
may be added the observation of Plato that men "imitating 
him [God] received from him the immortal principle of 
the soul."3 Man is differentiated with rational "being" re-
sembling the being of God the Infinite, and this is what 
makes man human. Man in his irrational state resembles the 
beasts; education cultivates his reason and brings him closer 
to the rational principle which is God. Though the Chris-
tian humanist is in one important sense at odds with the 
Greek emphasis upon Logos, it is quite evident that the 
emphasis on the transcendence of the spirit was a point of 
attraction between the humanists of both orders. 
Returning again to the classical emphasis: Man is human 
because he is spiritual, and so he can be free, since the spirit, 
the immaterial, is not subject to the determinations of the 
natural world. Man's freedom inheres in his spiritual nature, 
and it is this freedom which dignifies him as a person who 
can think, choose, and will. Were this not so, he would not 
be different from the animals which inhabit the earth. To 
deny this spiritual quality of man's being is to reduce him 
to an enslavement by the world of things, by the collective 
body, by the changing whims of the times. This is not to 
say that man is not also animal. He is in fact a son of earth, 
1 Laws, Bk. IV, 721. 2 Parts of Animals, 686a 29 (Oxford trans.). 
3 Timaeus, 69 (B. Jowett trans.). 
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but he is also a son of heaven because he is a rational animal. 
The body may be animal, but the soul is divine. 
This belief that man is human because he is the bearer 
of divine reason leads to an exclusive emphasis in man's 
relationship to the rest of nature and to a hierarchical ar-
rangement within his own nature. Because man belongs to 
two worlds, he has two distinct elements in his human na-
ture: the body, which is identifiable with the senses, the 
passions, the less noble; and the mind, the reason, the divine, 
which is the more noble. And obviously for the Greeks the 
mind stands at the top in this ordering of man's nature. 
Reason in man must necessarily preside; reason sits in the 
driver's seat and directs the activities of the lesser faculties. 
If the hierarchy is deranged and the lower faculties gain 
control, man loses the truly human qualities of his nature. 
The animal part of man is considered accidental, temporal, 
particular, while the soul-the organ of reason-is the ground 
of his divinely constituted personality. 
With Plato and Aristotle the hierarchical principle not 
only involved man's relationship to nature and man's quali-
ties of mind, but also the relationship of man to man. Just 
as virtues were ordered into degrees of value, so society was 
ordered into classes. At the top were the philosophers, the 
elite, then the warrior class, then the tradesmen and the 
artisans, and at the bottom the slaves. Slaves had practically 
no political or social rights, and foreigners were thought of 
as barbarians. However, the Stoics later carried the ideas 
of Plato and Aristotle to more logical conclusions, teaching 
that all men possess the divine spark. This new concept of 
humanity leaped the boundaries of class and learning. Hu-
manity became a truly universal idea. Once it was assumed 
that all men shared in a universal principle which made 
them human, the way was open for a spirit of cosmopolitan-
ism and a trend toward humane ideals characteristic of clas-
sical humanism throughout the centuries. 
A Greek Concept of Man 49 
The stoic concept of a universal principle which unites 
all mankind and supports ideal relationships between all 
men made possible a flowing together of Greek philosophy 
and early Christian theology, and these two streams later 
were joined in Thomas Aquinas, who synthesized the domi-
nant features of Aristotelianism with the medieval Christian 
faith. Yet, according to Emil Brunner, the union of these 
two streams in Thomism was only apparent; there was 
throughout the Middle Ages a close association of Greek 
and Christian elements but never a truly inner fusion, mainly 
because at the source of each philosophical stream there 
existed a radically different concept of man's nature, as will 
be shown in a later section. With the Renaissance and the 
Reformation the two streams became again clearly distin-
guishable. The Renaissance was a renewal of the Greek 
ideal of the rational man, and on the other hand the Refor-
mation, revolting against Scholasticism, reverted to the early 
church understanding of the personal nature of man in the 
light of his peculiar relationship to God the Creator. 
The elaboration of the nature of man sooner or later in-
volves the perennially difficult problem of evil and its rela-
tionship to man's nature. And any philosophy of education 
which pretends to be concerned with morality must also 
carefully consider this same perennial problem. 
The Greek concept of the nature of evil is usually an em-
phasis upon the principle of privation or incompleteness of 
being. The source of evil is related to the idea of nonbeing. 
Evil becomes a possibility in relation to potential being 
which is not yet actual or complete. Evil, according to 
Aristotle, is not a necessary feature of the universe, but rather 
the result of the potential not becoming the actual.4 And 
with Plato and his successors there is the implication that 
the physical body is evil as contrasted with the purity of the 
spirit. Man's evil is the result of the admixture of matter in 
4 W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1930), 178. 
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him.5 Hence a soul and body dualism where the soul is good 
and the body, being matter, is evil, a tomb in which the 
spirit is imprisoned. A man overcomes his evil and his de-
privation by partaking of the spirit. The divinity is of heav-
enly growth-whoever gets the divine element attains the 
perfect life. The confusion of the senses is finally overcome 
by rational control. The evil in man results from his de-
privation of knowledge. 
In the Thomistic synthesis of Greek philosophy, particu-
larly Aristotelian, and the Christian faith, this idea of evil 
as privation or negation continued to be a basic tenet. The 
Christian philosophers, particularly Augustine, translated 
the principle of privation to mean a recession from a state 
of perfection as compared to the Aristotelian concept of 
evil as that which had not yet attained the ideal. Whereas 
the medieval Christian view conceived the privation of man's 
nature as a movement from the top down, the Greeks un-
derstood evil as an evidence of an incompleteness of the 
movement toward fulfillment from the bottom upward. In 
the Greek sense a man was the victim of his passions because 
his reason had not developed to the point where it could 
control the passions and rightly direct them. A man was 
evil in the medieval Christian sense fundamentally because 
he had fallen from grace, from his state of perfection in 
which he was created. In both cases, however, evil essen-
tially was privation. 
Today the classical humanists quite readily acquiesce to 
the basic interpretations of the Greeks, particularly Aristotle, 
in the assumption that evil is privation. Mortimer Adler 
states the matter simply when he says that the good is con-
vertible with being, which in turn seems to imply that evil 
is somehow involved in nonbeing. This is one reason for 
the basic affinity between the Thomists and the classical 
humanists in contemporary education, though they may not 
5 Statesman, 273. 
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agree on many points theologically. The rational activity 
of man reflects his divinity, and his irrationalities are evi-
dences of his ignorance, of his incompleteness. The evil in 
man implies not necessarily depravity but rather privation. 
The classical humanist today, although in some respects 
on common ground with the Thomists, seems in the final 
analysis to cast his lot in favor of a classical metaphysics as 
the rock-bottom foundation. Robert Hutchins in his book 
The Higher Learning in America observes that for the con-
temporary university, theology has been almost completely 
discarded. "To look to theology to unify the modern uni-
versity is futile and vain."6 This does not imply that the-
ology should be degraded. The classical humanist should 
always respect theology. However, it is the Greek wisdom 
which offers the most consistent and surest support for the 
ordering of modern education. 
For the contemporary classical humanist there is, then, 
in the final analysis that universal within a man which pro-
vides the measure of all things. The eternal divine spark 
within him, his reason, provides the basis for interpreting 
the ceaseless activities of life which continually engulf him. 
Man sharing the Reason of the divine Logos discovers the 
key to human existence. But the Greek discovery of God 
is a movement from within man to God, as compared to the 
Christian theology, for example, which holds that in the 
final analysis God discovers himself to man. In this respect 
there is involved a deep cleavage between classical and Chris-
tian epistemologies: the conflict between reason and faith, 
between believing because we know and knowing because 
we believe. Understood in this light the distinctiveness of 
classical humanism in the twentieth century is incisive in 
its relationship to orthodox Christianity, with which it other-
wise shares a common conviction of the eternal and spiritual 
6 Robert M. Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America (New Haven, 
1936), 97. 
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nature of man in opposition to the current naturalistic 
philosophies. 
Classical humanism is dedicated to the idea that God is 
a spiritual principle and that this spiritual principle, active 
within human beings, distinguishes them from brutes. This 
divine principle in man provides the ends for man's educa-
tion. Everything in nature aims at its own perfection, and 
so it is with the nature of man. Education is committed to 
the actualization of man the potential, man the ignorant 
individual, man the incomplete individual. The end of 
man is his highest humanity, his happiness, which depends 
basically upon the fullest development of the divine reason 
within to apprehend the ultimate good. Man's rationality 
insures his unchangeableness of nature and the consistent 
ordering of all his activities toward his ultimate and un-
changing end. The means of educating him, therefore, de-
termined in the light of the end of man (which is unchang-
ing) may be quite graphically and clearly prescribed. Man 
is man by virtue of the divine reason immanent, and upon 
that norm educational procedures are built. 
CHAPTER SIX 
A Classical Solution to the Problem 
of Developing Responsibility 
SuRELY no phase of educational endeavor begins to com-
pare in importance with the moral aspect of education: the 
ordering of a program in terms of what is right and what is 
wrong, of what ought to be and what ought not to be. 
Ironically, in the face of this ever profound problem, edu-
cation currently seems hopelessly divided about the question 
of foundations for morals. At a time when education sorely 
needs a vigorous constructive approach to this problem, it 
finds its energies seriously dissipated because of its conflicting 
philosophies and ideals. 
The present moment in history presents a unique hazard 
because it is a time when man possesses the technological 
means to destroy his civilization at the shortest notice, and 
all the while the basis of moral action becomes more and 
more beclouded, every man doing more and more what 
seems right in his own eyes. Educators must somehow re-
discover and restate those universal principles by which men 
can lawfully compete with the tornadic impact of uncon-
trolled irrationality in the world. Already tragic is the 
insensitive disregard for those higher moral principles which 
through the long span of man's existence have been discov-
ered as ultimates, unchanging, eternal. Unless there is a 
moral and spiritual revolution matching the scope of scien-
tific and technological revolutions now taking place, civili-
zation cannot be saved.1 
1 The view of Robert M. Hutchins. 
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An extremely compelling evidence of the significance of 
the problem of responsibility in the contemporary world is 
the awful power now in human hands. Truly the scientists 
of the past two hundred years have demonstrated only too 
effectively that knowledge is power, but their works have 
also awakened within the hearts of men the growing convic-
tion that power does not necessarily mean freedom, as was 
so hopefully supposed earlier, but more probably bondage 
in the end. The naturalist and the pragmatist have spon-
sored their progressive control over the powers of nature 
with supreme optimism, being motivated by their ideals of 
service to man (as superseding the earlier ideals of service 
to God), but unfortunately a mass of evidence lately accu-
mulating shows that it is dangerous to confuse the will to 
power with the will to service. 
The deeper ground of responsible human relationships 
was passed over too casually. It was not realized that power 
over nature also meant power over other men, that through 
the natural order of things some men always seemed to ac-
quire more power than others, and that this implied not 
freedom but bondage for the masses. 
When political power becomes ultimate, to whom does 
the person in greatest power answer? If there be no laws 
which stand above all men, why should any man in power 
consider himself answerable? These are but a few implica-
tions of the problems faced by a society which exposes itself 
to the dangers of moral skepticism; here lies a danger for 
an education founded upon revolt against traditional au-
thorities. The philosophy of John Dewey, for example, 
radiates an assurance of progress: Knowledge is power, and 
power is freedom for all mankind. But his whole philosophy 
is energized with a faith in the natural continuum as the 
source of moral values. His views consistently exclude the 
reality, or even the possible validity, of laws which stand 
above men and nature. He has not presented an answer 
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to the problem of obligation, and in the peculiar status in 
which mankind now finds himself, what could be more 
important? The pragmatic sanctions seem prone in actual 
life to succumb to the rule of expediency-an expediency 
often motivated by no higher objective than the accumula-
tion of money and power. And why, realistically speaking, 
should this not naturally come to pass when men struggle 
for their existence in a world where expediency is the rule 
and spiritual realities are ignored? When men no longer 
consider themselves subject to higher moral or religious 
principles, there seems no longer an adequate defense against 
Machiavellianism. This is not to say that pragmatism lacks 
the will to do justice and to foster the spirit of brotherly 
love, but simply to point out that it does not possess the 
spiritual basis to fulfill its ideal. Pragmatism has grievously 
misunderstood the nature of man, and for this reason if no 
other, its position is insecure when confronted with the task 
of controlling men of power. And this problem of control 
and authority is, unfortunately, one of the most critical 
problems of the day. Pragmatism's peculiar weakness shows 
up at the point where only its greatest strength could suffice 
in the face of contemporary social and educational problems. 
Educators must realize once again that the idea of what 
ought to be cannot be derived from the environment. The 
moral ideas of "must" and "must not" (responsibility) are 
unexplainable naturally. v\lhenever man is objectified, treat-
ed as not distinctive from the natural continuum, the prin-
ciples of cause and effect destine him to act as does a machine, 
according to his construction, and then it is that the problem 
of responsibility is magnified a thousandfold. "Naturalistic 
determinism has not yet found a place for the concept of 
individual responsibility."2 
In the light of the contemporary crisis, the educational 
calling of the classical humanist is clear. He, like Plato and 
2 Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought, 381. 
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Aristotle, must restore the eternal and objective moral foun-
dations which have been severely weakened by the sophistic 
spirit pervading modern life. Once again men must learn, 
and learn quickly, that truth is eternal and unchanging. 
Sensory experience which is the ultimate for the pragmatist 
is the starting point, not the end, of knowledge. Man be-
cause he is human does not remain within the sensory flux 
of life, but proceeds toward a knowledge of universals. Sen-
sory knowledge is a means toward the discovery of the uni-
versal, the unchanging, the eternal. It is because man himself 
is the citizen of the eternal world, as well as the temporal 
world, that he can discover these eternal truths. He is the 
citizen of the supernatural world because he has within him 
the divine spark. Man alone can reason. Man alone can 
transcend the natural and contemplate in terms of ends, 
making choices. Man·s very nature is a testimony to the 
truth that it exists above the flux. 
And so man can know the true, the good, the beautiful, 
the universal; man does not need to order his society, his 
politics, his schools in the light of the changing climate of 
the various winds of opinion. By virtue of the fact that he 
is a man he has access to the truth, and he has but to dis-
cover the truth in order to learn that the truth will set him 
free. 
Now it is obvious that all men do not address themselves 
to the arduous assignment of discovering the truth. Most 
men are generally occupied with the all encompassing task 
of making a living. Some persons have no higher purpose 
than to satisfy their animal appetites. For that reason, in a 
real-life society there is the establishment of law which gov-
erns man's individual and corporate activity. The laws which 
govern civilized societies are actually based upon man's ra-
tional discovery throughout the centuries of those eternal 
laws which govern the whole universe. Were men completely 
to discover the laws of the universe, they would be com-
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pletely free. As it is, man is free to the extent that he is 
governed by laws founded upon the eternal. In any case 
the discovery and the appreciation of the proper meaning 
of law is the work of reason. Men as sons of nature are 
subject to passions and weaknesses of will; therefore they 
need the law, which becomes their schoolmaster. Eternal 
law becomes the rule for everyday responsible living, exer-
cising men toward the greater use of their reason, protecting 
them from the irrational surges of their lower selves. Edu-
cation becomes the discipline of children into the proper 
appreciation of eternal laws, and through this fundamental 
discipline they are given the spiritual framework for re-
sponsible relationships. 
This concept of the law is an inescapable part of the well-
ordered, well-proportioned society, and it is likewise an 
extremely important feature of the good school community. 
It is the realistic and reasonable means toward harmonious 
relationships between man and man. The young must learn 
the meaning of the law by habit. By rigorous, disciplined 
learning procedures which both shape and develop innate 
rational faculties, the young are refined to that rational level 
which frees them for responsible relationships with their 
fellow men. Through this discipline, by means of which 
the irrational and devitalizing passions which pervert the 
soul are subdued, the higher laws of reason are realized in 
the self, and men learn to be true to this higher self which 
they have discovered and likewise to be true to fellow shar-
ers-all human beings, distinctive because they too possess 
the power of human reason. 
Inasmuch as society always consists of its leaders and fol-
lowers, the ideal education must serve them both, teaching 
both leaders and potential followers a knowledge and respect 
for the moral law through which society may be harmonious-
ly ordered. The development of man's reason is the means 
by which he can be made to understand the law, to respect 
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the law, to co-operate with the law. In the United States 
one of the amazing demonstrations of the inherent respect 
for law in a democratic people is the present attitude of 
Americans toward the Supreme Court. At a time when 
supposedly democracy is becoming radical, shifting the em-
phasis from permanent law to the changing will of the 
people, the Supreme Court of the United States is becoming 
almost a symbol of reverence. And yet it is of all tribunals 
the most remote from the people.3 In spite of the view that 
pure democracy is only government by discussion, the Su-
preme Court continues to hold its prestige as a higher 
authority which proceeds in terms of comparatively fixed 
principles of law. Apparently Americans even in the twen-
tieth century hold intuitively to the conviction that the 
higher law is more to be trusted than the changing will of 
the people. 
The classical humanist firmly defends a twofold faith in 
man: that he can know rationally and that he can rationally 
support those laws which are necessary for the proper order-
ing of his society. The proper ends of man may be discov-
ered by reason, and in the light of these discoveries men are 
capable of organizing themselves democratically through 
law. This kind of responsible relationship must be estab-
lished educationally in the young. From infancy the child 
should be disciplined in the proper rational appreciation of 
the law-natural law, civil law, the eternal laws of human 
nature. 
One of the consequences of pragmatism is the neglect of 
the necessary educational principles of discipline and limita-
tion. The pragmatist, because he considers man a product 
of the natural world only, through necessity places a pre-
mium upon activity, because activity-interaction with the 
environment-constitutes his whole development; it is for 
the pragmatist the basis of the well-rounded person and the 
3 Gabriel, 406. 
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abundant life; it is therefore the essential basis of education. 
The broadened life is the enriched life; the life involving 
the greatest amount of constructive activity is the fullest life. 
The traditional concepts of discipline and limitation are set 
aside in favor of the more modern concept of "interest" in 
the widest possible range of activities. 
This pragmatic interpretation of educational activity is 
misleading because it beguiles men to expend their energies 
trying to fulfill themselves within the natural continuum 
rather than trying to rise above it. According to the classical 
view the human spirit by its very nature cannot realize itself 
within the natural continuum. When activity in the nat-
uralistic sense is made an end, the human spirit cannot but 
suffer the more intensely its incompleteness; this leads to 
even more intense activity in order to find a satisfaction 
which never materializes. Thus the round of activities be-
comes a circular process from which the soul cannot escape. 
The claim of reason, on the contrary, is that the principle 
of limitation is the only saving principle in the world. "The 
more you limit yourself the more fertile you become in 
invention."4 To paraphrase the Biblical quotation, narrow 
is the gate which leads to educational completeness, and wide 
is the gate which leads to educational shallowness and super-
ficiality. The principle of "either-or" points the way to the 
high road; the "both-and" slogan is at best a circuitous route 
to mediocrity. "Restriction," says Dr. Whitehead, "is the 
price of value .... There cannot be value without anteced-
ent standards of value."5 Limitation, not excess, is the clue 
to the good life. 
The application of the principle of limitation is a "must" 
at every level of educational procedure. This necessity of 
course involves the choice between goods. Even with the 
best-organized educational program the child cannot em-
4 A Kierkegaard Anthology, ed. by Robert Bretall (Princeton, 1946), 25. 
5 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York, 
1925), 178. 
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brace everything in its world. The educator must ever keep 
before his mind the proper end of man, and in terms of this 
end the educational program should be devised and limited. 
Since reason is the distinguishing faculty of man, reason 
must assume its foremost place in educational plans. There-
fore the principle of limitation rightly applied points up 
the traditional rational disciplines of logic, rhetoric, litera-
ture, arts, languages, mathematics, history, philosophy, and 
religion.6 
The schools of late seem to thrive upon the unselective 
accumulation of more and more materials of learning about 
more and more fields, which trend seems nothing less than 
an omen of a decadent and disintegrating civilization. Half 
education is a modern sign of the times-the result of a 
failure to realize the importance of the principle of limita-
tion. This concept of limitation must be applied from 
infancy in order to develop virtuous habits, the right use 
of freedom. The person who limits his life finds his life. 
Limitation is the framework of freedom. "The free mind 
is first of all the disciplined mind."7 
Through a proper program of intellectual discipline man 
attains human freedom, and human freedom is the basis of 
responsible activity. If man does not realize the fullness of 
the divine reason which resides within him, he becomes the 
victim of his lower nature. It is only by his reason which 
transcends these irrational forces that he truly becomes free, 
truly becomes human, truly becomes responsible; for re-
sponsibility is completely an alien concept to the natural 
world; it becomes reality only in the medium of a freedom 
which is the essence of the spirit. If man does not attain 
freedom, he is fixed by his lower nature as a machine is fixed 
by its construction, and with this turn of events one arrives 
at a virtual denial of human responsibility. 
6 Livingstone, Some Tasks for Education, 17-24. 
7 Hutchins, Education for Freedom, 91. 
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Victorious natural science with its observational and ex-
perimental methods has tended to obscure transcendent 
values, for scientific research deals only with the sum of 
things. But lately even the scientists themselves, along with 
a multitude of serious-minded persons, are discovering that 
scientific method does not by any means provide the whole 
answer; that, in fact, the ancients were in some respects 
more aware of the spiritual complexities of individual and 
social life than modern man with all of his technology. 
Modern vVestern culture has never really divorced itself 
from the Hellenic roots which abundantly contributed to its 
growth. Eternal Greece still remains, and the classical hu-
manist argues that it is even now an intellectual arsenal from 
which may be drawn powerful weapons to fight a winning 
battle for the cause of democracy and freedom. 8 The prin-
cipal teachings of Plato and Aristotle can be used to infinite 
advantage today in counteracting the same dangers of rela-
tivism which threatened Greek civilization. Virtue is vital 
even for the modern scientific man. He who honors virtue 
may have her, said Plato. 
vVe must once again educate man rationally, so that when 
he is asked a rational question he can give a rational answer. 
"It is by this fundamental faculty ... of giving a response 
to himself and to others, that man becomes a 'responsible' 
being, a moral subject."9 The most important science of all 
is the science of choice. This was the persuasion of the classic 
philosophers. This was the scientific task of paideia ( educa-
tion). Education in the profoundest sense of the term, then, 
was the development of responsible persons-persons who 
make the right choices by virtue of the right kind of educa-
tion which develops systematically their abilities to make 
8 Richard W. Livingstone, Greek Ideals and Modern Life (London, 1935), 
147-49. 
9 Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven, 1944), 6 (summarizing 
the view of Socrates). 
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such choices in terms of the proper understanding of rightful 
ends. 
The classical application of reason, law, and discipline 
result, socially, in a hierarchy. Any society, if it strives to-
ward the true standards of justice, requires the ordering of 
law and justice in determining the rightful positions of the 
law discoverers, the law enforcers, and the law observers; 
there must be leaders as well as followers. When a well-
balanced relationship exists between leaders and followers, 
justice prevails and the associations between the various 
parts of the society are responsibly harmonized. This is the 
ideal of proportion which applies not only to the society but 
to the individual person, for in him, also, reason must be 
dominant. 
To speak of proportion is not to approve of the radical 
idea of equality. Distorted equalitarianism is a dangerous 
philosophy which in the long run destroys community. How-
ever pronounced this egalitarian trend is in the twentieth 
century, it is not by any means new. The Greek philosophers 
too were distressed with a strange warping of their cultural 
pattern wherein fathers behaved like children and became 
afraid of their sons; children acted like adults and stopped 
respecting their parents; teachers became afraid of their 
pupils, and pupils despised their teachers; the young tried 
to act old, and the old tried to act young; the egalitarian 
spirit seemed to pervade the atmosphere; even dogs, horses, 
and donkeys seemed to catch it.10 These evidences are but 
the perennial symptoms of a society where man has lost sight 
of his true nature and his true end. The truly humanistic 
education needs to revive the meaning of proper hierarchy 
in society, supporting vigorously once again the standards 
of excellence and leadership, providing a way of escape from 
the numbing partiality to the "average," constructing once 
again the clear-cut standard by means of which a selection 
10 Werner Jaeger, Paideia (3 vols., New York, 1945), II, 340-41. 
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is possible between that which is good and that which is not 
good. Man always has need of the unifying, proportioning 
power of Greek letters as well to know "the best that has 
been taught and said in the world."11 Surely no one can 
deny the genius and the beauty of the Greek ideal of pro-
portion: the proper relationships of reason and desire, of 
mind and body, of the well-ordered state with its rulers and 
defenders and artisans, all harmoniously related to fulfill the 
rational ideal of perfection. There seems always to be that 
creative, divinely inspired activity which strives toward the 
highest self-realization, spurred on by a passionate love for 
perfection. 
Greek education is central to this classic ideal of propor-
tion whether in the individual or in the society. When the 
individual soul is properly balanced and the state is properly 
co-ordinated, the society can best achieve its highest end. 
The young must be educated into this habit of personal 
proportion where reason rules and keeps the balance in 
order. The educational task is to defeat the blind powers 
of passion in favor of the wisdom of higher reason. When 
this purpose is accomplished, men in their various stations 
in society will display the proper respect for authority, law, 
and justice. In this manner all individuals in whatever sta-
tion move satisfactorily toward the good life. The good 
ruler rules wisely and the good subject reacts responsibly 
to the laws which support justice in the society. 
This principle of proportion-this justifiable hierarchy-
applies with equal force in a social or communal unit. The 
leader committed to his special calling serves the welfare of 
all. The follower committed to his calling likewise con-
tributes to the welfare of the whole. Reason provides for 
each the true understanding of the significance of his own 
position, whether it is that of leadership or followership. 
11 Matthew Arnold, "Literature and Science,'" in Essays and Poems, ed. by 
Frederick W. Roe (New York, 1928), 57. 
64 Education and Responsibility 
The proper ordering of communities, therefore, takes 
place within the framework of the law. Even on an inter-
national scale the only practical hope of responsible relation-
ships between nations lies in the establishment of a league 
of nations by due process of law. Of course it is obvious 
that the law rationally formulated is not enough; it must be 
rationally respected. Reason, in one way or another, must 
take the place of irrationality. Men must arrive at the point 
where reason takes the place of war. Reason must conquer 
the passions. The problem of responsibility in personal re-
lationships or in international relationships must be solved 
rationally, and there is no other way. 
In the contemporary world, which is more and more yield-
ing itself to emotion-a predictable outcome for a world 
which forsakes its faith in reason and law-the first and 
greatest assignment for the classical humanist educator is 
to establish dialectically those first principles which have been 
lost sight of. Once the true foundation has again been 
widely discovered, it may yet be possible to liberate this 
civilization from the hazards of its moral skepticism. This 
sure moral foundation must again be discovered by follow-
ing the intellectual leadership of Plato and Aristotle, who 
competed so successfully with the moral relativists of their 
day. The philosopher today must again concern himself 
with the dialectical method. He must again become an ex-
plorer rediscovering basic rational principles and helping 
others to do likewise. The modern day is not tempered to 
theological dicta; the most effective approach to universals 
lies in the inductive approach which matches the philosophi-
cal bent of the times. The philosopher must begin with the 
sensory level of the skeptic and from there proceed to show 
that it is possible to distinguish between knowledge and 
opinion, that truth is objective. 
Mortimer Adler in his articles entitled "A Dialectic of 
Morals" illustrates in some detail the actual framework of 
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such a procedure by means of which universals are reached 
inductively in terms of sensory experience.12 
Like Plato, Adler begins his argument on a ground com-
mon with that of the moral skeptic, assuming tentatively 
that there are no evidences of objective moral laws; every-
thing is relative; there is no difference between knowledge 
and opinion. His first step is to show that no one denies the 
fact of preference and that the really essential problem is 
involved in the question, Is preference supported rationally 
or by the feelings? The skeptic of course will say that feel-
ings are primary; pleasure and satisfaction are the basis for 
preferring one thing to another. The moral skeptic himself 
will agree readily that he is a hedonist. Pleasure is the 
greatest good. 
Starting with this basic assumption the relativist will agree 
that the quantity of pleasure is involved in his preference. 
More pleasure is to be preferred to less pleasure. Now it 
appears that there are two criteria for preference involved-
pleasure and quantity. Already the skeptic is forced to 
admit that a universal principle is involved for all men: 
A man should always prefer the greater good, in this case 
the greater pleasure. Now experience continually shows 
that men do not always choose the greater pleasure or the 
greater good. This universal assumption, therefore, is not 
merely descriptive; it is normative. It says what all men 
should do. To this extent the position of the skeptics is 
moral in a universal sense. If it be agreed that this moral 
judgment exists universally, it should tentatively be agreed 
that other such judgments could reasonably exist universally. 
But now to go a step further. 
It appears that pleasure in itself cannot alone explain 
preferences. The object in itself seems to be related to 
preferences, supposedly because one object gives more pleas-
12 The next paragraphs are a brief outline of Mortimer Adler's dialectic, 
which illustrates quite graphically Adler's proposed task of the classical 
humanist. The articles may be found in The Review of Politics, III (1941). 
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ure than another. Men desire a certain object, or good, 
because pleasure results from it. Men do not only desire 
pleasure for its own sake, but they desire objects which in 
a particular way supply pleasurable results. A careful con-
sideration at this point will show that pleasure must often 
be distinguished from the object of desire. And further-
more, the "object" of desire obviously is to be distinguished 
from the desire for it. For example, a man desires wealth. 
The desire, and the wealth (the object of desire), and the 
pleasure derived from wealth are each to be distinguished 
from the other. Every object of desire should bring pleasure, 
but every object of desire is not pleasure in itself. Pleasure 
is simply one object of desire among many other objects 
of desire. Actually, men often desire unpleasurable objects 
in preference to pleasure. Hence, it becomes clear that the 
"object" of desire in itself has some bearing on preference. 
Pleasure as a simple criterion is most inadequate to explain 
preference. How then can it be reasonably explained that 
objects in themselves do indeed possess intrinsic value in 
relation to the preferences of human beings? 
The answer to this question must be found in the nature 
of man. Various objects or goods (health, wealth, social 
goods, personal goods, and others) are only good and de-
sirable because they relate to man's capacity to desire them. 
Because man desires them, they are good; man's desire is 
the force of his potential nature actualizing itself. Man is 
by nature everywhere the same, and thus man's universal 
nature objectifies the good of "goods." The problem then 
is rationally to discover the proper ordering of the process 
of attaining these goods. This proper ordering is to be dis-
covered by rationally analyzing the end of man. The con-
clusion, to make Aristotle's long story short, is that the end 
of man is happiness. 
Surely it is agreed that all men desire to live well, to be 
happy. All men should desire every sort of good which is 
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an indispensable means to the end of living well. One could 
classify this statement as a universal in the moral realm. It 
is a normative law: Men should . ... Actually they often 
do not. . . . The moral aspect is involved because men are 
qualitatively different from brutes. Men can choose objects 
in terms of ends. In other words, man can reason. 
The end of man is always the same: happiness. Objects 
desired should be distinguished in terms of man's end: hap-
piness. By means of reason man can understand his supreme 
end, and he can make his choices between the apparent and 
the real good. All men seek happiness; this is descriptive. 
Happiness actually comes through the proper seeking; this 
is normative. If man pursues his happiness on the basis of 
feeling-satisfaction of the senses-he fails; his failure stems 
from the fact that he desires as a brute. On the other hand, 
if man by reason understands his highest end and orders the 
means to that end accordingly, he fulfills himself as a human 
being. Only the proper understanding of the nature of man 
as a rational animal provides the means to the good life. 
The moral skeptic acknowledges happiness as the aim of all 
men, but immediately cancels out the means of attaining 
it by denying the objectivity of the end of man and the 
universal nature of man. It is man's nature to actualize him-
self, fulfill himself. Yet because man can choose, because 
he is free, he perverts his natural fulfillment by wrong think-
ing or weak willing. The objective norm for evaluating 
human desire (which is endowed with free choice) is natural 
desire, which is potency naturally becoming actual. The 
natural good is the objective basis for distinguishing be-
tween the good and the bad choices. The natural end of man 
is the criterion for directing his human choices. The natural 
end of man is happiness. 
Moral training involves the formation of an "inchoate 
virtue" -moral habits formed by one person (who has ra-
tionally found himself) regulating the acts of another, this 
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inchoate virtue providing the seed of genuine virtue. The 
legislator is the moral preceptor; just laws of the good so-
ciety provide for virtue and happiness. The principles of 
law, dialectically developed and rationally supported, pro-
vide an important part of the solution to the problem of 
responsibility. The ability to choose between good and evil 
is a reasoned capacity, and therefore it seems quite evident 
that the highest contribution of the schools should be that 
of "concentrating on the reasoning essential to it."13 This 
theme is neatly summarized by Everett D. Martin when he 
says that "there is only one sound method of moral educa-
tion. It is in teaching people to think."14 
The classical humanist, like the pragmatist, makes fellow-
ship an important and significant part of his way of life. It 
is at this point, possibly, that the highest concept of responsi-
bility, the idea of positive, unified, responsive relationships 
between persons, is most clearly circumscribed. Every person 
bears favor because he bears the name of man, according to 
Seneca. Man is man because he is the bearer of reason, and 
reason is a universal principle. The humanitas of the Stoics 
is the divine reason which unifies mankind as a whole. The 
sharing universally of the principle of divine reason binds 
together the whole human race. It is this principle which 
underlies Kant's dictum to treat all persons as ends and to 
act only in terms of the universal application of such an act. 
The ideal of humanitas implies a universal community of 
men and the cosmopolitan ideal of peace. Man's individ-
uality is accidental and material; his spirit is universal. 
Hence there exists a cosmic sympathy which provides a noble 
foundation for world citizenship. 
Irving Babbitt prefers the road of humanism even to the 
religious means of faith to create community among men. 
The secret to humanistic community is the common en-
13 Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America, 68. 
14 Everett D. Martin, The Meaning of a Liberal Education (New York, 
1926), 196. 
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gagement in the classical disciplines. Men in the common 
exercise and discipline of their reasoning powers develop a 
truly dependable ethical basis for social order and stability. 
In contrast to Christianity, which is not yet a world faith, 
the humanistic creed is not to be identified with any par-
ticular creed or religion and thus affords the most logical 
foundation for a world community. Robert Hutchins, too, 
shares enthusiastically in this conviction, assuming almost 
·literally the role of a crusader as he travels up and down in 
the land recommending to all men the saving power of the 
classics, those permanent studies which offer the greatest 
hope of connecting man with man. 
At this point the discussion could be turned easily to a 
practical educational problem which already has been posed 
for the pragmatist, namely, How, educationally, are the op-
positions now existing between races in many American 
communities to be resolved? This current difficulty is as 
pertinent a question as could be posed in order to draw out 
the practical reactions of various philosophies of education 
in their solutions to a problem of developing responsibility 
which is now so painfully needed in American society. What 
then is the proposed solution of the classical humanist to 
this contemporary problem? 
In the light of the discussion just concluded, the first phase 
of the humanist's answer is likely to be an emphasis upon 
the universalizing power of the rational disciplines. Sherlock 
Gass suggests that discipline, the exercising of all men in the 
same traditions of the great works of the past, giving the 
same elements, the same substance to minds, is the founda-
tion of harmonious relationships between persons and groups 
regardless of how diverse their conventions and their out-
looks. To forsake this discipline is to divorce men's minds 
one from the other.15 
15 Sherlock Gass, "The Well of Discipline,'" in Norman Foerster (ed.), 
Humanism and America (New York, 1930), 284. 
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Now this is not simply a farfetched theory. One has but 
to observe the facility of adjustment on the college graduate 
level to the common participation in learning activities of 
different races even in universities located more or less in 
the center of racial tension in America. It appears that per-
sons who have reached a comparatively high level of ra-
tionality, in university communities for example, adjust 
much more easily to interracial education than do those com-
munities at large which have not yet reached this rational 
level. The eventual progressive rationalization of all seg-
ments of society will bear, the classical humanist argues, 
similar good results in the solution of this racial problem. 
And actually it appears that education is the key to the 
solution of this social problem. 
This conviction is vigorously embodied in the missionary 
zeal of the contemporary classical humanists who literally go 
out into the highways and byways preaching the gospel of 
the great books program for all people. This program is 
actually an education designed for the common man. It is 
a movement seemingly vitalized by the burning conviction 
that the great ideas of the ages, if taken hold of by all peo-
ples, will usher in that rational state of mind which shall 
literally save this world from destruction. Men thus shall 
be drawn together on the common ground of human reason, 
freely refuting thereby the irrational forces abroad in the 
land. 
The simple logic of this position is that the proper re-
lationships between one man and another man have an 
infinite number of times been established and assured simply 
through reason which effectively counteracts irresponsible 
relationships born of passion and appetite. It remains now 
for reason to prevail in group relationships, so that hate and 
war and passion are substituted on a grand scale by reason. 
Actually man has been struggling desperately in the past 
few centuries to make this substitution in the world at large. 
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From Grotius to Woodrow Wilson and the present United 
Nations program, the world has been trying to substitute 
reason for war in the ordering of man's society. Actually 
man has demonstrated the power of this theory. The union 
of the thirteen American colonies is a noted example of the 
victory of reason over irrationality in relationships between 
groups. At the present time the relationships between na-
tions as well as the relationships between smaller groups 
have not been solved. Yet the road to solution is clearly 
demarcated. Reason must prevail. 
The radical ideal of egalitarianism with its Rousseauistic 
irrational bases is utterly unworkable in real life. Higher 
and lower ranks, and authority and subordination necessarily 
exist in this life of reality. So the real problem is, What 
"quality of relationship" should exist between different 
classes and groups and positions in society?16 The root of 
the unsatisfactory relationships between groups in society is 
not the result of hierarchy itself, but the lack of the infinitely 
valuable elements of self-respect and respect for others. Mi-
nority groups are not resentful primarily because of their 
position or their lot, but because they sense that they are 
used as means; they deeply realize that they are not respected 
as ends. This same significant psychological factor is often 
reflected in the reaction of soldiers facing the enemy. The 
one thing which most feeds the fires of resentment in their 
times of trial is not necessarily the agony of their lot, but 
the seeming callousness of their compatriots back home who 
live as if indifferent to their fate. This point touches at the 
heart of irresponsible group relationships and the dishar-
monies which result from them. It is simply lack of respon-
siveness to others as real persons, as ends rather than means. 
To treat all men properly as ends is the burden of reason; 
it is the alpha and the omega of the rational mind, as sug-
16 George H. Sabine, "Two Democratic Traditions," in The Philosophical 
Review, LXI (1952), 472. 
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gested by Kant. Once this rule prevails, it will be within 
the realm of possibility for all men to live in their station 
in life with a spirit of good will. 
A society built upon the eternal principles of reason will 
flower into a well-ordered, well-proportioned hierarchy 
where men willingly coalesce and behave responsibly in the 
discharge of their activities. Men are equal to one another 
and treat each other as ends by virtue of the principle of a 
universal humanitas; on the other hand, men are commu-
nally bound together by the fact of their individual inequali-
ties-which is substantially the true basis of community. 
Because all men are universally one in reason, they are drawn 
together; because men are different individually, they are 
united through mutual need of one another. This is the 
wisdom of reason; this is the positive, constructive contribu-
tion of reason. Reason in the negative sense facing the 
realities of life and of human nature recognizes the ever 
present irrational element in man: Man is rational, but he 
is also an animal. To the extent that the human community 
yields to the irrational impulse it must be governed by law. 
The law is the realistic authority which enforces order and 
right relationships between men when they have not yet 
found the autonomous power of reason freely to regulate 
themselves responsibly. Yet, even for the irrational man, 
reason is the only answer. Law is not enough. Until all 
men are disciplined into the insights of reason, there cannot 
truly be an ideal community. All men, whatever race or 
station, must be given the opportunity of discovering those 
eternal principles by which they become free individually 
and socially. For the classical humanist, paideia, universal 
education, is the high road to the good life rationally dis-




This page intentionally left blank
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Educational ReconStruCtionism tn Outline 
Lm EDUCATIONAL reconstructionist is dissatisfied with the 
pragmatic progressive position which holds so insistently to 
its faith in a naive evolutionary progress as the means of 
overcoming the tragic abnormalities of the age. The ideal 
of a gentle and orderly progress educationally nurtured may 
suit eras of relative stability in society, but not the period 
of tortured transition which the world is presently under-
going. For different reasons the educational reconstructionist 
is also skeptical of the philosophy of the classical humanist 
with his cold reasoning in ivory towers, a procedure which 
can do little that is illustrious in the face of the rugged 
realities of a culture which must form a new world within 
the generally disintegrating framework of obsolescent insti-
tutions. 
The reconstructionist makes no attempt to minimize the 
seriousness of the crisis which has gripped his culture. He 
is under no illusions about the critical bifurcations of a 
"schizophrenic society" in danger of actual dissolution as 
the result of its own deep-seated confticts.l At moments of 
crisis, such as the world now faces, it is the extremes of the 
spectrum of theory and action which become accentuated. 
Issues become more clear-cut, requiring decisive response. 
The reconstructionist is radical, not only in his estimate 
of the world's condition and in the means which must be 
used to get the world on the right course, but also in the 
goals which he contemplates in his vision of utopia. When 
the educational reconstructionist talks of utopia, however, 
1 Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, 59. 
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he is well aware of the scores of utopian adventures in the 
past that have eventually proved illusory, fanciful dreams 
which did not take into account the realities of life and of 
man's nature. But this time, he argues, utopia is not another 
idealistic escape into the world of fancy, because science has 
revealed to the world enough knowledge to make the uto-
pian dream an intelligent project, predictable, planable, con-
trollable. The reconstructionist's utopia is based upon a 
vision of human intelligence socially directed toward the 
reorganization of man's life and world. In this contemplated 
transformation of society, education possesses the keys to 
the new kingdom. 
The basic reason for the necessity of a new education is 
the inevitability of a contemporary trend called collectivism. 
"The modern development of man . . . shows one thing 
with indisputable clarity: the growing tendency toward col-
lectivity and the invalidation of the individual. The trend 
toward collectivity is inevitable. "\Ve cannot evade it unless 
we set aside technical and rational progress-which is ob-
viously impossible. Technics means collectivism."2 What 
seems inescapably evident to the reconstructionist is the fact 
that the new world has become largely interdependent and 
that this new interdependency exists within the molds of 
outworn institutions constructed in the days when the world 
was not weighted with the current complexities resulting 
from dense populations, industrial revolutions, and the com-
plicated problems stemming from the modern miracles of 
science and technology. 
Most important of the traditional institutions which no 
longer coincide with the new way of life is the pattern of 
economics known as capitalism. Capitalism may have func-
tioned tolerably in its heyday when world conditions were 
favorable to laissez faire and the world's untapped resources 
2 Erich Kahler, Man the Measure: A New Approach to History (New York, 
1943), 609. 
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gave free rein to individualistic ambitions, but the new 
world now largely exploited and inescapably bound by its 
industrialism and technics simply can no longer tolerate 
disrupting individualism in economics. 
Collectivism is with us. No longer does the choice exist 
between individual freedom and collectivism, but rather be-
tween a collectivism dictatorially regulated and a collec-
tivism democratically regulated. Education must realize this 
profound truth. Teachers should "recognize the corporate 
and interdependent character of the contemporary order, 
and transfer the democratic tradition from individualistic 
to collectivist economic foundations." 3 A new education is 
needed-a new curriculum, a new outlook for teachers. Fail-
ure to adapt society to the new technological world means 
death. It is a prime responsibility of the new education to 
face the implications of collectivism and to prepare for it. 
It must be recognized that the old capitalistic system is no 
longer adaptable to the designs of the new world and the 
new education. A first step in the recognition of this fact is 
the encouragement of a critical evaluation of existing eco-
nomic systems; this is a necessary aspect of every person's 
education. This liberalization of the functions of education, 
namely the encouragement of critical examination of all 
existing institutions, seems the best hope for an eventual 
transformation of archaic economic systems into new pat-
terns better adapted to the new world. 
Now this introductory projection of economics as a phase 
of living significantly related to education seems immediately 
to call for a clarification of the educational reconstructionist 
position as related to other world views usually classified 
as radical or leftist in their basic assumptions. To attempt 
this clarification is difficult because educational reconstruc-
tionism is an emerging trend. One discovers an interesting 
3 Harold Rugg, Foundations for American Education (Yonkers-on-Hudson, 
N. Y., 1947), 577 (quoting Frederick L. Redefer). 
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but hard-to-define series of forward movements in the past 
twenty-five years, emanating mostly from the traditional prag-
matic outlook. The earlier digressions from the progressive 
position did not usually extend too far afield, but some of 
the present radical reconstructionist ideas have moved quite 
far to the left and bear certain definite resemblances to 
Marxism. 
In attempting to understand this leftist movement in edu-
cation, possibly Sidney Hook's study of Hegel, Marx, and 
Dewey best outlines the basic reasons for certain underlying 
affinities between reconstructionism and extreme Marxism. 
On the other hand, a consideration of the educational re-
constructionism of Theodore Brameld best outlines the 
fundamental differences between American reconstructionist 
radicalism and Marxist radicalism. 
In the first place, it must be made perfectly clear that the 
Marxism of Marx is quite different from the communism of 
Stalin.4 It is sometimes an extreme injustice to evaluate a 
man and his philosophy in terms of his successors, and this 
is especially true of Marx. Marx "stems from the liberal, 
humanitarian, democratic, radical traditions of Western 
thought .... He is a genuine, if errant, child of the enlight-
enment."5 Once Marx has been legitimately distinguished 
from the corrupted Marxisms of the present, it becomes pos-
sible to understand some of the important likenesses of the 
philosophies of Marx and Dewey, an understanding funda-
mentally important to the reconstructionist whose American 
form of socialism is really dependent upon a synthesis of 
the strong points of Marx and Dewey. If the pragmatists 
would understand the original Marx and the Marxists would 
replace their outmoded dialectic with the scientific experi-
mental method, their positions should converge, say the 
4 Jim Cork, "John Dewey and Karl Marx," in Sidney Hook (ed.), fohn 
Dewey: A Symposium (New York, 1950), 338. 
5 Cork, in Hook, 347. 
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reconstructionists, thus providing a strong foundation for 
the socialistic reconstructionist program. 
The genetic likenesses of the two positions which make 
such a convergence possible are evident first of all in the 
common Hegelian heritage of both men. Both Marx and 
Dewey share a strong emphasis upon the organic nature of 
society and an insistence upon the elimination of a dis-
tracting dualistic interpretation of the nature of man and 
the nature of society. Both men retain the Hegelian idea 
of organic wholeness, but reject the spiritual nature of that 
"whole"; Hegel's Absolute Mind is replaced by Darwin's 
natural world of interaction and process. A natural monism 
takes the place of Hegel's spiritual monism. For Marx thesis-
antithesis becomes primarily an economic problem; for 
Dewey it becomes the conflicting elements in a situation 
arising in the natural continuum. 
This basic Hegelian idea of organism, applied to the 
natural realm as the only realm, leads to certain common 
conclusions about the importance of process. It leads to an 
agreement about the wholeness of man-that his mind as 
well as his body are the result of natural process and are 
actually inseparable. With transcendent realities eliminated 
from philosophy, it leads to a similar point of view about 
the practical nature of philosophy itself. Apriorisms are no 
longer meaningful; truth is relative; furthermore, faith and 
practice are not dual but a part of one process. On all of 
these basic ideas both Marx and Dewey reach similar con-
clusions. 
Now in the second place it is important for the recon-
structionist to distinguish the differences between the prag-
matism of John Dewey and the communism of Marx. The 
crux of the disagreement is easily discovered in Dewey's 
devotion to experimentalism. Things could have turned 
out differently for the Marxists if they had not resorted to 
dogma and force as means of supporting their program. The 
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Marxists were brilliant in diagnosing the basic troubles of 
society, but they did not have the necessary democratic 
tradition to deal with those evils in an intelligent, experi-
mental, and democratic manner. The tragic result is Rus-
sian communism. 
It seems obvious that new forms of socialization and 
control are inevitable in contemporary society. Yet the 
socializing process is extremely dangerous, likely to end in 
fascistic or communistic totalitarianism. In the face of these 
hazards the best and most realistic plan is to apply the scien-
tific method to the social problem and to do it democratically. 
The present socialistic answer is simply a practical extension 
of an earlier liberalism which freed the individual from 
feudalism and tyranny. Capitalism with its huge industrial 
empires has projected a new kind of tyranny inhibiting 
human freedom, and democratic collectivism provides the 
only emancipation from it. It seems in this changed world 
that the authority of capitalism is declining. The recon-
structionist insists, however, that the authority of capitalism 
must be replaced by the authority of the scientific method, 
rather than autocratic dogmatic force of Russian com-
munism. 
So what really appears to be the foundation upon which 
the reconstructionists build is a theory of social democracy. 
While acknowledging their debt to Marx, social democrats 
believe the world requires the democratic support and the 
democratic methods outlined by John Dewey. Pragmatism 
is the guiding light which prevents the inevitable . contem-
porary trend toward socialism from degenerating into com-
munist totalitarianism. Dewey's whole democratic ideal is 
antithetical to Marxian force and violence. His faith is 
centered in an intelligent, democratic, experimental pro-
cedure which offers the best possibility of bypassing violence 
and forceful methods. Pragmatism consistently and diametri-
cally opposes all kinds of absolutes, particularly the abso-
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lutisms of Marxism. Dewey himself wrote to an acquaint-
ance, after publishing his book Liberalism and Social Action} 
1935, saying that he thought he could be classified as a social 
democrat. 6 But consistently, in Dewey's views, the social 
aspects of life were always considered a means to free indi-
vidual development. 
The beginnings of educational reconstructionism in Amer-
ica are associated with the Great Depression. Its impact 
radically changed the point of view of some American lead-
ers in education. The progressive educational philosophies 
supported by the teachings of John Dewey were in the 
twenties clearly individualistic, generally in harmony with 
the American capitalistic economic framework. Although 
Dewey had argued strongly for a greater acknowledgment 
of the social aspects of education, it seemed that the spirit 
of the times inclined educators to concentrate upon the 
elements in his philosophy which emphasized American in-
dividualism and traditional resistance to authority. The 
emphasis was still clearly upon competition and opportunity 
rather than co-operation and security. And educators shared 
the prevailing view that economic and social progress must 
be both inevitable and uninterrupted. 
But depression and war shattered for many the worship 
of the free and independent spirit of individualism and the 
buoyant faith in progress. As always in times of stress and 
uncertainty, men began to re-examine their philosophies and 
institutions. George Counts was one of the outstanding pro-
gressives who raised serious doubts about the pragmatic 
opinions of his contemporary educators. In 1932, in a series 
of addresses entitled Dare the School Build a New Social 
Order} Counts challenged the progressives with these claims: 
(l) the progressives have no theory of social welfare; (2) 
they are not moved with strong convictions about the wel-
fare of mankind; (3) putting their trust in a child-centered 
6 Cork, in Hook, 349. 
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school does not take into account the new social crisis which 
faces society; (4) the pragmatic revolt against all imposed 
authority devitalizes the progressive movement; (5) imposi-
tion is inescapable in education. The author insisted that 
it was time for education to face the realities of life; it was 
time to reconsider more carefully the organic relationships 
of the school to community life and to face more squarely 
the practical problem of indoctrination in education. 
Educational reverberations such as these in the thirties 
inaugurated the educational reconstructionist movement in 
America. The pragmatists at that time were becoming less 
optimistic about uncontrolled individualism and more in-
telligent about the social implications of education; they 
were also becoming more sensitive to the critical needs of 
their society for more clear-cut goals in order to offset grow-
ing uncertainties and confusions in society. Demiashkevich 
points out how William Kilpatrick in Education and the 
Social Crisis shifts from the position of "no goals in advance" 
to the concept of "cultural goals, socially established," to-
ward which education must point.7 Berkson insists that the 
reconstructionist development was already inherent but un-
emphasized in Dewey's recognition of the importance of the 
society. But Dewey's disciples were not as foresighted as 
the master; it required the humbling blows of bitter social 
realities to make them come to their senses and to make 
haste out of the far country of idealistic fantasies about 
uninhibited progress, and to readjust their views to the 
tragic social incompatibilities of their own world. Accord-
ing to Berkson, Kilpatrick's book, Education for a Changing 
Civilization, was an outstanding precursor of the reconstruc-
tionist movement. The Educational Frontier, a new periodi-
cal, shared substantially in launching the new movement. 
These earlier reconstructionists still held progressive and 
sometimes classical views which have since been sloughed 
7 Michael Demiashkevich, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education 
(New York, 1935), 138. 
Educational Reconstructionism 83 
off in the rapid advance to radical reconstructionism as out-
lined by such men as Theodore Brameld. 
The main difference between the reconstructionist and 
the progressive view is a matter of degree, according to Theo-
dore Brameld. In both there is a common agreement that 
the character of cultures is naturalistic, that cultural process 
and change is the order of life, that there is no metaphysical 
framework to the universe, that men create their own desti-
nies, and that there is no preordained purpose in history to 
which life must conform. Indeed the universe is free, dy-
namic, expanding. But reconstructionism goes a few steps 
further: The conflict between the "expansive" forces and 
the "contractive" forces is universal, the expansive forces 
being the struggle of the common man for freedom and the 
contractive the efforts of the vested interests to hold their 
advantage at the expense of the masses. This new social 
concept is not only important but primary. Life must be 
understood in terms of the social organism, and the diseases 
which at present exist in this organism must be treated with 
a radical kind of medicine. The pragmatic concept of the 
world and of man is dynamic and promising, but the prag-
matic weakness lies in its stubborn denial of preordained 
goals, in its continued rebellion against authority, and in 
its blind faith in progress. So long as pragmatism rejects 
the ideas of goals and authority, its vitalities are neutralized. 
Pragmatism has force and method, but nothing to lead it to 
act boldly and vigorously. The kind of world men live in 
today requires this boldness of action, and reconstructionism 
provides the necessary blueprint for a brave new world. 8 
There are sharp differences between the democratic indi-
vidualists (the earlier pragmatists) and the democratic col-
lectivists (the later pragmatists) . The reconstructionists 
have moved quite close to the Marxists in their radical social 
interpretations of society, their strong condemnation of the 
8 Brameld, 720-24. 
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evils of capitalism, their inclination to name economics as 
the cause of social evils, and their conviction that clearly 
outlined goals are necessary. Yet the modern reconstruc-
tionists do not subscribe to dictatorial power in the hands 
of the few but to power established democratically through 
the co-operation of the masses-to democratic social power 
as opposed to autocratic power. To these ideas, however, the 
earlier pragmatic individualists are still hostile. 
The reconstructionist tends to lose patience with his com-
patriots, the earlier pragmatists. Theodore Brameld, deeply 
moved by a world "blotted with the grim realities of fear, 
deprivation and blood," accuses the progressives of limiting 
education to an innocent form of feeble individualism. The 
progressivist seems to avoid commitment and conviction; he 
avoids the problem of the future; he does not possess enough 
of the crusading spirit; he is still entangled with the tradi-
tional concept of individual evolution rather than social 
revolution; his outlook lacks cohesiveness and purposiveness; 
he has no clear authority upon which to build; he is still 
"caught in the false individualism of disintegrating Protes-
tantism."9 The pragmatist makes a fetish of method so that 
it becomes an end in itself which leads only to confusion and 
uncertainty. He confuses "planning" with the "planned." 
Of course, planning is basic to the educational program, but 
it is ineffective if there is no definite goal. Reconstructionism 
completes the pragmatic ideal by recognizing not only the 
process but the goal. 
The educational reconstructionists are thoroughly in ac· 
cord with the claim of Ross Finney, who said that educators 
are not only running the schools, but they are running the 
world. The school, he said, should supply the pattern for 
the whole of society. Later sociological and psychological 
discoveries have borne out clearly the significance of Finney's 
remarkable sociological insights. Today the school has in-
9 The observation of Alexander Meiklejohn. 
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deed been discovered at the center of the social vortex, in a 
position to give reconstructive direction to the whole of 
society in its throes of transition. 
It seems that sociologically and psychologically the twen-
tieth century provides the perfect stage for the anticipated 
drama of the emancipation of the common man. All over 
the world there are the vibrant expressions of the recon-
structionist spirit as exemplified politically in the socialist 
movement in England, the Scandinavian co-operative ex-
periment, the upsurge of the colored races in America and 
elsewhere, the significant expansion of Russian communism, 
the rapid growth of labor movements, and the resurgence 
of youth, especially in Oriental countries.10 The reconstruc-
tionist must harness these expanding forces, join them, use 
them, direct them. Education must provide the framework. 
Education must take the lead. 
Educational reconstructionism is not at all hesitant in 
admitting the necessity of a religion to motivate and em-
power its program. The unrational element in man's nature 
is powerful and useful and necessary. An educational pro-
gram which does not take into account the power of faith 
and religion is virtually defeated before it gets under way. 
For this reason there must be certain religious features in 
the reconstructionist pattern, motivations which support a 
dynamic faith. The traditional American faith underlying 
education was the Christian faith in God. But the eight-
eenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century intellectual and 
scientific impacts have all but obliterated this Christian 
faith, and a radical democratic faith is taking its place. In 
the past three hundred years there has been a definite transi-
tion from the control by the church to the control by the 
government in many fields, and particularly in education. 
As the state takes the place of the church in education, it 
must develop its own new religion. Obviously that religion 
10 Brameld, 391. 
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is democracy, the religion well adapted to provide a dynamic 
faith for a reconstructionist program. It was the religion of 
Rousseau with his vehement crusade for equality. Such a 
religion gives men the will to expend their lives if necessary 
for the cause. For Rousseau the general will of the people 
takes the place of the will of God. Man no longer has a 
divine protector. His rights are established by the state, and 
the state replaces the church as the primary institution of 
human brotherhood. The Rousseauistic state is the non-
theological substitute for medieval theocracy. This is the 
reconstructionist radical democratic alternative to Russian 
communism bogged down with its cult of autocracy. The 
majority is completely sovereign and determines what it is 
that men want, what their commonly agreed goals are. With 
the democratic power of majority will, those goals are ir-
resistibly achieved. 
Brameld has daringly planned the transformation of so-
ciety through education. The framework for the recon-
structionist education in all levels of learning, he says, shall 
be group discussion, testimony, consensus, and commit-
ment.11 Education must join itself to the expansive forces 
in the world which are struggling for the freedom of the 
common man. The first practical step of education, in this 
respect, is its affiliation with trade unions. These unions 
offer an excellent opportunity for a central channel through 
which the schools can fulfill social goals for the community. 
A general outline of the reconstructionist blueprint suggests 
an economy of abundance, a service state, a cultural design 
for the emphasis on the artistic in all phases of life, an edu-
cational system which is centralized and free to all, universal 
education from the nursery to adulthood, an education using 
all media of propaganda, a humane order which responds 
particularly to family life and to the needs of old people, 
minority protection, and world democracy. 
11 Summary of Brameld's views in Patterns of Educational Philosophy. 
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Since education becomes a "single great cultural design" 
of economics, politics, art, science, and human relations, 
there would ultimately come the necessary discouragement 
of private and parochial schools which promulgate divisive 
doctrines of vested interests and weaken the will of the ma-
jority. 
This, briefly, is the story of the inevitable advance of ideas 
and practices in a dynamic society. History is replete with 
the illustrations of the conservative-liberal-radical movement. 
It is the story of the theists, followed by the deists, followed 
by the atheists. It is the story of Comenius, who conceived 
of both man and the state created by God; followed by 
Locke, who compromised and said the state belonged to 
man and the individual belonged to God; followed by Rous-
seau, who said both the state and man belonged to men. 
It is the story of William James, who said God was allowable 
for men who empirically benefited from a faith in Him; 
followed by John Dewey, who said the concept of God was 
generally impracticable and should be ignored; followed 
by the reconstructionists, who say definitely that the tradi-
tional concept of God is itself a kind of vested interest and 
should be eliminated as expeditiously as possible in order 
to unblock the channels of progress. This is the pattern in 
history which provides the utopian reconstructionist with 
great hopes for the future of his movement as he presents 
his blueprints for a new society and a new world. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
A Social Concept of the Nature of Man 
Lm RECONSTRUCTIONIST is convinced that one of the 
critical weaknesses of contemporary Western civilization is 
the cult of individualism. Both ancient Greek humanism and 
modern Christianity have helped develop an individualistic 
trend in almost every sphere of human activity-in philos-
ophy, religion, science, economics, politics, education. The 
result has been an unnatural isolation of the individual 
from his neighbor, accented more than ever by the machine 
age. Now finally there is evidence of a strong counter move-
ment toward a new understanding of the social nature of 
the individual, a new appreciation of the necessity to inter-
pret the individual in the light of his society and his total 
surroundings. 
In America, at least, the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
tury educational perspective was strongly colored by the 
atomistic concept of man, largely an English influence, which 
appropriated nineteenth century biological and psychological 
discoveries to support it. Spencer, for example, utilized the 
Darwinian evolutionary principle to support an individualis-
tic philosophy in education. Likewise, the new science of 
psychology was at first mainly involved in the error of trying 
to understand the nature of man in isolation. It is under-
standable, therefore, that the earlier progressives, John 
Dewey for one, emphasized the individualistic spirit in their 
child-centered education. 
The modern social concept of man's nature has much in 
common with pragmatism, just as does educational recon-
structionism with progressivism in education. In the first 
place they are joined in their mutual insistence that man is 
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completely a product of the natural continuum. According 
to Sidney Hook, the concept of the soul as supernatural is a 
Christian idea, and the classical humanists have borrowed 
this concept from Christianity. But whether this supernat-
ural concept is purely philosophical, based on reason, or 
theological, in the sense that it is based on revelation, it 
cannot in either case stand against the critical scrutiny of 
modern science and associated contemporary philosophies. 
The modern philosophical principle that "process" rather 
than "being" is the ultimate principle of the universe has 
the most profound implications when it is applied to human 
nature. Man is not an absolute being whose nature is always 
the same, as the classical humanists believe, but is rather an 
evolving entity, developing into what he is through inter-
action with his environment. Man increases in value to the 
extent that he interacts successfully with a good environ-
ment. This is one of the basic presuppositions of Kurt 
Lewin. Man is no longer understood in isolation but in 
terms of "individual and the environment." The emphasis 
shifts from the organism to the process. The question of 
relationships becomes the dominating consideration. In this 
principle both the pragmatists and the educational recon-
structionists concur. 
Once human nature is relieved of its theological and 
metaphysical a priori straitjackets, it is possible to appreciate 
man's remarkable plasticity and potentialities for develop-
ment. What really fires the imagination of the reconstruc-
tionist is the understanding of man as unlimited in his 
possibilities, especially since modern science has made great 
progress in setting up techniques to control the interaction 
of the organism with the environment. What science has 
done in the control and direction of inanimate nature has 
been an excellent preparation for a new challenge as it now 
turns its attention to the greatest problems of all, those con-
cerned with man and his society in these troubled times. 
A further important liberation of the nature of man, as 
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he is understood in the light of biological, psychological, and 
sociological empirical investigations, is the final removal of 
the theological doctrine of sin, especially original sin. Since 
the Reformation there has been an interesting advance phil-
osophically in reference to man's nature and sin. John 
Calvin was the leading exponent of the doctrine that the 
evil in man's nature overcomes the good. Jean Jacques 
Rousseau reacted sharply to this harsh doctrine and argued 
that essentially man by nature is good. Rousseau concluded 
that vice and error are strangers to man's constitution; they 
are due, in short, to his institutions. Were it not for vested 
interests unresponsive to man's highest good, his beneficent 
inclinations would "gush forth torrentially." These views 
are basically the position of the present educational recon-
structionist, except that he would be inclined to carry the 
advance one step further by saying that scientifically one 
must describe human nature as fundamentally neither bad 
(Calvin) nor good (Rousseau) but neutral, which also is 
the carefully considered opinion of John Dewey. 
The reconstructionist is more realistic than the progressive 
in his recognition of the evils of society, but he is consistent 
with pragmatic interpretation in holding that the evil does 
not lie within man himself. Indeed, man has undergone a 
kind of "fall," according to the reconstructionist, not in the 
Christian sense of original sin but in a social sense (if one 
takes Karl Marx or Rousseau seriously) , when he became 
civilized and embarked upon the capitalistic way of life. 
Society is in a state of revolt, and therefore man, because 
he is the product of society, is against himself. Sin is not 
the defective "being" of the humanist, or the incomplete 
"intelligence" of the pragmatist, primarily, or the Christian 
concept of a perversion of relationship of man to God, but 
simply a badly adjusted environment distorting the plastic, 
responsive, sensitive human organism. Social institutions, 
not men, are bad. John Dewey in this respect justifies the 
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special place which the reconstructionists allow for him in 
their program when he observes that the defects of society 
"do not lie in an aversion of human nature to serviceable 
action, but in the historic conditions which have differen-
tiated the work of the laborer for wages from that of the 
artist, adventurer, soldier, administrator and speculator."1 
At another time Dewey observed that social conditions rather 
than an "old and unchangeable Adam" are primarily re-
sponsible for wars. George Counts states simply the con-
clusion of the matter in a positive sense: The good person 
must be formed in terms of a good society, and a good society 
is not natural; "it must be formed by the hand and brain of 
man."2 
The reconstructionist shares with the pragmatist a fierce 
kind of loyalty to the Rousseauistic ideal of equality for all 
men in reaction to the classical and frequently Christian 
patronage of the hierarchical orders. The doctrine of equal-
ity supplies a driving, almost evangelical motif for the re-
constructionist because it is at this point that he can most 
effectively appeal to the masses in bringing about a recon-
structed world. There is no argument which can more 
completely activate the expansive forces of the common 
people than to emphasize the inequalities they unjustly 
endure. There is no longer any doubt that men are essen-
tially born equal; reason supports this thesis; science con-
tinually demonstrates it; nature decrees it. If men are in 
truth equal, they all deserve the enjoyments of the good 
things this life offers, which until now have been denied 
the masses by vested interests. 
To subscribe to the tenet that all men are equal does not 
by any means imply that there should be a leveling down 
of society; rather, there must be a "leveling up" of the 
population. The fact that all men are born equal implies 
1 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 124. 
2 GeorgeS. Counts, Dare the School Build a New Social Order (New York, 
1932), 15. 
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that persons with outstanding abilities and opportunities 
should not use these personal prerogatives for themselves, 
but dedicate them to the welfare of the group. 
Once it is agreed that the nature of man can only be 
properly understood in terms of his total "gestalt" or "life-
space,"3 the entire field of time and space is understood as 
contributory to the significance of the individual. Now the 
social scientist must try to understand the basic principles 
of this total field which bear most directly upon the forma-
tion of human nature, or more particularly, human per-
sonality. The educational reconstructionist is inclined on 
this point to agree with Karl Marx that the area of economics 
is the starting point for reconstruction because it bears vital-
ly upon the whole structure of society. To make economics 
the starting point by no means implies a crass materialistic 
interpretation of life, but simply that the ideals of human 
freedom and human equality can only be fulfilled when 
material needs are met, and this can only happen when the 
aberrations of a capitalistic society are readjusted so that 
the individual is free to fulfill himself intellectually in an 
atmosphere of social harmony. The end of this program is 
not the accumulation of material goods but the emancipa-
tion of the human intellect. This too was the goal of Marx. 
The main reconstructionist disagreement with Marx is his 
method of reaching the goal. Violence and autocratic dic-
tatorship have backfired. This method must be replaced with 
a saner democratic process of majority group action. 
The educational reconstructionist also distinguishes him-
self quite definitely from the traditional pragmatist in his 
serious concern with the irrational nature of man. The 
pragmatists are inclined to put the supreme emphasis upon 
the power of intelligence to eclipse these irrational features 
of man's nature. Some of the newer thinkers point to "in-
stinctual and emotional forces" which eclipse the forces of 
3 Kurt Lewin's terminology. 
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intelligence. Again, dependence upon one's intelligence 
suggests individualization. For the reconstructionist, educa-
tion must become more social and less intellectual in the 
individual sense of the word. A fuller understanding of 
man's nature cannot help taking into account the dominant 
role of the irrational, or the "unrational" as Brameld prefers 
to call it. Man is basically a goal-seeking animal, and much 
of his goal seeking is "unrational." In addition to acquiring 
knowledge by "apprehension" (intelligent learning), man 
also possesses a "prehensive ability," profoundly enhanced 
in group interaction. The group mind tends to be "pre-
hensive," possessing a kind of intuitive, emotional, instinc-
tive faculty by which it discerns the really deep things of 
life. This emotional side of man's nature the pragmatist 
has overlooked. In order to challenge men to reconstruct 
their society, the emphasis upon intelligence is not enough. 
The whole man must be appealed to, and this includes in 
no small degree his emotions. The irresistible force upon 
which the reconstructionist depends to reach his goals is the 
emotional, unrational prehensive flow of the group mind, 
guided in the proper direction by the social techniques 
which insure democratic procedure in the reconstruction 
of society. 
Some of the educational reconstructionists, notably Theo-
dore Brameld, are inclined to follow the Marxian pattern, 
centering their educational efforts upon a transformation of 
the economic framework as the primary means of fulfilling 
the new order of society. There are, however, other van-
guard sociologists and social psychologists, for example, 
Mannheim and Lewin, of reconstructionist temper who do 
not wish to stop with economic considerations only. They 
point out that in so doing there is danger of an overempha-
sis upon one aspect of man's nature and man's world to the 
exclusion of many other factors which also must be dealt 
with in order to carry out a successful program. In other 
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words, the sociological emphasis of reconstruction is total. 
And this is to say that the economic sphere does not account 
for the whole nature of man; we must consider all of the 
cultural factors which contribute to his nature. Since the 
person is the product of his society, and since sociological 
advances have pointed out the infinite possibilities of social 
control, the time is at hand when the ideal for man can be 
selected, and he can be sociologically developed into it. 
Behaviorism, one of the older psychological naturalistic in-
terpretations of man's nature, suggested surface planning-
really an external approach-whereas the newer reconstruc-
tionist ideal for planning envelops not only externals, but 
the whole man. Kurt Lewin in his field theories gives elo-
quent support to this new ideal. Psychology attempts to 
understand all of the underlying realities of man's nature 
scientifically, just as science deals with the problems of chem-
istry and physics. The whole field affecting human behavior 
becomes the ground for study, including not only the physi-
cal world, but the psychological and social world as well. 
The scientific outcomes of such investigations point to a 
whole new control of man's future, of his society, even of 
man himself. 
These new perspectives in psychology and sociology pro-
vide an educational framework (psychology and sociology 
are becoming more and more the foundations of educational 
theory) for the reconstructionist platform. New cultural 
factors must be built into personalities. A new kind of 
world requires a new kind of person. This assumption pre-
supposes a new kind of education which is predominantly 
social. The educational program must be extended into the 
community in order to create social patterns which in turn 
sustain the new social personality. Reconstruction must take 
place in mass, group, form. The traditional concept of 
"individual conversion" is outdated. The "transformation 
of the individual in order to transform society" idea should 
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be reversed, and the new procedure should follow the plan 
of converting the society in order to convert the individual. 
Man's repressions and individual perversions must be un-
derstood socially. Once this is accomplished, the planners 
can decide what is ideal for man's new nature and reor-
ganize his environment accordingly. Public education in 
the twentieth century provides the ideal means for the exe-
cution of this program. Of course a consideration of this 
kind of mass regulation of the mind of man is frightening, 
but from a realistic point of view it is inevitable. Therefore 
the educator must take these sociological tools with all their 
potencies and see to it that they are used rightly.4 
In the final analysis, man is but one segment of nature's 
infinite expanse, and what science has already done in its 
conquest of plants, animals, soil, and water, it can do to 
improve the nature and destiny of man. When Finney said 
that educators not only administer schools but the world, 
his observations were couched in an idealistic, traditional 
perspective. Now the educational reconstructionist speaks 
the same language with the realistic backing of scientific 
knowledge adding tremendous conviction to his assertions 
that the transformation and direction of youth are the keys 
to the world's major problems. 
4 See Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (New 
York, 1941). 
CHAPTER NINE 
A Radical Solution to the Problem 
of Developing Responsibility 
SuRELY no one can be more serious about the problem 
of responsibility than the educational reconstructionist, al-
though with his dynamic concept of the role of education 
in society he shifts the weight of responsibility from indi-
vidual to group. He recognizes the gravity of the present 
trend toward the magnification of power in the modern 
world and what this trend implies in reference to the re-
sponsible application of this power. In a simple society, man 
cast himself upon the mercy of some inscrutable higher 
power. But now man realizes he must take the place of the 
gods because he himself possesses the knowledge and the 
control formerly attributed to them. He, not some higher 
mystical power, must act, plan, control. To avoid this new 
responsibility is nothing less than criminal, for if man does 
not actively direct and control these new forces, they will 
crush him. History is rushing toward a decision between 
the forces of expansion and the forces of contraction, be-
tween the forces of freedom and tyranny. Men must choose 
between them. How they choose decides the fate of civili-
zation; it is a choice, possibly, between life and death. The 
forces of expansion are evident in the awakening of common 
peoples the world over, "mingled together in a vast rumbling, 
clumsy, infinitely powerful mass of hundreds of millions 
of men, women, and children; blacks, whites, yellows, Jews, 
Christians, Mohammedans, peasants, professionals, laborers, 
artists, doctors, teachers."1 These forces may liberate the 
1 Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, 669·70. 
A Radical Solution 97 
world forever from the tyrannies of special interests and 
traditional monopolies. There can be no doubt that it is 
the school's task to harness and to direct these potentialities 
for liberation. This is one of the grave and overwhelming 
responsibilities of education. 
The current problems of society are so serious that the 
older concepts of individual responsibility are no longer 
adequate for the immense tasks of social reconstruction. The 
new emphasis upon responsibility must be social. The deep-
seated ills of society require the concerted power of the group 
to remove them. The progressives with their program cen-
tered on the individual pupil had not taken into account 
the possibility of radical and total social disintegration. For 
that reason, among others, the progressive schools with their 
enthusiastic experiments now show serious signs of disin-
tegrating morale and poor discipline. Undoubtedly the 
home is also shirking its responsibilities in training American 
youth, and probably there are many other reasons for the 
plight of our young people, but their condition today points 
up acutely the need for the new education. The teacher 
as an individual no longer can cope with many of these 
problems, because they stem from a total social disintegra-
tion. The logical answer is a social approach. The restora-
tion of order and stability in the schools can only be ac-
complished by a social program strong enough to direct and 
to regulate this shattering individualism which is sabotaging 
the social good. Actually, the teacher should not be the 
center of an educational program; his learning, personality, 
and authority are not the basis for good educational pro-
cedures, as the humanists believe, but rather his ability to 
manipulate the social environment in such a way that social 
pressure is brought to bear upon the individuals of the 
group in order to develop responsible action. Thus the 
educator creates a social and cultural field which properly 
supports and influences the individual in his choices between 
responsible and irresponsible actions. 
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This implication of the "social" concept of responsibility 
suggests the need for a revised set of values for mankind. 
The rules by which men lived for the last two or three cen-
turies are now outdated. A new interdependent society 
requires a new, socially oriented set of values. The admoni-
tion "love your neighbor" now connotes a much greater 
social significance. Men now need "a set of attitudes and 
ideas by which to tell what is right and wrong, desirable and 
undesirable, with respect to the policies and actions of large 
social groups that have supplanted the old-fashioned com-
munity."2 Ethical standards should be discovered to a great-
er extent in social relationships. Moral choices are more 
to be determined within the social setting. The question 
of moral man is less significant than the problem of immoral 
society. Twentieth century problems are centered in mass 
movements and mass relationships. 
The path to new concepts of social morality, according 
to the educational reconstructionist, lies in the techniques 
of social consensus, a discovering of the group mind. This 
involves an inductive procedure wherein consensus, agree-
ment through public discussion, extends outward through 
larger and larger groups until there is a majority agreement 
on basic issues in the whole country, or even in the whole 
world. The establishment of a proper set of values starts 
with an examination of individual wants and proceeds by 
intensive investigation of the larger needs of the community. 
The majority agreement on basic issues is not just a quanti-
tative result-a counting of noses-but a qualitative result 
as well, for the sources of consensus are the prehensive, 
unrational, deep desires of all mankind, and consensus so 
supported becomes the standard of value by which the society 
regulates itself and makes its social decisions. The idea of 
power "becomes itself a moral concept of mass action through 
2 B. Othanel Smith, William 0. Stanley, and J. Harlan Shores, Funda-
mentals of Curriculum Development (Yonkers-on-Hudson, N. Y., 1950), 57. 
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democratic channels for Utopian goals."3 Power, the greatest 
of which is the over-all group mind centered on its goals, 
becomes responsibly directed because it is applied in accord 
with the wants of the majority discovered democratically. 
The starting point for the discovery of values is the 
"wants" of individuals. A human being is a goal-seeking 
animal. Learning what his goals are involves a "consensus" 
process, and this process needs no superexperiential dictates. 
The process is social; the individual no longer possesses the 
means to cope with the immensity of social problems, and 
he also lacks the breadth of understanding as an individual 
to determine values. Power and values alike belong to the 
collective will which democratically discovers its values and 
applies its powers. The highest value which man can know, 
the final all-embracing value, is the supreme ideal of "social-
self-realization." The individual in a prehensive and unra-
tional kind of way identifies himself with the group mind 
in the processes of social consensus and thereby realizes his 
deepest wants. A person by denying himself individually 
finds himself collectively; this is "social-self-realization." This 
is actually not a novel concept, because it was long ago 
anticipated by the Christian emphasis upon the dignity of 
personality and the brotherhood of man. In fact this whole 
group process with its emphasis upon the unrational and 
the prehensive readily submits to a religious impulse which 
is admittedly essential to the human being. A new "cultural 
myth" becomes the basis for religious faith, although it is a 
faith grounded in modern scientific knowledge.4 
The educational reconstructionists, like the classical hu-
manists, are vitally concerned with the problem of freedom, 
for therein is also fundamentally involved the problem of 
responsibility. No one seems to disagree with the assumption 
that responsibility implies freedom and freedom implies re-
sponsibility. The reconstructionist, however, in contrast to 
3 Brameld, 506. 4 Summary of Brameld's outlook. 
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the classical humanist, places a quite different interpretation 
on freedom and responsibility. 
A realistic survey of the current social problems will easily 
show why new concepts are necessary. The complexity of 
modern society's problems cancels out any hope of individual 
mastery and with it the high place of individual responsi-
bility in the face of such problems. Social forces are thus 
inevitable. The individual must limit his own freedom to 
enhance the freedom of the group. The social force estab-
lished in free groups makes possible the more satisfactory 
control of invidious forces in the world with which the 
individual cannot cope. In the modern collective trend the 
individual is becoming less and less free; as an individual 
he is in the grip of circumstances about which he can do 
little. Man's best hope, therefore, is a collective effort to 
re-establish freedom for the group. It is the group, really, 
which is free and which discovers itself increasingly account-
able. Social responsibility is gradually replacing individual 
responsibility. The classical humanist's emphasis upon in-
dividual responsibility, noble though it has been, is now 
outmoded by new needs for collective responsibility. 
For the reconstructionist the modern complex culture 
necessitates the subjugation of the individual to the group. 
Submission to the group makes responsible action possible. 
The group is responsible because it is free and capable of 
responding to the whole situation. The complexities of 
modern life make it difficult for the individual to respond 
to the total situation or to act effectively in the face of it. 
The freedom and the responsibility of individuals must be 
realized in the obedient act of conforming to the group 
mind-a democratically determined group mind-and in the 
group, men realize their true freedom; they fulfill their 
deepest responsibilities. Intelligence can emancipate educa-
tion, and for that matter the whole society, not by acting 
individually but by discovering socially the necessary road 
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which must be followed. This road can be discovered demo-
cratically, through public consensus educationally directed, 
in order to fulfill the new ideals of social freedom and social 
responsibility. And finally, where the individual is faced 
with crucial decisions, the group interpretation of what is 
necessary is the safest and most satisfactory. 
The reconstructionist, in contrast to the progressive, deals 
realistically with the problem of authority. He does not, 
like the pragmatist, undercut all foundations for authorita-
tive action in the face of radical difficulties. The reconstruc-
tionist feels with the pragmatist that he can no longer appeal 
to the will of God to help him with practical decisions. 
Neither does he wish to succumb to the dictatorial policies 
of a totalitarian state. Intelligence, not in an individual 
sense but in a social sense, shall provide the necessary man-
made social authority needed at the present time. The 
process by which this authority is established is the technique 
of consensus, first a local and later a large scale consensus 
which binds the whole society to majority-approved action. 
The minority may dissent in voice but not in action when 
a consensus becomes the expression of the majority. The 
public schools possess the capabilities of directing this whole 
process of consensus, and after consensus has been attained, 
the public schools themselves obviously will be regulated in 
their activity by these majority decrees which, however, may 
change from time to time. The reconstructionists must by 
all means correct the key weaknesses of pragmatic indecision 
by outlining an unequivocal basis of authority for social 
action, for a realistic appraisal of our present needs shows 
that social order requires some definite kind of cultural 
authority. 
Discipline, now becoming a problem in the schools, is 
not to be obtained by an "interest" appeal (progressive), 
nor by an authoritarian pedagogue (classical humanism) 
who assumes responsibility for the discipline of the group, 
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but rather by group control itself. Discipline is formulated 
by the group, and it is imposed by the group. Majority-
established discipline is neither soft not sentimental, but 
imposes stern requirements upon its members. Minorities 
must conform in action to group consensus, though they 
must always be guaranteed the privilege to voice dissent in 
public discussion. It is the conviction of the reconstruc-
tionist that no discipline is so effective in redirecting the 
straying individual as group discipline, and consequently 
there is no method so effective in establishing responsible 
action on the part of each individual in the group. In a sense, 
reconstructionist discipline is a force which makes the indi-
vidual lose himself in order to find himself. Individual 
differences are played down at the beginning of the disci-
plinary process in order that corporately, at the end of the 
process, the individual is enhanced with a greater freedom 
by virtue of his membership in the group. 
If a long range view is taken of the problem of responsi-
bility, the position of the reconstructionist comes more clear-
ly into focus as an up-to-date adjustment to the changing 
modes of thought and action in the world. In the case of 
the primitives the prevailing concept was a kind of "horde 
responsibility" where there were strict limits to individual 
choices. Western civilization stimulated individual compe-
tition, hence the irresistible swing toward individual action 
and individual responsibility. This was a great step forward 
over the primitive, but a stride toward a more complicated 
form of culture is the new concept of group responsibility, 
which is a kind of "sharing responsibility." At present this 
concept of responsibility is best expressed in small-group 
sharing, strongly recommended as an educational procedure. 
Eventually this concept will evolve itself into larger and 
larger areas of group planning. Planning becomes the key 
to the establishment of social responsibility. All persons 
share in planning and in the formation of group consensus, 
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and this process psychologically identifies the individual with 
the group process, developing in him a sense of social re-
sponsibility. This is the basis for a remarkable amount of 
emphasis in recent educational theory on group dynamics, 
on the encouragement of more intercommunication, com-
mittee action, conferences, discussions. The more advanced 
theorists now talk about problem-centered groups which dis-
cuss social problems, analyze them, come to conclusions, and 
then act. "Social action" is one of the latest concepts of a 
substantial basis for an enduring democracy. If there is an 
evidence of individual responsibility in a collective society, 
it is simply the obligation of the individual to identify him-
self with the group process, involving himself in group dis-
cussion, by which consensus is obtained and programs for 
the general welfare are initiated. In that same sense, irre-
sponsibility is conceived as the resistance of the individual 
will to share in the collective will. This is a modern con-
clusion not far afield from the earlier views of Rousseau 
when he argued that the general will of the society is identi-
fied with infallible right, forming the consensus of the group, 
and nothing should stand between the individual and his 
loyalty to this group consensus in a democratic regime. 
The scaling up of the concept of responsibility to the 
social level places a new emphasis upon the problem of 
intergroup relationships, a situation which must become 
more and more a vital concern of education. Minority prob-
lems are actually majority problems, and they must be 
solved primarily on the group level. More intensive scientific 
research is required in the areas of intergroup relationships 
in order scientifically to establish clear-cut responsible group 
interaction. This challenge, in terms of social responsi-
bilities, appeals particularly to the social psychologists, un-
doubtedly influenced by the Kurt Lewin school, who con-
sider the issue of proper group relationships to be possibly 
the greatest contemporary problem of society. 
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At the base of this whole point of view, then, is the 
assumption that a twentieth century concept of responsibility 
and education's relation to it involves not the traditional 
or even the pragmatic approach, but a group approach to 
the problem. The modern environment, different from any-
thing previously experienced, has engendered a recession in 
moral and rational progress. The traditional concepts of 
morality, couched in an individualistic framework, have now 
in a sense become propagators of individual irresponsibility, 
because the old order no longer applies to the new age and 
so tends to be divisive. The nature of modern society inevi-
tably decrees more state control, emphasis on security, and 
the control of all phases of social activity. This collectivistic 
trend, so inevitable and inescapable, calls for one of two 
possible solutions: dictatorial control or democratic group 
planning. In fact, planning itself is inevitable, and for a 
people dedicated to the democratic way of life there must 
be a radical adjustment to the idea that planning and the 
democratic process are not at all exclusive to each other and 
that a negligent or an obstructive attitude toward social 
planning may weaken the democratic vitality of a society 
so that it succumbs to an autocratic form of totalitarianism. 
In the face of a continuing social crisis, therefore, the 
reconstructionist insists on the educational utilization of 
every means to help young people learn "about the quality 
and quantity of what we want and how we get what we 
want."5 The process of consensus, concerning what it is 
that the majority wants and how it is to be obtained, begins 
in earnest in the public schools with the lowest grades 
through the intensification of the group process, involving 
all manner of councils and committees for students, parents, 
service employees, citizens-everyone who in any way is di-
rectly or indirectly involved in public education. Teachers 
should reach for power and use it wisely in order to promote 
5 Brameld, 541. 
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the process of consensus democratically. They should be 
strongly committed to the democratic ideal which insists 
that all forces tending toward class distinction should be 
controverted. On the part of teachers there should be an 
active resistance to every form of privilege, a responsiveness 
to the underprivileged, an exaltation of human labor, a 
devotion to equality among races, a supreme loyalty to the 
interests of the masses. 
The teacher should be thoroughly grounded in modern 
psychological and sociological principles which are the basis 
for intelligent reconstruction. He should be concerned with 
the problem of group conflict, the principles of social psy-
chology, anthropology, economics, political science, history. 
The teacher should deliberately center the school activities 
upon debatable social, political, and economic problems 
which currently are critical issues. Basic debatable questions 
should become prominent features of the educational cur-
riculum. The continual critical review of the roles of the 
family, of religion, and of government is essentially im-
portant. These problems constitute the basis of learning, 
especially those social problems which block the goal-seeking 
society from reaching its national and international goals. 
The practical educational problem heretofore posed for 
the pragmatists and the classical humanists is ideally con-
stituted, it would seem, to show the reconstructionist ap-
proach in the best light. Surely there is no educational 
problem more basic to the thinking of the reconstructionists 
than that of intergroup relationships, in this case the har-
monization of racial groups in the community. 
The pragmatists attempt to solve this problem by means 
of an intelligent approach, and the classical humanists em-
phasize basically the means of reason and the law. In con-
trast, the reconstructionists suggest a new approach which 
would revise the concept of individual intelligence into the 
new idea of social intelligence, this social ability to be 
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fostered by group dynamics, group consensus, group action. 
The educational reconstructionist suggests at least three 
important approaches to the solution of this problem of 
responsible intergroup relationships in the community. The 
first point outlines the actual groundwork which is done in 
the schools of the community. The whole philosophy of 
the school program is revised in such a way that the emphasis 
is shifted from the "I" to the "we." This orientation starts 
at the lowest levels of education with a program of group 
interaction. Public school nurseries are sponsored in order 
to submit the child to the wholesome impact of socialization 
at a most impressionable age. Teachers and administrators 
forsake the roles of individual directors and leaders, and 
commit themselves to the task of fostering the group process. 
The total environment of the child is group oriented, from 
the bottom up. The administrative policies of the school, 
the faculty meetings, and teacher-pupil relationships are 
group oriented, wherein all persons associated with school 
life are given an increasing public share in decisions which 
in any way affect them. Social problems-in this case the 
race question-are directly faced and discussed; they are 
included as an integral part of the school curriculum. Edu-
cation becomes a means for the group to think and feel its 
way toward community-accepted ends. 
Group dynamics is the key to the reconstructionist cur-
riculum and likewise the key to the particular problem now 
being considered. The teacher, even though he is not a 
sociological expert, can use relatively simple social tech-
niques in order to bolster the group processes, such as the 
sociogram by means of which he can obtain a reasonably 
scientific picture of the group structure of his class, who are 
the key persons which the group holds in high regard, who 
are the group outcasts, the divisions of the group into cliques, 
and so on. This knowledge is invaluable to the instructor 
in intelligently promoting "in-group" growth, helping lone 
individuals learn to be a part of the group, and bringing 
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closer together different small factions within the larger 
group. The teacher recognizes his secondary position in 
maintaining group morals personally and instead directs 
his energies toward the intensification of group togetherness, 
establishing a community spirit which automatically resolves 
many of the problems of discipline and motivation in learn-
ing. The more success the teacher has in establishing the 
group spirit and eliminating the lone eagle spirit in his class, 
the closer he comes to establishing a total milieu which is 
essential to the solution of the practical problem at hand. 
A second phase of the educational reconstructionist's at-
tack on the problem of racial relationships follows in the 
extension of the principles of group dynamics from the 
school to the community. This transition is quite reason-
ably possible because the school already has integrated basic 
community problems into the school curriculum. The actual 
process of group dynamics practised by the school in its 
administrative-teacher, administrative-employee, and admin-
istrative-teacher-pupil relationships has already involved the 
wider community, including elements of the minority groups, 
represented possibly by the janitors and other service em-
ployees. Since the curriculum is community oriented, it is 
a natural outcome that the school shall more and more 
integrate its activities with the community through its tours, 
projects, and investigations; through the use of community 
facilities and talents in the educational processes of the 
school; and through its community work programs. This 
ever widening group process sooner or later is bound to 
involve the direct attention of the students on the race 
problems of the community, and these problems will be 
faced not by some elite or intellectual group, but by many 
persons intimately concerned with the problem. 
In the group discussions of these problems, public rather 
than private, the basic issues of sufficient nourishment, ade-
quate dress, equal status, become prominent issues discussed 
by all types of persons in the school and eventually in the 
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community. This kind of interplay of ideas, wherein the 
problems involving the minority groups are seen partially 
from the perspective of the minorities themselves, is bound 
to have a salutary effect upon the thinking of the whole 
community. Furthermore, the actual experience of such 
group dynamics involving all sections, cutting across caste 
and class lines, establishes a line of communication between 
various groups and classes which previously did not exist. 
The middle walls of partition are broken down, and men 
no longer think and feel and act in isolation. Prejudices 
are thereby softened, and the understanding becomes en-
lightened. Once the point is reached where there is a reason-
able toleration of minority groups, the total community 
morale will be inestimably raised, and a really substantial 
foundation will be laid for mutual respect and co-operation 
between all groups. The whole process will be continually 
undergirded by participation, the sharing in responsible 
group decisions, the magnification of the sense of belonging, 
and the increase of mutual appreciation which comes through 
co-operative activity. The basic reconstructionist principles 
involved in this solution to the problem are first, that com-
munication is basic; second, that learning is most effective 
through group dynamics and that here is discovered the 
basis of social consensus; third, that the wider and wider 
effect of group dynamics establishes a kind of super ego 
which includes all kinds of peoples and all classes, and by 
this means the individual is group oriented; and fourth, 
that this whole procedure is public, open, always subject to 
community examination. 
And finally, the educational reconstructionist theorist is 
concerned with the processes of group dynamics not only 
to solve immediate problems but to institute a drive syste-
matically to reduce the intensity of the individualistic com-
petitive spirit. The educational reconstructionist hopes to 
supplant the spirit of individualism with the ritual of co-
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operation as it is experienced in the group processes. When 
this goal is accomplished, men will be freed for higher levels 
of responsibility so that they may creatively engage in pro-
ductive activities for the welfare of all mankind, so that 
they may work unhampered by the traditional influences of 
individualism and selfish competition. 
The educational reconstructionist is convinced that the 
total effect of the group processes in a community will supply 
the clearly demarcated patterns for "social-self-realization." 
These group processes give the individual in the community 
that sense of stability which socially supports him for re-
sponsible action. Group participation leads to group orien-
tation in man's thinking and in his responses. The purposes 
of the community become more clear to him and conse-
quently more challenging, calling for his co-operation and 
dedication. Always there is in operation in the group proc-
esses the psychological principle that sharing in group 
decisions automatically dignifies the sharing in group re-
sponsibilities. The continuing identification of the indi-
vidual with the group through group processes effectively 
lessens the irresponsible actions of the egoist in isolation, 
and one's egoistic tendencies are thus largely offset by the 
intellectual power which is generated through participation 
in group decisions and actions. The new world is a collective 
world, and it requires a sound, scientific emphasis of the 
group processes in order to insure the development of a 
collective responsibility, the only ideal force which insures 
a reasonable chance for the survival of a twentieth century 
democratic society. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
Education, the State, and 
ChriStian Faith 
LnA Y the proper relationship of Christian faith to public 
education is a serious problem. It is reasonably safe to say 
that the educational history of the United States is quite 
unintelligible apart from Christian faith. Christian influence 
is deeply felt not only by contemporary leaders in education, 
progressivists and classical humanists, but even by educa-
tional reconstructionists who admit certain Christian ethical 
forms pervading their otherwise non-Christian educational 
faith. 
Although it is relatively simple to argue the vital historical 
relationship between Christian faith and public education, 
it seems extremely difficult to analyze this relationship. Edu-
cation is complicated by its divergent philosophies, and 
Christendom is beset with its manifold variations of faith. 
These deviations in both areas create many tensions: philos-
ophy against philosophy, faith against faith, and philosophy 
against faith. 
Early American education was without doubt predomi-
nantly a Protestant Christian enterprise. A vigorous Refor-
mation faith decreed that all men are individually account-
able to a sovereign God; all men, therefore, ought to be 
taught to read the Bible in order to fulfill their theological 
responsibilities. So believed the early Puritans of New 
England who are credited with a major contribution to the 
religious foundations of the public school in America. 
The same faith which emphasized strongly the responsi-
bility of every man to God also insisted that all men are 
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basically unreliable when they are tempted with power. 
When the problem of government was faced, it was decided 
that power and authority ought to be placed in the hands 
of many. A constitution was written which provided checks 
and balances to counteract the ever present human failing 
to misuse state power. By virtue of this lively Protestant 
faith in the sovereignty of God and man's obligation to Him, 
along with a parallel distrust in the natural perfectibility 
of man, early America organized a unique kind of education 
and launched a remarkable governmental experiment in the 
new world. Both the new education and the new state pro-
ceeded "under God," and both proclaimed that "in God 
we trust." 
Because early Protestantism in America took its faith 
seriously both for the individual and for the community, 
it was vulnerable to schism, a common weakness in groups 
who take faith seriously. The Protestant insistence that 
every man is his own priest before God supported a fresh 
and vital form of individualism. Yet the wholesome diversity 
which this doctrine inspired also made possible a trend 
toward unwholesome fragmentation. Some of the strength 
of Protestantism was transformed to weakness when various 
groups seemingly misunderstood and misused their Christian 
liberties. Eventually a proliferation of the sects and a sub-
sequent intensity of conflict among them, often about peri-
pheral matters, necessitated the formulation of new laws to 
separate religious conflict from public education. And in 
the days of Horace Mann it was decided that no religious 
sectarian instruction must be given in the public schools 
and that public funds must not be granted to sectarian 
schools. 
During this era the strife between sectarian groups was 
apparently serious enough to obscure the central core of 
theological faith which was yet common ground for the 
contending sects. Dissension about lesser religious problems 
occupied the center of the stage to the extent that the central 
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theological faith which provided the infinitely valuable 
framework for both school and state was not treasured prop-
erly, but was seemingly taken for granted. 
Our twentieth century historical perspective shows how 
much important headway nontheological world views had 
already gained by the middle of the nineteenth century. 
·while the common Christian faith of the nation was being 
taken for granted, the minds of the educated were already 
excited by novel and fascinating naturalistic faiths: organic 
evolution, the possibilities of the scientific method, the dream 
of progress. Faith in reason and in nature was subtly dis-
placing the Reformation concept of faith in God. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, educational 
philosophers ambitiously viewed the prospect of creating 
the good life by means of newly discovered knowledge-
physical, biological, psychological, sociological. John Dewey 
led the way in outlining a philosophy which turned its face 
against traditional absolutes and placed its confidence in 
scientifically established criteria based upon experience. The 
scientific method was expected to revolutionize moral knowl-
edge in the same way that it was already transforming 
knowledge of the physical world. But the educational flow-
ering of this secular faith was cut short by two disastrous 
world wars and a great depression. 
As early as 1930 educators were seriously reconsidering 
their ebullient secular optimism. The forward movement 
of secular programs was being distracted by the harsh reali-
ties of war and want. Unexpected pressures upon education 
revealed latent weaknesses stemming from a lack of common 
faith. Confusion and uncertainty generated many competing 
faiths, each attempting to supply the answers to education's 
new problems. Now educators began to talk more seriously, 
with some nostalgia it seemed, about the earlier common 
theological faith which effectively provided an integrative 
framework for education. But it was evident that powerful 
secular faiths had seriously weakened the original founda-
116 Education and Responsibility 
tions. Many educators were coming to the conclusion that 
a common faith ought to be restored to education, but there 
was little agreement about what that faith should be. The 
pragmatists and the reconstructionists believing in a dynamic 
novel universe argued that we needed a new faith for a new 
age. The classical humanists said that education had for-
saken the classical emphasis on reason and that education 
restored to the life of reason would dispel the confusion. 
And a resurging Christian faith with its two outstanding 
traditional forms, Roman Catholicism and Reformation 
faith, insisted that education's dilemma could be traced to 
its separation from Christian faith or at least to the weaken-
ing of Christian foundations. 
Today secularism in education represented by pragmatic 
and reconstructionist views presents democracy as the new 
faith which best supports a dynamic and diversified educa-
tional program. As theological faith fulfilled the needs of 
an earlier age, so democracy as a new faith can fulfill the 
needs of the present age. As theological foundations once 
commonly supported both education and the state, so a 
secular democratic faith can now provide the foundation 
for modern education and the modern state. The new faith 
carries great potentiality because it is nontheological and 
therefore nonsectarian. Its purposes relate themselves to all 
of the people. The democratic faith considers the principle 
of the separation of church and state extremely important, 
for dogmatic supernaturalisms tend to be divisive and they 
ought to be detained outside the high wall of separation to 
prevent them from impeding the development of this com-
mon faith. 
The creed of this secular democratic faith is centered in 
the ideals of human dignity, equality, and freedom. Final 
authority rests in the democratic state which derives its au-
thority from the people. In times of national and interna-
tional crisis it may be necessary for the state to assume more 
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direct control of the educative processes in order to insure 
the democratization of its citizenry, in order to support more 
effectively the democratic processes of sharing and group 
participation so that the young may be better grounded in 
responsible democratic citizenship. 
The Roman Catholic Church with its separative practices 
in contemporary American education represents a formidable 
threat to this secular democratic faith. The hope of a com-
mon democratic faith for all of the people is difficult to 
achieve indeed when a gigantic organization of some 
29,000,000 souls officially withdraws its young from public 
education and proposes to educate them in separate schools 
where practicable and to found them in a religious faith 
which is admittedly thoroughly opposed to the powerful 
nontheological faiths which now permeate public education. 
The Roman Catholic Church was a small minority group 
in early America. During the past hundred years, however, 
it has added to its rolls a multitude of Catholic immigrants 
who came to the United States from Europe. In addition 
it has undergone a modern spiritual renaissance, due partial-
ly at least to an unwavering adherence to its faith in this 
present age of uncertainty. These developments have con-
tributed substantially to the establishment in America of a 
powerful ecclesiastical organization which traditionally car-
ries with it a determined and unapologetic philosophy of 
education. 
The parents rather than the state, insists the Roman 
Catholic Church, are primarily responsible for the education 
of their children. It is the parents who are accountable to 
God through the church for administering the right kind 
of education. Since parents cannot fulfill this obligation 
individually (education is a social function), the church 
considers it necessary to provide the right kind of education 
for the children of believers. Actually education is not 
Christian unless it is presided over by the Christian ecclesia-
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which of course is exclusively the Roman Catholic Church. 
And "there can be no ideally perfect education which is not 
Christian education.''1 
Long experience has shown that the Roman Catholic 
Church and the family are best qualified to promote the 
education of children. The church therefore considers it 
justifiable to agitate politically, if necessary, to fulfill its 
educational purposes for the young. The idea of the separa-
tion of church from school cannot be tolerated, because the 
church is the spiritual guardian of education. It is necessary 
to the state as well as to the church that children learn the 
meaning of personal and community responsibility under 
the spiritual direction of God's chosen organization. The 
state has its area of temporal authority, but the church un-
compromisingly claims the primary authority in moral and 
spiritual matters. And many of the most profound moral 
and spiritual responsibilities are unquestionably involved 
in the educative processes. 
This problem of authority points to the heart of the 
dilemma for education, because it not only involves a con-
troversial relationship between Christian faith and secular 
faiths, but also indicates a basic cleavage at the center of 
Christendom itself. 
For the Neo-Thomist, God the Creator is absolutely sov-
ereign. And God is the creator and sustainer of natural law. 
Man learns about God and about truth through two im-
portant channels: first, through the discovery of natural 
law, and second, by divine revelation through the Roman 
Catholic Church. Man through the proper development of 
his reason can discover authoritative truth by learning about 
God's laws which sustain His creation, and through the 
church the believer receives higher truth which is revealed 
by God. Rationally discovered truth and revealed truth 
coming from the same source must always support one an-
1 Encyclical letter of Pope Pius XI on "Christian Education of Youth." 
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other. Moral and spiritual persons by means of right reason 
and divine enlightenment are vested with unquestionable 
authority because they can speak the truth. There is a 
hierarchy of authority, however, in accordance with the level 
in which truth is discovered. The authority of rationally 
discovered truth is not equal to authority based upon re-
vealed truth (which is the primary basis for the authority 
of the church). Men by reason can discover truth which 
supports their temporal authorities, but men by faith 
through the church learn the highest truth which carries 
with it the highest authority. The highest ability to speak 
the truth involves a parallel highest responsibility to com-
mand with authority. 
Obviously this view of authority and truth evokes a violent 
reaction from nontheological secular democratic faiths which 
stand adamant against these claims of absolute authority, 
and education is the critical area where these faiths meet 
head on. The Roman Catholic Church cannot possibly sub-
scribe in principle to an autonomous secular arrangement 
where the state or the individual can proceed on the basis 
that they are free of the church's higher authority. And 
modern secular democratic faith on the other hand cannot 
brook the proposition that any organization which is only 
a part of the whole can authoritatively command the whole 
in the name of God. The democratic equalitarian view 
insists that authority must reside in all persons concerned 
with any decision which carries authority with it. In the 
final analysis the people are sovereign. Authority is essen-
tially internal, stemming from the group or the situation, 
rather than external, flowing from a power which stands 
above the situation. 
Jacques Maritain, possibly the most distinguished of Cath-
olic philosophers commonly known to American readers, 
presents a closely reasoned Catholic analysis of the question 
of church and state relationships. This noted philosopher 
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first makes a serious point of distinguishing the state from 
what he calls the "body politic."2 The body politic is the 
whole body of citizens of a nation. This body sustains within 
its life the whole gamut of cultural activity: thousands of 
different combinations of citizens centering upon a varied 
multitude of interests. The state, in contrast to the body 
politic, is the topmost part of the whole body of people, 
the hood of the people which protects and nourishes their 
cultural activities. The varied activity of the body politic 
is the work of reason extending upward, while the work of 
the state is reason (manifested through its works of justice) 
working downward. The state umpires and coerces, if neces-
sary, and it has the power to fulfill these assignments, but 
the direct source of its power is the people. The state spon-
sors justice, but the state ought not to participate in, or 
become a part of, the cultural enterprises which take place 
within the body politic. As the referee does not play in the 
actual game, the state ought not actually to participate in 
the cultural activities of the people. 
The authority of the state-and this is basic-is not ulti-
mately sovereign authority. The government possesses power 
to rule, but the government must not claim ultimate au-
thority for itself. The state is immediately answerable to 
the people and ultimately answerable to God who is sov-
ereign over all. And the organization on earth which is the 
chosen representative of the eternal sovereign God is the 
Roman Catholic Church. The state is answerable temporally 
to the people and eternally to God. 
If this be the position of the state, it seems obvious that 
education ought not to be subject, in its cultural and spir-
itual aspects, to the unequivocal authority of the state, nor 
ought education to be the function of the state, for education 
is not the legitimate business of the state any more than 
playing the game is the legitimate function of the umpire. 
2 In the discussions which follow, Jacques Maritain's book, Man and the 
State, is heavily drawn upon for outlining the Roman Catholic viewpoint. 
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Education is a cultural activity which ought to be under 
the jurisdiction of an authority higher than the state, and 
this higher authority is the Roman Catholic Church. The 
state by all means ought to co-operate with education and 
to support education, but the actual functioning of education 
is a family commitment, and the extension of this family 
responsibility is a church assignment. Just as the state ought 
to encourage all of the cultural activities of the body politic, 
it ought also to encourage and support education, but the 
state ought to acknowledge the higher authority of the 
church in spiritually guiding the educational process. 
Since the modern state is more and more discovering that 
its own vitality is drawn from the spiritual strength which 
the church gives to the body politic (this is the Roman 
Catholic position) , it ought to be particularly attentive to 
the work of Christian agencies in the realm of education. 
A nation which realizes that its beginnings and its prosperity 
are inseparable from Christian faith cannot afford to remain 
neutral about supporting the source of its strength. The 
church has the spiritual resources for solving the problem 
of developing responsible citizens. It is the urgent business 
of the state to support the organization which knows through 
its godly wisdom the manner and the means of best carrying 
out this educational assignment. 
This position of the church in reference to authority in 
education is obviously unacceptable to the secular forces 
which control public education today. But this same ques-
tion also creates a formidable barrier between Roman Cath-
olic faith and Reformation Christian faith. 
Martin Luther revived the New Testament implications 
of man's direct responsibility to God and the infinitely per-
sonal nature of man's relationship, by faith, to his Creator. 
Man's salvation is a personal matter, and nothing ought to 
come between him and God. Salvation involves an intensely 
active personal response to God and not only a passive ac-
ceptance of the dictates of the church. Salvation involves a 
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meeting of persons: man meeting God; God discovering 
Himself to man. The person himself is in one sense an 
ultimate, and his personal relationship to God (not to the 
church) is the ultimate basis for his humanity and his sal-
vation. The frightening aspect of every man's existence is 
that he can personally say yes or no to God his Creator. 
And this interpretation of man's existence involves a radical 
understanding of the nature of responsibility. With the 
Thomist view the church assumes considerable responsibility 
for man's salvation. The church makes many of the hard 
decisions, and its members accept the church's authority 
about these decisions. With the Reformation view a fuller 
weight of responsibility falls upon every individual who has 
reached the age of discretion. 
According to the Reformers the emphasis upon the sov-
ereignty of God is not primarily an organizational matter 
but a personal matter. The Schoolmen under the guise of 
ecclesiastical authority actually tended to draw a veil over 
the minds of men. Faith does not consist of placing trust 
in the authority of the church, but of personal knowledge. 
And men ought never to place their final confidence in 
divine teachers so called, because it is obvious, as Calvin 
observed, that "some portion of unbelief is always mixed 
with faith in every Christian." Christians, even though they 
are leaders in the household of faith, are yet sinners, and 
they cannot say that they possess the whole truth unmixed 
with error. To claim that the church, though made up of 
sinful and deficient men, is at the same time the body of 
Christ and therefore sinless as a community which functions 
officially in the name of Christ, does not take into account 
the radical nature of personal human sinfulness and the 
communal solidarity of sin as it is seen from the Reformation 
point of view. Because men even at their best are sinful, 
final authority simply cannot be centered in any group or 
organization, even though it claims to represent God on 
earth. 
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But history well shows that this Protestant revolt against 
the authority of the Roman Catholic Church has created 
some difficult problems for modern society. Protestantism 
has splintered into a confusing array of individualistic groups 
in the ecclesiastical realm, and in the world at large, men 
have perverted this Protestant revolt to mean that everyone 
could do as he pleased to satisfy his lust for unbridled 
freedom. The discipline and the authority which human 
beings seem desperately to need for their community life 
has been woefully dissipated in this modern age, and every 
man tends to do what is right in his own eyes. God was 
sovereign for the Reformers first of all in a personal sense, 
but the God of the Reformers has too often been personally 
discarded. And today pragmatism, Protestantism's illegiti-
mate offspring, has virtually eliminated the sovereign God 
from its field of interest, and the disintegrative results are 
only too apparent in public education. Modern education 
in the name of the modern disciplines of psychology and 
sociology has sponsored a spirit of revolt against all kinds 
of traditional authorities, not the least of which is the God 
of the Bible. 
The essential disagreement between Roman Catholic faith 
and Reformation faith about the question of church au-
thority seems irreconcilable for the time being. The argu-
ment of the Catholic Church is strengthened by Protestant-
ism's weaknesses resulting from an absence of a strong central 
integrative authority. The argument for the Protestant con-
cept of authority is strengthened by the obvious misuses of 
authority which are to be observed in any highly centralized 
organization. Those persons or organizations who believe 
they unquestionably possess the truth and the authority 
which attaches to this truth are inevitably tempted with the 
sin of pride, which is the greatest undoer of all. 
The strength of the Reformation position lies in its recog-
nition of the radical nature of human sinfulness and in its 
assumption that the truth is not necessarily to be dispensed 
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by him who claims a special rational talent or a special posi-
tion in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and not by the man who 
revolts against all forms of authority, but by the person who 
is genuinely humble in the presence of truth. Select men 
do not apprehend the deepest truth by virtue of their ra-
tional discipline or by virtue of the organization to which 
they belong, but by Christian faith, the fruit of which, 
among other things, is humility. 
But this kind of relationship to truth involves a paradox: 
If one does not make an aggressive claim for possessing the 
truth, how can he act effectively with the truth which he 
possesses? What does humility have to offer in claiming 
the community for the good life? For one thing the ad-
ministration of justice demands power and force on occasion. 
Reformation faith without question acknowledges the work 
of the state and need for power to support this work. The 
distinction comes in considering what basically is the work 
of the church in contrast to the work of the state. The work 
of the state with its external power and authority ought to 
be based upon reason as far as possible, but the concern of 
the church with deeper faith involves a relationship of hu-
mility to the body politic primarily, and not of force. The 
state ought to be related to education impersonally and 
forcefully insofar as the externals of education are con-
cerned. But the church ought to be related to education in 
the realm of deeper truth, the fruits of which are faith and 
peace and gentleness. The power and the authority which 
attaches to the concern with personal truth ought to be a 
permeative spiritual power and not an organizational ex-
ternal authority. The church ought to command by its 
humility and not by its organizational might. 
But the need for organizational influence cannot be mini-
mized in the face of evil even in the best of societies. Refor-
mation faith supports the concept of the state and its power 
as arbiter even over the church because the sinful nature 
The State and Christian Faith 125 
of the community requires this authoritative control. The 
state rather than the church is the final arbiter where coer-
cion and power are necessary, because the church ought not 
to be engaged primarily in the business of maintaining 
moral standards by force. Of course from a practical view 
a certain amount of organization is necessary in the church. 
To speak of permeative spiritual influence by the church 
tends to be an idealistic play on words in the light of the 
sinful nature of the church itself. Organization in the church 
and the authority which attaches to it can seemingly be 
justified because the church, like any other social group, is 
composed of sinful human beings. Now if the community 
in general requires organizational pressures and influences 
because of its moral and spiritual weaknesses, is it not also 
practical to assume that the church must deal organization-
ally with some of the spiritual weaknesses within itself and 
also with the cultural areas in the community for which it 
considers itself responsible? If this argument be valid-and 
the Roman Catholic Church once again demonstrates its 
practical understanding of what ought to be the relationship 
of church to cultural activities, particularly education-then 
historical Protestantism appears comparatively prostrate be-
fore the modern dilemma of its relationship to public edu-
cation. Reformation faith is still generally committed to 
the principle of separation of church organizations from 
public education, and therefore it seems to have little means 
of practically supporting its own convictions about what 
ought to transpire in education in order to bring about a 
godly reorientation. 
Before giving a final consideration to this whole problem 
of Reformation and Catholic faiths and their relationships 
to public education, it seems important to digress for one 
chapter at least to review the similarities and divergences 
of Reformation and Thomistic concepts of the nature of 
man. An outline of Reformation and Catholic anthropolo-
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gies ought to provide a useful background for any serious 
attempt to discover practical means of lessening the tension 
within the Christian household of faith in order to strength-
en the over-all Christian commitment to the restoration of 
a godly faith to the educational work of the community. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Reformation and ThomiStic Concepts 
of the Nature of Man 
THoMISM and Reformation faiths seem to stand side by 
side in their fundamental opposition to secular concepts of 
the nature of man. Yet there are serious differences of view 
between these two Christian outlooks which in some respects 
lead to widely separated positions in theology and in educa-
tion. To trace the lines of agreement and divergence, how-
ever, is a difficult undertaking. Hebrew, Christian, Greek, 
and modern secular outlooks contribute to an interweaving 
of theological and philosophical themes which seem far be-
yond the comprehension of this review. 
It is important to preface a study in contrasts with a brief 
review of similarities in the Catholic and Reformation ver-
sions of faith which constitute presuppositions for a Christian 
interpretation of the nature of man. As the sects in the nine-
teenth century erred in not being mindful of an important 
area of common agreement, there seems today a comparable 
danger that the two dominant streams of Christendom in 
America may obscure areas of faith common to both. Basic 
areas of agreement in Christian faith are infinitely important 
as foundations for the solution of difficult current educa-
tional problems, and they ought to provide a basis for 
working at these problems with genuine hope. In some 
respects, for example, conservative Protestantism seems to 
stand closer to the center of Catholic faith than it does to 
the more liberal and sometimes radical expressions of mod-
ern Protestantism. Possibly Neo-Reformation faith and Neo-
Thomism as they turn back more and more to their original 
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sources for refreshment and revival will discover that their 
paths at first were not far apart. The clashes on the periphery 
of faith, magnified by the centuries, may have cast a con-
fusing haze over common beginnings. Divergent lines near 
their point of origin are close, even though their extension 
into space leaves them eventually far apart. 
Serious consideration ought to be given, for example, to 
the common faith in the God of the Bible, the sovereign 
God who created the world out of nothing and who mo-
mentarily sustains this whole created universe and all who 
are in it. Essential agreement is also evident about the 
doctrine that man stands in personal relationship to his 
Creator, that man was first created good and that now he 
suffers from defect and corruption. In the final analysis both 
outlooks agree that faith stands above reason, and both agree 
that the state is for man and not man for the state. Both the 
Thomist and the Reformation faiths ascribe to the basic 
doctrines of the Apostle's Creed; both show a high respect 
for Augustine, one of the greatest of the early church fathers. 
Actually the leading figures of the Reformation were 
hesitant about a radical break with the mother church. And 
even after this seemingly inevitable step had been taken, 
the Reformation leaders outlined a Reformed pattern which 
was in many respects essentially Catholic. For this reason 
some liberal Protestant theologians today are inclined to 
label the revival of Reformation faith as a revival of Catholic 
Protestantism. 
Yet in the face of all of these arguments for common 
ground, it must be recognized that theological divergences 
in the earlier centuries, extended through time, have created 
a wide gulf between the present positions of these theological 
faiths. And the wideness of this gulf substantially contributes 
to the woes of current education in America. It would seem 
that the best way to understand these critical aberrations 
is to trace at least summarily a few of the differences of 
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interpretation about man's nature. As one Catholic philoso-
pher has said, the purposes of education hinge upon the 
question of the "precise nature of the educand." Educational 
philosophers of all descriptions seem inclined to agree with 
this pronouncement. 
The Christian problem of how to describe man's nature 
leads all the way back to a key statement in Genesis: "And 
God said, Let us make man in our image, after our like-
ness."1 At first glance it seems fantastic to think that this 
short sentence formulated in ancient times should have an 
all-important relationship to twentieth century problems in 
American public education. Nevertheless, when that early 
writer of Scripture added the complementary phrase "after 
our likeness," he set in motion the formulation of a theo-
logical pattern for the whole Roman Catholic Church during 
the past millenium. And this theological pattern is crucial 
to American education today. 
In order to understand why this phrase "after our likeness" 
is so important, we must refer to the significant influence of 
ancient Greek philosophy on early Christian faith. It is true 
that some of the early church fathers condemned pagan 
philosophies, but other influential theologians believed the 
ideas of the Greeks important enough to be used in the 
systematic formulation of Christian faith. Irenaeus in the 
third century worked out a synthesis between philosophy 
and Christian theology which was a forerunner of the even-
tual magnificent synthesis of Thomas Aquinas. This syn-
thesis, insofar as an understanding of man's nature is con-
cerned, deals in a supremely important fashion with the 
Genesis statement that God created man in His own image 
and after His likeness. The image of God in man, said 
Irenaeus, and Aquinas later, is man's reason. This is a con-
clusion which harmonizes particularly with the Greek view. 
And the likeness of God in man, said the theologians, is man's 
1 Genesis I :26. 
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original supernature, given him by God in order that man 
could enjoy personal fellowship with the Creator. This is 
a conclusion drawn from Christian faith, and of course it is 
revealed wisdom which stands above philosophical knowl-
edge. The Greeks through their natural philosophical ca-
pacities did an amazing piece of work in discovering by 
reason the idea of Infinite Reason. This discovery was the 
basis of the Greek understanding of the humanity of man. 
Man infused by the divine Reason becomes human and 
infinitely distinctive from the lower creatures. Yet the 
Greeks could not discover by reason the personal nature of 
God. This knowledge was made known to man by God 
through revelation. God is not only Infinite Reason but 
God the Father. This is the message of the church. Man is 
not only made in the image of God (what the Greeks dis-
covered) , but man is also made in the likeness of God (what 
was revealed to the church). Man is really a two-storied 
being. His natural being is dignified by reason, and his 
supernatural being is a special human capacity to enjoy 
personal fellowship with God the Creator. The image de-
notes a kind of rational substance which makes man human 
and different from the other creatures. The likeness indi-
cates a special capacity for relationship with God. 
This interpretation of man in the ancient and medieval 
church was not by any means the only theological position. 
Many of the earlier theologians, including Augustine, placed 
reason in a much less favorable light and preferred a Gospel 
personalism unconditioned by Greek rationalism. We be-
lieve in order to know, said Augustine. But the thirteenth 
century saw a shift away from Augustinian influence and 
an increasing infusion of Christian theology with Aristotelian 
ideas. At this point Thomas Aquinas with his respect for 
Aristotle lifted reason to a more favorable status in the 
church. Rather than categorically insisting that we must be-
lieve in order to know, Aquinas made a distinction between 
the realm of knowing by reason and the realm of knowing by 
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faith. The natural man created in the image of God is 
gifted with the unique capacity to reason and thereby to 
order the institutions of temporal society. To this extent 
reason is supremely important. Yet the life of man is more 
than a temporal consideration. Life is eternal, and the wis-
dom which man needs to contemplate the eternal aspects 
of his existence comes through Christian faith. Since the 
eternal life stands above the temporal life, faith obviously 
stands above reason. But this distinction by no means de-
grades the value of reason. Reason is good because reasoning 
is a human capacity made possible by the "image" of God 
in man. 
This Thomistic interpretation of the Genesis account is 
not only significant for the place it gives reason in the Chris-
tian understanding of the nature of man, but also for the 
remarkable fashion by which it rationalizes the dogma of 
original sin. Both the Reformation and Catholic faiths be-
lieve that God created man without sin. Since all mankind 
is now under sin, it seems necessary to conclude that man 
has suffered a fall. Yet societies of men apart from Christian 
faith often show evidences of human goodness and refine-
ment. The problem is how to account for this fact and still 
to recognize the evidences of a fall. The Catholic synthesis 
provides a neat answer for this question. Man created in 
the image of God possesses the capacity to reason. The ra-
tional substance which constitutes man's image of God hu-
manizes all men, even though all men are fallen. The fall 
of man relates therefore not to the image but to the likeness 
of God in man. As a result of original sin man lost this 
special fellowship with God. Man was deprived of his super-
nature, but man was not deprived of the "image" of God, 
his reason. Now the restoration of the supernature (the 
"likeness") is the work of God through the church, and 
there is no human means by which this restoration can be 
effected. The church alone mediates this work of grace. 
There is enough similarity between the Greek idea of 
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evil and the medieval idea of evil to add further significance 
to the Thomistic synthesis of Greek philosophy and Christian 
theology. In both cases there is a primary emphasis upon 
the idea of incompleteness. For the Greeks evil is often 
explained in terms of the potential failing of actuality. Evil 
stems from the incomplete nature. The Thomistic Christian 
concept of original sin also suggests that man's sinful state 
derives from his incompleteness resulting from the loss of 
his supernature. Original sin is not associated with some-
thing positive in man, but rather with his deprived condi-
tion. Aquinas taught that being is convertible with truth 
and goodness, which seems to imply that the false and the 
bad are in some manner associated with a lesser or greater 
degree of nonbeing. ·with this kind of teaching surely Aris-
totle would not be inclined to disagree.2 
When the Reformation took place in the sixteenth cen-
tury, it seems that an outstanding factor in this upheaval 
was the questionable impact of Greek philosophy in the 
church. The Reformation in one respect was a powerful 
revolt against certain unfortunate rationalized accessories of 
this great ecclesiastical organization. The Reformers felt a 
need for the church to return to the fundamentals of the 
Bible itself. In the Reformation movement the confluence of 
Christian theology and Greek philosophy was seriously dis-
rupted. And the challenge was sharp against the traditional 
Catholic concept of the nature of man, against the idea that 
man was originally created as a two-storied being with a 
good rational being (image) which man still possessed and 
a supernatural likeness which man had lost. 
Martin Luther was the leader in this new evaluation of 
the Catholic understanding of man's nature. Luther argued 
that the early Genesis statement about image and likeness 
was simply an example of the Hebrew literary habit of em-
2 Emil Brunner's book Man in Revolt discusses in detail this whole ques-
tion of Christian anthropology. 
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phasis. Image and likeness, said Luther, refer to the same 
thing. The idea of a double level arrangement of man's 
nature is an artificial dualism. Man is a single being who 
responds with his whole heart to his Creator and to other 
persons. 
In terms of twentieth century knowledge, the Neo-Refor-
mation theologians have suggested that the significance of 
man's humanity is his "relationship" to God. Man is not 
human in the medieval sense by virtue of a rational sub-
stance which exists in his being, but rather because the 
whole man is in distinctive relationship to God. God created 
man in His own image, which is to say that man is a person. 
But the Neo-Reformation theologians mean something dif-
ferent from the Scholastics when they use the term "person." 
The medieval definition by Boethius says: "Person is an 
individual substance of a rational nature."3 By contrast the 
theologians of the Reformation revival speak of the concept 
of the person as the most profound of all realities and of 
the essential significance of personal existence as relationship 
and not rational substance. Reason is one of the capacities 
of a person, but not that which determines the person. The 
person is the subject, and the only way man can know the 
subject is through personal relationship-and this is a reality 
beyond the power of reason alone to grasp. The origin of 
the human person is deep in the heart of the eternal Person. 
The origin of the person is a divine mystery, and the closest 
man can describe it is to say that the creation of man is an 
act of divine love. The true relationship between persons 
is love. Love is the highest expression of a person. This 
kind of personal relationship is suprarational. God makes 
Himself known to man through His divine love. Personal 
relationship involves the whole man, and this means his 
reason, his will, his feelings, responding as a unity. Man 
responds to the eternal Person with his whole heart by faith. 
3 Runes (ed.), The Dictionary of Philosophy, 229. 
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Faith like love is the profound expression of the whole man 
toward another person. 
This Reformation concept of the person and his relation-
ship to God led to an entirely different kind of interpretation 
of the fall of man. As mentioned earlier, the Thomistic 
view suggests that the fall of man consisted in the depriva-
tion of his supernature, but that man retained his rational 
being (which was good) , and this accounted for his humanity 
even after his fall. Since the Reformer believed that man 
as a whole is related to God the Creator, the idea of the fall 
of man indicated that the whole man had fallen. And this 
revolutionary concept meant that man's reason too had 
fallen. For the Reformers the whole man becomes perverted 
and affected by his fall; for the Catholic position only the 
supernature is radically affected. The distinction of utmost 
significance at this point is that for the Thomist the fall 
means that man is deprived. For the Reformer the fall 
means that man is depraved. The Reformation leaders 
taught that man's reason, will, and feelings-all that is man-
are tainted by sin and therefore are basically untrustworthy. 
This radical Reformation view of man's fall created a 
serious problem for Protestant theology. If all of man's 
nature is perverted, how could the refined cultures and the 
natural good in pagan and heathen civilizations be ex-
plained? The Catholic view said the answer is to be found 
in reason, a substance in man existing unimpaired by orig-
inal sin. Neo-Reformation theologians today try to answer 
this question by teaching that the humanity which natural 
man still possesses must also be explained in terms of rela-
tionship rather than as rational substance. Even though 
every man is a sinner, every man is still related to God. The 
relationship is there; it is not good, but a bad relationship 
is still a relationship. God by His infinite power who made 
the world out of nothing continues in His infinite love to 
sustain every man. Even more, though man is a sinner, he 
remains a creation in the image of God. The inhumanity 
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which man demonstrates comes not from defect or depriva-
tion but from a positively bad relationship to the Creator. 
Perfect humanity stems not from perfect reason but from 
perfect relationship to the Creator. Perfect relationship is 
responsive relationship. Bad relationships between man and 
God, or man and man, are irresponsible relationships. The 
problem of responsibility is personal, suprarational, theologi-
cal. The exercise of reason is an integral part of responsible 
relationships between persons, but the Greek idea of putting 
reason on a pedestal is unacceptable to Reformation faith, 
whether this idea be purely classical humanism or medieval 
Christianity. 
The Roman Catholic belief that human nature is deprived 
but not depraved and that through the church human nature 
is restored by grace gives a clearer understanding for di-
vergent views about truth and authority. Because reason in 
man remains intact in principle at least, reason can discover 
truth which is certain, according to the Thomist view. Rea-
son can proceed from self-evident truth to general principles 
which are genuinely authoritative. This faith in the au-
thority of reason was the hope of the classic Greek philoso-
phers in refuting the relativism of their time. Today Catholic 
philosophers share the confidence of the classical humanists 
in authoritative truth as discovered in natural law. But in 
addition the church relies upon another source of authori-
tative truth divinely revealed. Since the church is God's 
chosen vehicle for the dissemination of spiritual truth, the 
church is infallible when it speaks the truth in the name of 
God. The Roman Catholic Church has combined the un-
questionable authority of reason with its divine commission 
to speak with unquestioned spiritual authority. With this 
kind of command of the truth the church has the inalienable 
right to speak with authority and to insist upon obedience 
to its truth. And possession of this kind of truth presupposes 
the right to command. 
Reformation faith cannot subscribe to this Thomistic con-
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cept of truth and authority, and the ground, it seems, for 
this Reformation dissent is the Protestant dogma that human 
nature is not only "deprived" but "depraved." In saying 
man is depraved, the Reformers did not mean that human 
nature is totally bad, but rather that no part of human 
nature is free from the perverting influences of sin. The 
whole man is affected by sin. This conclusion placed the 
Reformers in sharp opposition to Thomistic optimism about 
reason, because reason too, according to Reformation faith, 
is tainted with sin. The significance of man's humanity lies 
in the responsive relationship of the whole man to God. By 
the same token the significance of the depravity of the whole 
man lies in the perverted relationship of the whole person 
to God. This idea leads to the Reformation conclusion that 
all men are sinners to the extent that they cannot lay claim 
to unquestionable truth and unquestionable authority. It 
is true that man has much good in him, but evil always 
overcomes the good regardless of the level of personal ethics 
or the refinement of the culture or the plane of rational 
development. There is no solid foundation within the na-
ture of man upon which to found claims of having the truth. 
Reason, if it be man's only hope for working out his own 
salvation, claims illustrious progress for itself, but in the 
end reason succumbs to a sin which is the most terrible of 
all-pride. Therefore absolute authority cannot be vested in 
any organization or person, and therefore the only hope for 
a temperate and balanced authority lies in the people. But 
they must be good people. Hence the Reformation bent 
toward public education which gave every person the means 
to become a good person, a good citizen. 
These concepts about man's capacity to fulfill himself 
show an interesting progression as one traces them from 
Greek classical humanism to the synthesis of Aquinas and 
finally to Reformation faith. In the Greek sense man pos-
sesses the potential for his fulfillment, and this fulfillment 
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is effected through the work of reason. Thus education is 
a basic theme in the whole Greek culture because it is the 
process of actualizing man's potential, uniting him to God, 
attuning man with the Infinite, so to speak. But Thomas 
Aquinas refutes the idea that man can save himself by reason 
alone. Salvation comes through the church as it brings about 
the restoration of the deprived part of man's nature through 
the church's word of truth and the sacraments. Once grace 
has been added to natural reason, man has acquired the 
capacity to work out his salvation in history. In contrast to 
these views the Reformers took the radical position that 
salvation is acquired by the grace of God alone, through 
faith. Salvation is completely a gift, and one cannot work 
at it as do the Catholics, after receiving God's grace through 
the church, or as do those of secular faith who believe that 
reason alone is enough. Furthermore, the Reformers in-
sisted that the grace of God did not give man the capacity 
to dispense the truth. Even after a man was regenerated by 
God through faith, he was still a sinner and subject to error. 
When any man tries authoritatively to outline the truth, he 
colors it with his own sinfulness. The Neo-Reformation 
theologians therefore insist that a Protestant view of truth 
and authority must emphasize a dominant theme of humili-
ty. No person, saved or unsaved, can claim to be the au-
thoritative possessor and dispenser of truth. This pretension 
is the subtlest of errors. 
This Reformation conclusion about truth and authority 
undoubtedly has its serious drawbacks. Neo-Reformation 
faith is forced to outline for itself a kind of complicated dia-
lectical explanation about these matters. There can be no 
forceful and direct claim to certainty and authority on the 
one hand, and yet on the other hand, Reformation faith too 
must speak of truth with certainty and authority. This 
problem makes it necessary for theologians like Niebuhr to 
talk about "having and not having the truth." And of 
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course once the Protestant position moves away from the 
Catholic assumption of an unequivocal claim to spiritual 
truth and authority, its defence against secular relativism 
becomes a hazardous proposition. Pragmatism seems to be 
a notable modern example of a reconstructed Protestantism 
made possible through the liberalization of ideas about God 
and the authority of the Bible. In fact, at this point we can 
see the progression carrying through from one extreme to 
the other. The classical humanists and the Thomists say 
that the truth is the truth and we have it. Neo-Reformation 
theologians usually claim that the truth is reliable and un-
changing but because we are sinful men we cannot say that 
we have it; we can only say "we have it and we don't have 
it." The pragmatists, retaining a Protestant form but elimi-
nating God, arrive at the extreme position of assuming that 
since we cannot know whether God really exists, we can 
only judge for practical purposes that all truth is relative. 
Therefore, say the pragmatists, no one has the truth, be-
cause apparently truth does not exist absolutely in the first 
place. 
The classical humanists insist that man infused with the 
divine Reason can perceive what are the eternal principles 
to be followed in the perfection of his nature, and it follows 
that man's education can be definitely outlined and or-
ganized in the light of his rational nature. The Thomists 
concur, but they add to the authority of reason the authority 
of the church, which is the authority of God, and by the 
authority of the church they point out that the end of man 
is not for this temporal life alone, but for divine fellowship 
with God the Father. And the Catholic Church, concerned 
not only with the good life for this world but for the world 
to come, must exercise prior authority in the supervision of 
the educational process so that education not only takes into 
account a rational development of the learner in preparation 
for temporal life, but the spiritual development also in 
preparation for eternal life. 
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The Reformation faith, by contrast, with its radical doc-
trine of the sinfulness of all men (and of the whole man) 
cannot logically set itself up as a final authority in the affairs 
of this temporal life. Reformation faith is opposed to cen-
tering unquestioned authority in any man or any human 
organization, the Roman Catholic Church notwithstanding. 
The problem of sin precludes the assumption that even the 
church can speak with divine and unquestioned authority in 
human affairs, including education. The concept of personal 
responsibility in the divine-human encounter suggests that 
no man or organization can speak with final authority about, 
or step between, this infinitely serious relationship. Dicta-
torial men or dictatorial organizations, no matter how be-
nign or necessary the form of dictation at certain levels, are 
inherently dangerous to the profound demands of personal 
responsibility. The highest responsibilities in life are per-
sonal. There is a point in human existence beyond which 
human dictation or organizational dictation ought not to 
extend. 
But this seemingly individualistic idea that no man or 
organization has the unquestioned right to mediate between 
a man and his Creator is fraught with hidden dangers. Indi-
viduals and societies simply cannot get along without a 
guiding authority. When the authority of the church is re-
moved, what other restraining and directing force can take 
its place? The great danger is anarchy. Has not this con-
dition, for example, actually developed in American educa-
tion? The extension of the Reformation revolt against the 
Roman Catholic Church has evolved into the modern prag-
matic pseudo-Protestant revolt against practically everything. 
Obviously the Reformers had no intention of instigating 
this kind of anarchistic chain of events. For Reformation 
faith the sovereign God assumed the place of rightful au-
thority in place of a decadent church. God and truth and 
authority are accessible by each person through the Bible 
rather than through the church primarily. 
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There must be a freedom to discover God and truth and 
authority personally. The personal discovery of God and 
authority are the foundation stones for a truly free society. 
This does not mean that individuals ought not to be subject 
to the dictations of organizations, including the church, or 
churches, and the state, nor does this mean that the church 
is not essential to man's personal spiritual development. Men 
ought to respect and obey the higher powers. Christians 
ought to be supremely loyal to their church and its disci-
plines. Yet basically man circumvents external authorities 
in his most essential contact with God and His authority. 
This is the Reformation idea about the person, and it sets 
the stage for the Reformation concept of responsibility in 
education. The idea of responsibility is inextricably asso-
ciated with the undefinable mystery of the existence of the 
person created in the image of God. And when God is elimi-
nated from education, the only proper foundation for de-
veloping truly responsible persons is likewise eliminated. 
Pragmatic secularism in modern education quite significant-
ly emphasizes educational principles which are similar to 
this Reformation point of view with one tragic exception: 
Relationships between man and man are substituted for 
the Reformation emphasis upon the prior relationships be-
tween man and God. Self-other relationships are substituted 
for the Reformation doctrine of the divine-human encounter. 
This secularization of Reformation faith leads to a dangerous 
kind of antirationalism which is abhorrent to both the 
Thomist and the classical humanist. In this respect the 
Thomist believes his synthesis of faith and reason provides 
a much safer balance for modern society. If men are taught 
to respect reason as well as to use it, the temporal world has 
a means to formulate authoritative procedures which prevent 
it from flying to pieces when irrationalism and relativism 
threaten its stability. Furthermore, man by nature is always 
in quest of certainty, and the emphasis upon reason as an 
Reformation and Thomistic Concepts 141 
integral part of human nature satisfies this quest. Societies 
can be much more easily stabilized when men recognize the 
validity of natural law as discovered by reason. The place 
to teach men to recognize this validity of reason is in school. 
And with the Catholic faith, Christian education is funda-
mentally in harmony with the life of reason because reason 
is God's creative form for the human person. Reason is 
good, and reason provides the reliable means to a well-
ordered society. 
Reformation faith agrees that reason is important in edu-
cation, but nevertheless reason is also sinful and cannot be 
relied upon in the way the Thomists trust it. The Neo-
Reformation theologians say that the tendency toward irra-
tionalism ought not to be associated with Reformation 
Christian faith but rather with the decline of faith in God 
as the basis of personal existence. Irrationalism is a result 
of revolt: first, revolt by man against God and second, revolt 
of man within himself. Irrationalism is not the result of a 
rejection of the Aristotelian and Thomistic idea of rational 
substance pervading man's nature, but rather the result of a 
disrupted relationship between the whole person and God, 
and this disruption prevents the proper relationship between 
reason, will, and feeling within. By all means a rational 
emphasis in education is important today, but its promotion 
ought to come primarily through a readjustment of basic 
relationships and not primarily through the actualization of 
potential reason which the Thomists consider to be the basis 
of the human in man. The faith of the Reformers points 
to the restoration of proper relationships between the whole 
man and his Creator, and consequently the restoration of a 
proper balance between reason and will and feeling in the 
person, which in turn provides the means toward responsible 
relationships between persons and their neighbors. 
Catholic and Reformation views of the communal signifi-
cance of man's existence also lead to practical disagreements 
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of considerable import. Again the primary division involves 
ideas about the nature of the church as a human community. 
Neo-Reformation faith places unusual emphasis upon the 
communal as well as the individual nature of man's fall. 
Men in a collective sense share in the guilt of the fall, and 
the communal refutation of God's order for the good com-
munity life is even harder for man to cope with than his 
own individual perversities. Communal and social move-
ments are exceedingly powerful but also exceedingly danger-
ous in view of their power. Catholic faith might agree, but 
would except the church. The Roman Catholic Church, 
though made up of sinful men, is in some supernatural sense 
a sinless institution. But Reformation faith cannot be op-
timistic about the church's special category of sinlessness. 
When the church becomes powerful, the human tendency 
toward organizational perversion is particularly subtle and 
subversive. And this Reformation conviction suggests yet 
another reason for its traditional objections to final authority 
vested in the church as related to the cultural activities of 
the community, and to education in particular. 
Because of conflicting views between Catholic and Refor-
mation faith about the essential nature of man, there follows 
an inevitable disagreement about the nature of human sin-
fulness and about the function of the church in renewing 
the individual so that in principle he is capable of working 
out his salvation in history. Likewise, the Catholic concept 
of man as the image of God and as the likeness of God-so 
dignifying his reason on the one hand and making possible 
the restoration of the supernature by the church on the 
other hand, and therefore positing man as capable of per-
fectly knowing the truth and proceeding authoritatively in 
the light of this truth-is not acceptable to Reformation faith. 
These disagreements about the nature of man make a co-
operative Christian venture in community education almost 
an impossibility today. Are there any alternatives to this 
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seemingly inevitable deadlock within the center of Christen-
dom-this deep cleavage which more than any other factor 
seems to frustrate an effective program for the restoration 
of the education of the community to its godly heritage? 
Are there any practical means of supplying education once 
again with a faith desperately needed in its task of develop-
ing responsible persons? 
CHAPTER TWELVE 
Education and N eo-Reformation 
ChriStian Faith 
AMERICA's whole cultural history, it has been noted, has 
a significant Protestant orientation, with early Calvinistic 
influences playing a leading role. With Protestantism so 
strongly a part of the American tradition, it is reasonable to 
suppose that a new Protestantism is significantly related to 
contemporary life with its crucial spiritual problems. As 
Time in a recent editorial says, the critical problem for 
America is to discover the means of bolstering moral progress 
so that it. can catch up with material progress. Perhaps, 
writes Time, the most significant movement in this direction 
for "predominantly Protestant U. S. is the recent movement 
to restate and strengthen Protestant philosophy and the-
ology."1 
Reformation faith is also considered significant to con-
temporary American education because of its dynamic re-
lationship to the early development of public education in 
America. The historical relationship between Protestantism 
and public education is nowhere more clearly demonstrated 
than in the educational history of the New England colonies. 
This faith, so distinguished for its early educational achieve-
ments, ought, in its present resurgence, to be reasonably 
considered for its powers of creative restoration. 
Moreover, the twentieth century may distinguish itself 
in a most awesome way as another of those centuries of new 
birth, an age of unusual travail, possibly more tragic than 
ever before because of the new physical power at man's 
1 Time (March 9, 1953), 60. 
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disposal. Yet in a century of unusual turmoil Augustine 
made his great contribution, and likewise the Reformers, 
following in the theological footsteps of St. Paul. In times 
like these, men seem more prone to consider seriously the 
usually somewhat unpopular Christian acclamation of the 
sovereignty of God and the sinfulness of man. 
At present this new Protestant orthodoxy is more vocal 
and more vital in Europe than in America, because Conti-
nental Christianity is in a position to be more directly aware 
of the disintegrative forces which threaten the world. For 
great sections of Europe these times are already violent, with 
the paralyzing specter of totalitarianism an immediate reality. 
Tragedy in Europe may explain the extreme theological 
position of Karl Barth in Germany, who, in his militant 
reaction against the intolerable evils of his culture, empha-
sizes anew the message of "man's impotence in the face of 
Supreme Righteousness."2 Barth's neo-orthodoxy exempli-
fies an extreme Protestant reaction against the kind of radi-
calism which eventually regresses into "systems" degrading 
the worth of the individual and magnifying the supreme 
importance of the state. This new emphasis on the sov-
ereignty of God is surely one of Christianity's most dynamic 
and radical defenses against the present world trend toward 
totalitarianism and collectivism. And it is not surprising 
that such a defense is at first most vigorously formulated in 
those areas where "systems" have revealed themselves in 
their most diabolical forms. 
And so, because the core of American religious tradition 
is Protestant, because Reformation theology permeates the 
core of the Protestant contribution to public education in 
America, and finally because the temper of the times in this 
twentieth century is radical, the new Protestantism is as-
sumed to be a significant emerging moral force in the world 
today, possessing a unique competency to counteract the 
2 John H. Randall, The Making of the Modern Mind (Boston, 1940), 569. 
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mounting challenges of collectivism and totalitarianism-
challenges which more and more involve the deliberate edu-
cational processes of the nation. 
Roman Catholicism appears at present the most powerful 
anticommunist religious force in that it is capable of oppos-
ing organizational force with similar organizational force. 
Its main defect, however, from the Reformation point of 
view, is that Catholicism itself is a great system, and the 
Neo-Reformation faith is fearful of any great system, good 
and powerful though it may be. The Reformed understand-
ing of the radical nature of sin assumes that any powerful 
organization, whether the church or the state, is ever subject 
to great and terrible perversions. Accumulated power of 
any kind, even though in good faith it considers itself the 
representative of God, is nevertheless subject to the subtle 
perversions of lust for power for power's sake. Reformation 
Christian faith chooses not to answer the dark challenges of 
evil systems with counter systems primarily, but with per-
sonal faith. For Reformed Protestantism the real battlefield 
of the world remains the battlefield of the human soul. The 
primary battle with evil is a personal battle. Organizational 
power cannot be substituted for this personal encounter with 
sin and with the deepest realities of human life and destiny. 
The highest sovereignty for a man can never be that of an 
organization, a state, or a church, but only the sovereignty 
of God, this to be recognized as a personal act of faith. Of 
course, to make the personal relationship of every man to 
God primary does not, in this sinful world, annul the realistic 
need for organization and law in the name of justice. It does, 
however, accent the order of importance as between the in-
dividual and the state or the church. 
Besides Karl Barth, the prophetic figure in Germany who 
rediscovers the "transcendent God of Calvin and His liberat-
ing Word," there are more moderate theological representa-
tives of this Reformation movement, such as Emil Brunner, 
a theologian from Zurich, Switzerland (now in Japan), who 
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writes and teaches in a more temperate mood without sac-
rificing the central theme of the Reformation tradition. He 
is more the theologian of proportion and moderation, deal-
ing more generously with the motives and the fruits of 
human science and reason. Brunner is considered an im-
portant guide in this review of the relationships of the new 
Protestantism to public education. In America, Reinhold 
Niebuhr may be considered the nco-orthodox counterpart 
of Emil Brunner. 
In this review of Reformation Christian faith and educa-
tion it should be acknowledged immediately that history is 
not expected to repeat itself in the sense that Reformed 
Protestantism will soon become the creative force which 
permeates and restores to health the slumping form of twen-
tieth century public education. In the first place the re-
sponse today by society as a whole to Christian faith is mild 
compared to the times of the early Puritans in New England, 
when a theocracy was literally within the realm of possibility. 
Today the whole society is predominantly secular, and the 
school reflecting faithfully the status quo of its society can 
hardly be anything else. The impact of the new Protestant-
ism, if it proves itself significant, can hope at best to begin 
reversing the dangerous trend toward secularism, by saying 
more clearly and forcefully that God is a Person and that 
He is sovereign over all, that He is "a Spirit, infinite, eternal 
and unchangeable in His being, wisdom, power, holiness, 
justice, goodness and truth."3 
The mood of Reformation faith is not revolutionary in 
relationship to social or political organization. It is revolu-
tionary only in respect to interpretation of the meaning of 
the person individually. The idea of "leavening" or "savor-
ing" outlines the primary appointment of Christianity as 
the supporter and the regenerator of the existing order. This 
idea is explicitly not in accord with the more radical revolu-
tionary impulses of some of the socialistic theorists intent 
3 The Shorter Catechism (Philadelphia, 1941), 3. 
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upon pulling down strongholds in order to build some new 
kind of utopian world. 
In education, for example, there are many advances asso-
ciated with the nineteenth and twentieth century liberal 
impulse which ought to be recognized. Pragmatic influences 
have undoubtedly acted as a corrective in reference to both 
the Christian tradition and the classical tradition which 
failed in many cases to renew themselves in meeting modern 
challenges and thereby became formal and relatively un-
productive. It is the task of Neo-Reformation Protestantism 
not to carry on a reactionary program against progressive 
methods when they have proven themselves-particularly in 
the elementary levels where the child is more correctly being 
understood as a dynamic individual rather than a passive 
receptacle-but to counteract that aspect of the liberal im-
pulse which exemplifies a regressive movement from a super-
naturalistic faith, particularly evident during the last hun-
dred years. Pragmatism today, as a notable end product of 
this regression, is an example of a theological form divested 
of theological power. The contemporary American demo-
cratic faith, as a liberal expression, is in heavy debt to Protes-
tantism, but it is also true that the prophets of the religion 
of humanity after 1865 tried to purge "the democratic pat-
tern of the theological survivals it contained."4 It seems 
impossible to deny the fact that "indeed 'nature' has silently 
displaced God as the ultimate basis to which all other things 
are referred."5 There are features of modern education 
which are admirable and good. Yet there is needed the 
Christian attempt to re-present a challenging faith in the 
sovereign God who has been consciously or unconsciously, 
deliberately or carelessly, displaced or misplaced in the ex-
pansive, ebullient, philosophical educational transformations 
of the past century. 
4 Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought, 330. 
5 Walter Moberly, The Crisis in the University (London, 1951), 138. 
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Certainly this problem of authority points up the critical 
conflict between the Pauline-Augustinian-Calvinistic Chris-
tian tradition and modern pragmatism. The Reformation 
view in this sense is radical: God is sovereign; God is the 
Authority. For the pragmatist, in contrast, there is no divine 
authority, and for some of the more radical pragmatic ad-
herents, John Childs for example, supernatural faiths are 
actually a hindrance to democratic progress and ought to be 
dispelled as quickly as possible. 
Yet the neo-orthodox Protestant insistence upon a faith 
in the sovereign God does not alienate Christian faith from 
experience. Surely there is no more consistent theme in the 
New Testament than the teaching that a tree is known by its 
fruits; 6 that "hearing" and "seeing" and "looking" are inti-
mately related to the basic issues of life. Possibly the most pro-
found and central truth of the Scriptures is the statement that 
"the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us." 7 Constantly 
there is the scriptural implication that faith without works 
is dead, being alone. The New Testament seems to be 
unique in its remarkable emphasis on the idea that the Word 
must become flesh, that faith should fulfill itself in practice, 
that the idea should fulfill itself in the act. It becomes quite 
explicit that a Christian critique of modern pragmatism 
does not create any fundamental schism concerning experi-
ence in itself, but rather applies to the pragmatic elimination 
of the spiritual origin and meaning of life and experience, 
namely of God the Creator and Preserver of all mankind. 
The question of authority, being basic as it is, points up a 
second critical conflict between Reformation faith and mod-
ern pragmatism, namely, the question of what is truth. This 
problem is projected to the practical level in the question 
of the relationship of scientific truth to religious faith. Emil 
Brunner insists that within the Protestant theological frame-
work there is a full recognition of the two concepts of truth 
6 For example, Matthew 13:23 or 7:16-20. 7 John 1:14_ 
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involved in the Christian-pragmatic disagreement about the 
nature of truth. Brunner says the early church made an 
unfortunate mistake in not distinguishing between what he 
calls "world-truth" and "God-Truth."8 The medieval church 
unwisely censored men who were interested in discovering 
"world-truth," and this attitude by the church eventually 
engendered a powerful reaction so that today "world-truth" 
(scientific truth or pragmatic truth) has virtually eclipsed 
"God-Truth." 
World-truth or pragmatic truth concerns itself primarily 
with the empirically understood universe. In the Christian 
view God created this universe and instituted the orders 
which maintain it. Furthermore, it is good for man to con-
cern himself about the universe in which he lives. It is his 
to learn about, to investigate, to subdue. Science is a noble 
calling-a worthy and exciting calling. Yet scientific truth 
or world-truth can only be the rational, intellectual discovery 
of facts, laws, principles. This truth is at best only a partial 
description of reality. Not only should there be a concern 
about the nature of the created world, but also about the 
Creator who made it. This Creator-truth, however, is not 
a scientific discovery but a personal discovery. It is come 
by through a meeting of persons, not by the searching of a 
person through the realm of things. This knowledge of the 
personal God, this God-truth, is revealed truth and comes 
not through reason or scientific method, but by faith. For 
the pragmatist, world-truth is ultimate; for practical pur-
poses there is no truth above and beyond world-truth. For 
Neo-Reformation Christianity, world-truth is good and legiti-
mate, but the highest truth is come by personally through 
faith. Yet there need be no conflict between these two areas 
of truth discovery. The conflict arises when one area or the 
other is repressed. 
s Emil Brunner, Christianity and Civilization (2 vols., New York, 1948-
1949), I, 36-38. 
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When the Reformation view of man and his destiny is 
compared with the outlook of the classical humanists, a 
different kind of basic contrast presents itself, involving dis-
similarities which are of critical importance. When anyone 
tries to overemphasize the fundamental similarities between 
the Greek view and the Christian view, says Emil Brunner, 
he looks at the problem from such a distance that the whole 
picture is blurred.9 The Greeks, in principle, start with 
humanity and proceed rationally to God. The Christian 
starts with God and from Him derives the meaning of man's 
humanity. With the Greeks man is the center (imbued, of 
course, with the divine principle); with the Christian, the 
Reformation view certainly, God is the center. On the one 
hand Reason is supreme, a principle which even supersedes 
the person; on the other hand the personal God stands su-
preme, the highest Truth, a Person, above reason. The 
classicists magnify the dictates of reason; the Christian ac-
knowledges the will of God. In the one, reason comes first; 
in the other, revelation stands higher than reason. The one 
gives dominant support to the happiness of the elite; the 
other is primarily concerned with an expression of love to 
all, including the unlovely. The one, for example Socrates, 
chooses intelligence as the primary basis for the good; the 
other, for example Christ, decrees love as the highest mean-
ing of the good. Biblical teachings emphasize that the pri-
mary aim of man is to do the will of God, but the Greeks 
stress the excellence of human nature.10 
The Christian personal concept of God does not coincide 
with the Greek idea which tends to make God a divine 
principle immanent in the world and in man. With the 
Greeks the divine principle, Reason, makes the person. In 
Christian anthropology the person is not subservient to the 
9 Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt (Philadelphia, 1947), 48-49. 
10 A summary taken from Livingstone, Greek Ideals and Modern Life, 
153-68. 
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divine principle, but prior to it. God is a Person; if there 
be principles, they proceed from Him. 
This concept of God as the eternal Person delineates a 
distinctive relationship of God to the world and God to man, 
quite different from the Greek humanistic point of view. 
If God is a Person, He does not pervade the created universe 
primarily as a divine principle or impersonal law; He does 
not undergird man's humanity as the divine spark of reason 
dwelling immanent in the individual, but on the contrary, 
as a Person He exists uniquely separate and distinct from 
His creation and from man. God's significance to His crea-
tion and to man is His relationship to the created world and 
to man. God the Creator is a Person; He is the Subject. The 
created universe is impersonal; it is composed of things; it 
is objective. God through His infinite power and the orders 
of His creation momentarily sustains the created natural 
world. This is God's relationship as Subject to the objective 
natural world. 
The Biblical emphasis upon the person stands in notable 
contrast to the classical emphasis. In the one case "person" 
is the highest principle; in the other case "reason" is the 
highest principle. For the Neo-Reformation theologian rea-
son is an integral God-given part of the person, along with 
his will and feelings which are also God-given and essential. 
For the Greeks, by contrast, reason is clearly placed at the 
top of the hierarchy as the essential principle of humanity. 
The person is understood in terms of his reason, which is 
the divine principle underlying personality. In the classical 
view individuals are not persons in an infinite radical sense 
but are accidental expressions of the divine universal prin-
ciple of reason. Hence the importance of "relationship" is 
limited, since with the Greeks the divine principle is a 
universal principle which does not set off one person against 
another in a radical manner but rather emphasizes the shar-
ing of the common principle. In the Christian view, reason 
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along with the will and the emotions constitutes the whole 
person who relates himself as a whole to other persons. For 
the classical humanist, reason is the primary principle of 
which all persons partake, and the relationship of person 
to person involves individual variations which are not radical 
but accidental. For the Christian every individual who 
bears a human face is not only the bearer of reason, but is 
a whole person created in the image of the divine Person. 
Every man is essentially a person whether he has rationally 
developed the divine spark or not. Every person stands in 
mysterious and sacred relationship to his Creator and to his 
fellow men regardless of the status of his reasoning abilities. 
The existence of the poor, the humble, and even the un-
lovely is sacred because they are persons, in personal rela-
tionship to God and to man. The rational principle in the 
Christian viewpoint is not the essential determining factor 
of man's humanity, whereas in the classical outlook this 
seems to be the case. 
In spite of these radical differences between the faiths of 
the classical humanist and the neo-orthodox Christian, there 
is one extremely important aspect, at least, in which these 
two views coincide. They commonly testify to the humanity 
of man in terms of a human nature which partakes of a 
transcendent reality. Man is human because he possesses the 
qualitatively distinctive capacity to stand above the natural 
continuum. Christianity and Greek humanism present a 
solid front against all forms of naturalism which presuppose 
man's humanity to be contained within the natural sphere 
only. 
A comparative review of Reformation Christian faith and 
educational reconstructionism highlights yet another series 
of similarities and some basic differences. Tawney observes 
that Calvinists and the more radical socialists are similar in 
that they all consider themselves chosen people, predestined 
to perform an all-important mission in the world. Tillich, 
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in comparing orthodox Christianity and Marxism, says that 
they are similar in that both are deeply concerned with 
history and its end, both have a pessimistic sense of sin, both 
look toward goals of peace and justice, both have a deepened 
sense of catastrophe, and both agree that man exists in a 
fallen state, either because of original sin or because of a 
maladjusted society.11 Both Reformation faith and recon-
structionism acknowledge the basic importance of the irra-
tional part of man's nature (or the "unrational" as Brameld 
calls it) . The Christian labels the "irrational" as a good 
part of man which has become perverted; the reconstruc-
tionists classify the "unrational" as a nonmoral force that 
needs harnessing for moral purposes. 
A polar distinction between the Neo·Reformation view 
and reconstructionism has to do with the nature of evil. The 
Christian understanding of evil is that it is personal. The 
reconstructionist insists that evil basically stems from the 
society. The one says that the person is in "revolt." The 
other says that the person is in revolt only because basically 
the society is in revolt. Reinhold Niebuhr, representing the 
Neo-Reformation view, has no confidence in social projects 
as a means of eliminating evil from the world. Niebuhr 
argues that every advance toward the good by man or by 
society is attended with an exposure to more subtle forms 
of perversion to which the good succumbs. Every increase 
in human knowledge brings greater evil as well as greater 
good. And group action is even more susceptible to evil 
perversion than individual action. Group morality is even 
more easily perverted than individual morality. Thus the 
collective and totalitarian ideals, modern socialistic schemes 
projected as the basis for the elimination of social evils, are 
hopeless and dangerous dreams. According to the Reforma-
tion's realistic view of man's sinful nature, there can be no 
utopia in this world. The optimistic progressive dreams of 
11 Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era (Chicago, 1948), 254. 
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the perfectibility of man by social maneuver do not stand 
the test of reality. The contemporary radical hope that 
great power centered in some benevolent collective force 
shall be morally and physicaly strong enough to overcome 
the evils in the world must eventually frustrate itself at the 
sight of the great evils and injustices which flow from the 
collective force itself. 
Yet the Christian is not pessimistic in the face of discourag-
ing world events with all of the attendant evils, because the 
Christian way is the personal way, the way of faith in God, 
so that by the power of God man transcends the evil which 
he cannot overcome in his own strength. Here the basic 
positions of the Christian educator and the educational re-
constructionist are polar, the one saying that God and no 
other is the answer to evil in the world, and the contrary 
position saying that man and no other can furnish a solution 
to this problem. 
These positions become polar not only in theory but in 
practice when the collectivist systems come to the conclusion 
that any type of personal faith contrary to that of the "sys-
tem" is a serious deterrent to the system in reaching its 
self-appointed objectives for society. This observation seems 
to apply to any totalitarian regime, whether church or state. 
Man-made systems in the name of god probably provided 
first-rate historical models for the twentieth century man-
made systems in the name of man. In any case a personal 
loyalty to a Sovereign higher than the system becomes a 
stumbling block to the designs of the system, and eventually 
the person must succumb to the system or suffer unfortunate 
consequences. And yet, insists the Christian personalist, the 
freedom of the person to choose his sovereign loyalty is the 
foundation of a good society. Many a modern radical social 
reformer, Toynbee observes, is purging out as best he can 
the very spiritual faculty by which man can know the true 
nature of man and God and sin. 
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The grave danger to the personal concept of the nature 
of man latent in the collectivist trend, whether democratic 
or autocratic, can best be discovered by looking at the roots 
of the radical, naturalistic form of democracy which has 
emerged as a full-fledged religious faith in support of collec-
tivistic programs. Rousseau seems to be an early champion 
of this non-Christian form of equalitarian democracy. Rous-
seau's concept of democracy was non-Christian first of all 
because he replaced the sovereignty of God with the sov-
ereignty of the general will. The general will, expressed in 
practical form as majority will, he identified with the infal-
lible right, with the assertion that nothing must stand be-
tween the individual and his duty to the state. For this 
reason Rousseau considered Christianity a radical vice-a 
constant source of dissension impeding the democratic 
process.12 
In the light of this background, the N eo-Reformation 
theologian is impelled to examine critically all modern ex-
pressions of the democratic faith, especially those which 
clearly show their discontinuity with supernatural faiths. 
Evidently a proposed democratic way of life substantiated 
by a naturalistic faith is radically different from a democratic 
way of life based upon a Christian faith in the sovereignty 
of God. At least two widely divergent streams of democratic 
thought and faith become distinguishable, the one rationally 
and scientifically founded upon the sovereignty of man, and 
the other personally founded upon the sovereignty of God. 
From the point of view of Reformation faith the difference 
between these two outlooks is radical. One basic considera-
tion, however, is common to all views and is highlighted 
in the simple question: What makes man human? Each 
philosophical position seriously proposes an answer to this 
question; hence the many kinds of humanists: classical, ra-
tional, scientific, and Christian. Karl Barth, in behalf of 
12 Sabine, "The Two Democratic Traditions," in The Philosophical Re-
view, LXI (1952), 464. 
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the Christian humanists, defines the humanism of man in 
terms of the "humanism of God." In the Christian sense, 
the supreme basis of humanism is God incarnate. The prac-
tical expression of humanism is love for fellow man, sacri-
ficial love, genuine love for the unlovely as well as the lovely. 
As Augustine puts it, man's humanity depends not on his 
intelligence but on what he loves, and what a man loves 
makes an infinite amount of difference to the status of his 
humanity. "For every civilization, or every period in history 
it is true to say: 'Show me what kind of god you have, and 
I will tell you what kind of humanity you possess.' "13 It 
seems only logical, for example, that the heathen worshipers 
of Molech, the god of fire, should eventually sacrifice their 
children by burning them alive, or that pagan cults in their 
nature worship of fertility should eventually sexually dese-
crate human beings in their temples. 
If it be true that man's humanity is based upon what he 
loves or worships, ann that genuine humanism cannot be 
dissociated from the worship of the sovereign God, it follows 
that the continuing eradication of man's personal worship 
of God decrees a continuing depersonalization of man, a 
continuing deterioration of the kind of humanism to which 
all philosophies seem to subscribe. The modern naturalisms 
which describe man only as a complex animal who derives 
his human qualities from the natural environment are in 
danger of promoting the grossest kind of inhumanity. Chris-
tian humanism therefore insists that "it is imperative to 
understand once more that the rediscovery of man will also 
be the rediscovery of God. That is the essential theme of 
Christianity. "14 
Neo-Reformation humanism, based upon man's personal 
faith in God, is eloquently presented in Dr. Baillie's Invita-
tion to Pilgrimage, where he quotes the French writer E. 
Doumergue on this essential theological tenet of Reformed 
13 Brunner, Man in Revolt, 34. 
14 Nicolas Berdyaev, Solitude and Society (London, 1938), 152. 
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Protestantism: "It is . . . the theologies of the enslaved 
will which have saved liberty; it is the theologies of salvation 
by another than man which saved human morality; it is the 
theologies of renunciation of the world which have saved 
man's mastery over the world; it is the theologies of man's 
renunciation of himself which have saved human personality; 
it is the theologies that preached love toward God alone 
which have saved love towards all men; it is the theologies 
of eternal predestination which have saved progress; ... it 
is the theologies that said, 'God is all, man is nothing' which 
have made man a force, an energy, a power incomparable 
and divine. "15 
With these distinctive Christian elaborations of the nature 
of God and the nature of man, Reformation faith is urgently 
concerned with the problem of the relationship of God to 
education in America today. For surely education is a moral 
venture, fundamentally concerned with this all-encompassing 
quest for the basis of man's humanity. If the Christian 
concept of God is basically related to man's humanity, it 
must be radically considered in its relation to man's edu-
cation. 
In the earlier days American education was not so directly 
confronted with the problem of God in education, because 
the whole society was permeated to a certain extent with 
Christian faith in God. It was not considered hypocritical 
at that time, apparently, that even American currency ought 
to be a witness to this faith: "In God We Trust." Not only 
the Christian church, but the home and the school were 
generally strong in this common faith. Today America no 
longer possesses to the same degree this common godly faith. 
The former theological support to both home and school 
for the educational task of developing responsible persons 
is now greatly weakened, and the moral vacuum left in its 
wake has indeed precipitated a contemporary educational 
15 John Baillie, Invitation to Pilgrimage (New York, 1942), 104. 
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cns1s. As a result there are today many movements in edu-
cation to develop moral and spiritual values programs; a 
new flood of books and articles is being written on the con-
temporary problem of education and morals; discussions 
about the problem are prominent in many educational meet-
ings and conventions. The schools must have working an-
swers to these problems, or else the community tends to 
fall apart. And it seems, regardless of the philosophical 
starting point for the solutions of those problems, there is 
always posed the primary question of "faith." Faith in 
what-democracy, or some kind of "ism," or God? 
Actually the problem of education and faith is itself in-
deed a dilemma. Both liberal nonsectarians and orthodox 
Protestants have been generally firm in their insistence of 
the separation of church and state. Particular faiths must 
not be allowed to utilize public education as sounding boards 
for their own special interests. This is, in fact, against the 
law. Yet how can education today operate without a basic 
faith upon which it itself rests and by which it is guided? 
How can education as a moral venture say what ought to be, 
without a faith to help it? Because of this pressing need 
many progressive educators, and the radical educators more 
boldly, have formulated a democratic, secular faith which 
they believe is quite in accord with the spirit of the times 
and which supports the proposition that all men have a 
right to certain basic freedoms, including the freedom from 
religious imposition in the educational process. 
But here the real dilemma comes more clearly into focus. 
The democratic faith which men propose as the underlying 
faith for twentieth century American education is itself, by 
virtue of its naturalistic origins, an imposition and a viola-
tion of conscience for that segment of the citizenry which 
yet adheres to a faith in God and seeks the same for its 
children. The principle of separation of church and state, 
designed to protect the religious sensibilities of its citizens, 
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including non-Christians, from the danger of imposition and 
violation of conscience, is here again faced, but in reverse 
order. The new danger is that a non-Christian democratic 
faith shall violate the conscience of many who yet adhere to 
a Christian faith in the sovereign God. 
The dilemma is that education must have a faith in order 
to fulfill its moral task in society, but this faith ought not 
to be officially motivated by any particular sectarian or 
secular group which violates the religious conscience of any 
minority. Yet this assumption seems to imply that education 
can have no faith at all in our American society of hetero-
geneous faiths. But an education without faith is meaning-
less if its primary assignment in the twentieth century is 
considered a moral assignment: the development of good 
men, good citizens, good workmen. 
And so, from the Nco-Reformation point of view, the 
problem of God in education is critical, for if education 
cannot proceed upon faith in God, it must be guided by some 
other faith; education must have its faith. And the N eo-
Reformation concept of the nature of man cannot allow it 
to express any confidence in a naturalistic, nontheological 
faith as the basis for an education which is to succeed in the 
face of contemporary problems where the hope of a free 
society is at stake. In other words, Nco-Reformation faith 
insists that the problem of developing responsible persons in 
education requires a theological solution. 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
A Theological Solution to the Problem 
of Developing Responsibility 
THE IMPLICATIONS of personal responsibility are not so 
profound in a closed society, either primitive, with its set 
frame for determining men's activities, or totalitarian in the 
modern sense, where the state makes the critical choices and 
the individual simply defers to the state. But in our open 
society with its framework of individual freedom as outlined 
by the Greeks and vitalized by the Christian faith in Western 
culture, personal responsibility becomes at once a great glory 
and a heavy cross.1 Western civilization has drunk deeply 
of the wine of individual freedoms, and the thought of losing 
these freedoms seems unbearable. 
In the ',Yestern Hebrew-Christian tradition a free society 
is hardly conceivable apart from free persons who constitute 
it. And persons cannot long remain free unless they use 
their freedoms responsibly. Individual responsibility is sure-
ly to be discovered a fundamental factor at the base of an 
open society. On the other hand, the personal freedoms 
which the Western world holds priceless, along with its ideal 
of the infinite worth of the individual, seem uniquely sensi-
tive to the deteriorating effects of individual irresponsibility. 
Personal irresponsibility, from a Reformation Christian point 
of view at least, is to be discovered at the base of the growing 
threats of totalitarianisms and collectivisms. If an open so-
ciety is to be defended against the increasing non-Christian 
collectivistic entrenchments, there must be a revitalization 
1 Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (2 vols., London, 
1945), I, 176. 
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of the essential cohesive forces which hold together an open, 
free society.2 
The dilemma for an open society is that these cohesive 
forces cannot be external forces primarily, for if they are, 
they violate the principles of personal freedom with which 
the free world is now so seriously concerned. Because an 
open society is not organized along the lines of close and 
detailed regulation of the activities of its citizens, the ele-
ment of personal irresponsibility is all the more devastating. 
A free society is relatively unprotected against the tempta-
tions of many kinds of personal irresponsibilities. When a 
person is free to the extent that he can be responsible in a 
higher sense of the word, he invariably possesses a greater 
freedom to be irresponsible. In a free society there exists 
a minimum of rigid custom; there are few policies of the 
mailed fist to check irresponsibilities which violate specific 
laws. An open society, therefore, finds itself in really serious 
straits when more and more members utilize their freedoms 
irresponsibly. 
The force which holds a free society intact must be, it 
seems, some kind of inner conviction. This inner virtue, 
according to the N eo-Reformation view, is personal responsi-
bility. Neo-Reformation theology insists that the current 
trend toward personal irresponsibility in free communities 
can, in the long run, best be counteracted by the rediscovery 
of the radical meaning and origin of this human capacity 
called responsibility; that the true meaning of responsibility 
is to be discovered and substantiated theologically; that his-
torical formulations of personal freedom and personal re-
sponsibility are concomitants of vital Christian faith; that 
there is a significant relationship between the decline of per-
sonal responsibility of free persons in open societies and the 
decline of theological faith in all realms of life; and finally, 
2 An open society is described by Popper as a society in which individuals 
are confronted with personal decisions. 
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that the relationship between Christian theology and the 
concepts of freedom and responsibility are so basic that no 
amount of substituted activity, good though it may be in 
itself, such as social planning or the erudite explorations of 
the meaning of values or the application of the scientific 
method to morals, can in the long run hold the line in sup-
porting an open society. Though planning and collective 
measures in the twentieth century world seem necessary, 
their primary purpose ought to be that of stopgap measures, 
holding actions, so that free peoples may yet use the free-
doms they possess to discover the deeper truths needful in 
the development of responsible persons. And it is the view 
of N eo-Reformation faith that the twentieth century re-
newal of the Biblical concept of the sovereignty of God with 
its concomitant belief about the sinful nature of man is the 
starting point in the support and vitalization of personal 
responsibility needed for the continuance of a free society. 
The meaning of responsibility and irresponsibility is so 
fundamental in a Christian sense that they cannot be dis-
sociated from the deepest origins of human personality. And 
these origins, theologically speaking, are supratemporal, su-
pernatural, founded in the Being of the eternal Person. 
Responsibility, in its deepest meaning, is grounded in a 
positive relationship between the person and his Creator. 
Irresponsibility has its roots in negative relationship between 
person and Creator, which is simply another way of speaking 
about the dogma of the fall of man, or original sin. The 
highest degree of responsibility, in this setting, is understood 
as charity in action: love. Yet this does not define responsi-
bility, for the supreme meaning of love seems to transcend 
all definition, as does the full meaning of freedom and 
personality. In a practical sense, however, this power of 
love does reveal itself as a kind of inner dynamic which con-
structively relates a person to his neighbor. This basic rela-
tional power is the spiritual texture of a free community, 
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and it is the Christian conclusion that this supremely needful 
element of human existence can only be understood theo-
logically. 
Yet, according to the Neo-Reformation concept of man's 
nature it must be acknowledged that some degree of re-
sponsibility exists in human beings regardless of their primi-
tiveness, their culture, their religion. Every man is created 
in the image of God. The creative order of man is a re-
sponsible order. Whatever the culture, man distinguishes 
himself in terms of his nature as a responsible being. In 
primitive societies where the potential for personal freedom 
is low, man understands his own nature only vaguely, and 
yet the concept of responsibility is there, else there would 
not be a human society. In the degree to which responsibility 
is understood as God's creative order for man's existence, the 
potentiality for an open society has been established. The 
fullest understanding of freedom and responsibility comes 
in the Christian theological concept of man created for free 
fellowship with God and with other persons, his neighbors. 
Yet, regardless of whether the society is Christian or not, 
regardless of the culture or the religion, men do evolve some 
type and degree of responsible relationships because they are 
created in the image of God. Responsibility in any form is 
theologically rooted, whether men are cognizant of it or not, 
because men's natures are grounded in God their Creator. 
The real basis of a free community, then, according to 
Reformation faith, is that vital inner bent within the hearts 
of men which expresses itself practically through love in 
action. Yet this concept of love is never ideally fulfilled by 
man. Faith in God and its concomitant expression in love 
toward one's neighbor is always the act of sinful man in a 
sinful society. But even imperfect faith expressed in im-
perfect love by imperfect man effects a powerful influence 
upon the community of men, just as good salt has great 
powers of seasoning. Hence, in the Neo-Reformation view, 
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one may strive toward the ideal of a free society without 
having to subscribe to some form of utopian ideology. 
The basis of individual responsibility may be designated 
in the Christian sense as God's creative order of personal 
existence: man created in the image of God and created 
with the unique individual capacity to be personally re-
sponsible in his relationship to his Creator. A corollary to 
this creative personal design for man is the creative order 
of family existence: male and female in their creative human 
relationships. The "person" is not a changeable product of 
a natural environment but the eternal creation of the eternal 
God, and likewise the family is not a human institution 
which may be radically modified to suit the demands of the 
times. God's orders for human existence-orders which in-
volve basic relationships to Him, and creative family rela-
tionships-are not to be modified to a changing environment, 
because they are divine orders. Ignorance or violation of 
these orders involves serious injury to persons and to the 
hope of their responsible development. 
The proper consideration of these orders for human exist-
ence gives man the clue to the proper basis for the orderly 
community, of which education is an integral part. Such a 
consideration is extremely important today when society 
suffers from an unfortunate disruptive emphasis upon the 
importance of the individual on the one hand over against 
the importance of the group on the other. In the one case 
society is reduced more and more to an aggregate of "atomis-
tic" individuals, and in the other case society becomes merely 
an organism with individuals as comparatively insignificant 
cells.3 The Neo-Reformation emphasis of the divine "per-
sonal'' order and the divine "family" order integrates this 
antithetical emphasis of the one and the many. The theo-
logical idea of the personal order of existence properly 
3 Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, abridged by D. C. Somervell 
(New York, 1947), 576. 
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acknowledges the infinite worth and dignity of the indi-
vidual. At the same time the theological idea of the family 
order comprehends the root meaning of community. The 
life of the family, in practice, integrates the "one" and the 
"many" so that both are infinitely important and comple-
mentary to one another. These two orders, believed to be 
divinely instituted and supported, constitute the basis for 
the Neo-Reformation idea of an education which can truly 
concern itself with the problem of developing the kind of 
personal responsibility needed to support and maintain a 
free society. 
Johann Pestalozzi, a teacher in Switzerland during the 
latter part of the eighteenth century, was one of the most 
illustrious educational exponents of this idea that the family 
order most effectively takes into account the problems in-
volved in educating for responsibility. At best, said Pesta-
lozzi, the larger school constitutes a husk around the kernel 
which the child has received at home. At the beginning of 
the child's educational venture there is no teacher who can 
take the place of the mother. The highest aim of education, 
he insisted, is the emphasis upon love and faith which begins 
in the relationship of mother to child and ends in relation-
ship of the person to his Creator and Redeemer.4 The con-
cept of love as the basic foundation for a proper education 
was emphasized over and over again in Pestalozzian educa-
tional philosophy. However, it was not a concept of an 
abstract love, but love in activity, an inclusive kind of per-
sonal expression which involves head, hand, and heart. 
The strength of the larger community is to be discovered, 
according to Pestalozzi, in the strength of the home; the 
vitality of the education in the larger community is directly 
related to the vitality of the education in the home. And 
since the home is irreplaceable, one of the prime responsi-
bilities of the larger community educational ventures should 
4 Lewis Flint Anderson, Pestalozzi (New York, 1931), 28-34, 216-17. 
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be the positive and aggressive support of home and family. 
"In order to promote the education of the people it is above 
all necessary to revive in parents the conviction that they pos-
sess the ability to promote the education of their children."5 
The regeneration of the community comes not by "endow-
ments, legislation, or by new methods, important as these 
are, but, as Pestalozzi thought, by love and devotion of noble 
women overflowing from the domestic circle into the com-
munity.''6 
These Pestalozzian views on education constitute a signifi-
cant starting point for the Neo-Reformation ideas about 
modern education. The family must be the foundation of 
an education which truly takes the "person" seriously. The 
family order makes possible the deepest understanding of 
responsible "1-thou" relationships. And the Christian family 
provides the real foundation for community education. The 
best kind of community education is the direct extension 
of family education. This kind of an educational foundation 
makes possible a free community, because persons, learning 
the profound meaning of responsibility at the most com-
pletely personal family level and the next most personal 
community level, possess the kind of vitality necessary for 
fulfilling their obligations responsibly to all levels of com-
munity existence. 
Of course, it is much easier to contemplate than to demon-
strate the ideal education in an ideal community. As usual, 
there is today much that is unsatisfactory about the educa-
tional setting provided by the larger society. Today's com-
munity, generally speaking, no longer appears to be founded 
upon any common faith, let alone a common Christian faith. 
Possibly this whole idea of an education based upon a Chris-
tian personal concept of the nature of man is quite visionary 
in the face of the cold realities of the collective trend accen-
5 Anderson, 135. 
6 Eva Channing (trans.), Leonard and Gertrude, by Johann Pesta1ozzi (Bos-
ton, 1885), vii. 
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tuated by a mechanized and industrialized environment. 
Furthermore, seeing how prone education is to reflect the 
status quo of its society, is it not unrealistic to think of an 
education theologically undergirded within a larger com-
munity which has for the most part lost its theological orien-
tation? 
In response to the implication that this Reformation em-
phasis on educational fundamentals tends to be utopian, it 
should be pointed out that the Reformation tradition is 
extremely realistic about the nature of man. The moment 
the Christian faith becomes sentimental and dreams about 
evolving the good life and the good society in some ideal 
form, it deviates sharply from its basic Christian dogma 
about the radical nature of evil in man. Yet an expression 
of its pessimism is also an expression of its optimism. Refor-
mation faith is convinced that man in history has always 
clearly demonstrated his sinful ways, and that he continues 
to do so today, and that within the natural course of history 
he will continue to do so. This conclusion is the pessimistic 
aspect of the Reformation tradition. Yet, paradoxically, 
where this tradition has been strongest, open societies have 
come into existence. Free societies have not, in history, 
evolved from ideal conditions; actually they have developed 
within the confines of unideal cultures. This conviction is 
Reformation optimism. 
Comparatively free societies do exist. The American way 
of life is a notable example. Yet surely the American way 
of life was not born and fostered in an ideal setting. Any 
society in any age seems to be characterized by a goodly share 
of aberrant and questionable features. American culture at 
its best is beset with many sins and shortcomings, social 
injustices, moral blind spots. 
The question of the practicality of a contribution of N eo-
Reformation faith, therefore, ought not to be decided upon 
the basis of the ideality or unideality of the contemporary 
moral and spiritual climate. Not the determination of the 
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existing environment but the vitality of a faith would seem 
to be the basic feature which determines a successful and 
effective contribution to the present needs of education. A 
vital faith ought to gain significance in its relation to difficult 
problems simply because it need not be vitiated by subversive 
environmental influences. 
What, then, are some of the specific contributions which 
a Christian faith may offer to a society and an education 
which is not necessarily Christian in its perspective? What 
does a Christian faith with its strong emphasis upon the 
personal nature of man and the divinely instituted family 
order as the basis of a good education have to say to a secular 
and public order of education in a free society which is now 
in jeopardy? 
In response to these questions it should be made clear 
that the examination of the relationship of Christian faith 
to public education is not primarily to be concerned at this 
point with specifics of the educational process: administra-
tive and instructive procedures, methods, programs, and the 
like. The primary concern here is the philosophical setting 
in which education proceeds with its practical duties. 
In the first place, N eo-Reformation Christianity has a 
positive contribution to make to its society in its re-emphasis 
upon the worth of tradition. An essential need for our time 
is the restoration of a greater respect for law and order. This 
emphasis is particularly significant to the modern educational 
program. One of the volatile characteristics of the contem-
porary age is the widespread revolt against all kinds of 
authority, and especially against tradition as an authority. 
In this revolt there seems little doubt that pragmatic doc-
trines take the lead, founded as they are in the teachings 
of John Dewey whose theme of revolt against tradition 
seems to qualify him as the protestant of protestants. 
Public education cannot effectively serve the community 
so long as it remains in a constant state of revolt, where 
tradition and the individual dynamic stand in "either-or" 
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relationship. Christian faith offers a mediating influence 
in this conflict because Christianity in essence is tradition, 
and Christianity in essence is also a recognition of the dy-
namic appropriative nature of the individual. The Reforma-
tion of course is unique for its recognition of the God-given 
rights of the individual over against a false tradition. But 
certainly the Reformation was not antitraditional. Modern 
pragmatic doctrines are the consequence of a one-sided em-
phasis upon the dynamic of the individual. Reformation 
faith offers a doctrine which takes into account both the 
dynamic of the individual and the valid place of tradition 
in the educational process. 
Directly connected with a revival of respect for tradition 
is the revival of a respect for the law. According to the 
Reformers, men ought to obey the law because it is an order 
for society which God approves. So long as the government 
allows a workable degree of freedom for men, the Christian 
best serves his country, his government, and its agencies, 
including the schools, by seeking to conserve them and to 
respect the persons who represent them. Discipline in the 
schools is an increasingly frightful problem which is sapping 
the morale of many teachers and administrators. According 
to the Reformation point of view, godly fear is not only the 
beginning of wisdom but the foundation for the effective 
maintenance of discipline. And without discipline there can 
hardly exist an education worthy of the name. 
In this respect Reformation faith tends to align itself with 
the classical emphasis on discipline and reason in the learn-
ing process. The recognition of the importance of law almost 
necessarily involves a parallel acknowledgment of discipline 
and reason in the educative program. The Reformation, of 
course, interprets the New Testament message to mean that 
neither reason nor the law can save mankind. But this con-
clusion does not detract from the practical importance of 
the work of law and reason in a sinful world, the life of 
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which obviously is not based upon the standards of love 
alone; a world wherein love ought to prevail but does not, 
and where the practical expedient of law based upon reason 
must be depended upon. A friendly attitude toward a 
stronger emphasis on law and reason in education is quite 
apparent in denominations which have not moved far from 
orthodox Reformation theology, as, for example, the Chris-
tian Reformed Church with its strong Calvinistic predilec-
tion or the Presbyterian Church in the United States, which 
is now saying that there ought to be a powerful renewal of 
the life of reason in its higher educational institutions. One 
of the preliminary conclusions of the North Carolina Pres-
byterian Synod Survey is that piety is not enough-which is 
but the reiteration of a long standing Scottish Presbyterian 
ecclesiastical sentiment. 7 
In the second place, Reformation Christian faith in its 
preoccupation with the family order as the basis of education, 
and the community family-of-families school as the logical 
extension of the family education, raises a critical voice 
against the modern trend toward standardization and con-
solidation in public education. Modern education seems 
bent on separating the child from his immediate environ-
ment in order to build up bigger and better schoolhouses 
for bigger and better systems all for less over-all costs and 
more efficiency. But Reformation Christian faith suggests 
that when the state more and more assumes a central place 
in education and when persons and communities more and 
more defer to it, there is a serious danger that what is in-
tended to be personal in education becomes routinely im-
personal. The best kind of education, according to Refor-
mation faith, is founded upon a "spiritual federalism" as 
opposed to the radically socialistic utopian and often eco-
nomically determined "spiritual centralism." There is always 
7 A tentative conclusion presented by Roger McCutcheon, director of the 
Synod Survey of educational institutions in North Carolina, at the annual 
Synod meeting, July 14, 1954. 
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the real danger that great organizations, instead of being 
protectors of individual freedoms, become usurpers of them. 
In at least one other respect the Reformation Christian 
idea of the family order as the basis for good education yields 
a significant commentary on modern educational trends. 
This comment applies to the Rousseauistic rationally formu-
lated theory of egalitarianism which has now reached virile 
proportions in some modern circles of educational philos-
ophy. Rousseau, and later Marx, and now many adherents 
of a radical democracy have made a fetish of the idea of 
equality. The principle of equality, they imply, is to be 
matched with the idea of justice; hence there should be a 
kind of revolutionary communistic equalizing trend in many 
areas of life, not only in economics, but in the realm of 
authority and government, in social relations, and even in 
methods of evaluation in education. The central hypothesis 
of the equalitarians seems to be that the principle of equality 
is so overwhelmingly the distinguishing feature of human 
existence, and inequalities are so comparatively unessential, 
that when men, being basically equal, are the unequal re-
cipients of the various goods of life, injustice prevails. 
The Christian answer to these egalitarian, radically demo-
cratic conclusions is the Christian concept of the family. The 
family, as a base unit of community, illustrates not only the 
essential meaning of equality, but also the fundamental sig-
nificance of inequality. The unique value of inequality is 
that it enhances the significance of real community. A sig-
nificant aspect of community, in a Christian sense, is the fact 
that people are different from one another and therefore 
really need one another. By contrast it would seem that the 
rationalistic emphasis upon equality engenders not com-
munity but independence. The whole basis of family life 
is endangered because marriage is not considered a profound 
union based upon mutual dependence, but a kind of contract 
between two equal parties.8 The Christian idea suggests 
8 The analysis of Emil Brunner in Christianity and Civilization, Book I. 
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that marriage is a vital communion because each party is 
different from the other in function and therefore each is 
dependent upon the other for his proper fulfillment. This 
concept of essential differences of function is not given 
proper consideration in modern equalitarian philosophies. 
In a Christian sense the family order illustrates both the 
infinite value of the individual and the differences of func-
tion of each individual, so that he is radically needed by 
other persons-and needs other persons-for a full personal 
life. And because persons, equal in the sight of God, are 
different in their functions and capacities, they ought so to 
be recognized, whether in the family, or in the school, or in 
the larger society, for these differences constitute an essential 
human need for community existence. 
At this point possibly it is time to recall the particular 
problem in education which each of the previous educational 
theories, discussed in this book, were faced up to: the ques-
tion of developing responsibility in education in connection 
with the relationships of racial groups in the community. 
The pragmatists argued that experience was the key to this 
problem. The classical humanists placed the emphasis upon 
reason, the one area where all races and all religions can 
find a common ground. The reconstructionists placed their 
confidence in group dynamics, beginning with the school 
as the hub and eventually extending outward into the whole 
community, so that through group discussion and group 
action all races and religious groups of the community learn 
properly to appreciate one another. 
The Christian position in the light of the Christian defini-
tion of the profound basis of human responsibility suggests 
that what is most needful in establishing responsible relation-
ships between groups and persons in any community is the 
positive personal relationship between neighbors which is-
sues from a positive personal relationship between every 
man and his Creator. The man who is responsive to the 
eternal Person who created him is genuinely humble in his 
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dealings with his neighbor. Right relationship to God is 
the basis for an "unjudging" and responsive relationship 
to other persons. Outstanding Negro leaders like Ralph 
Bunche have emphasized the "personal" aspect of the race 
problem, saying that the only truly satisfactory basis for an 
eventual solution of the problem lies in the multiplication 
of positive personal relationships between persons of each 
race. And this is in effect a conservative position in regard 
to the problem. Organized crusades and organized conflict 
fomented by radical forces lead to harmful circumstances 
for all concerned. An emphasis on the common ground of 
reason seems plausible, but men at large show little talent 
for rational procedure in the face of emotional aspects of 
race relationships. The pragmatic emphasis on common 
experience does not distinguish clearly enough between qual-
ities of experience. Closer associations and common experi-
ences can result in untoward as well as favorable relations. 
The common intermingling of American soldiers with many 
peoples in far parts of the world has not by any means dem-
onstrated only positive gains in interracial understandings. 
The Reformation explanation of the tendency of groups 
to maintain themselves at odds with one another suggests 
the deep basis of revolt between individuals and their Crea-
tor. The clearest evidence of this basic revolt is idolization 
of self. And the practical demonstration of this kind of 
perverse idolization is pride, a human capacity which more 
than any other leads one person to consider himself superior 
to others. When this attitude is intensified in the more 
irrational aspects of group relationships, nothing less can 
be expected than that underprivileged peoples get the un-
mistakable impression that they are considered means rather 
than ends. Because every person is in fact created a son of 
God and because he realizes himself as an end, every person 
regardless of his station is extremely sensitive to any attitude 
which values him as less than an end. In this respect Refor-
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mation faith is radical in its diagnosis of the problem: Only 
the proper relationships of persons to God can restore the 
proper relationships of groups one to the other. 
But in another aspect Reformation faith is conservative 
in its attitude toward the problems of race relationships; it 
stands clearly opposed to radical socialistic programs intend-
ed to correct the problem on a mass scale. Social programs 
which are not founded upon the radical revolution within 
individual persons is doomed to failure, creating more havoc 
and grief than good. The little book of the New Testament 
called Philemon is the standard text for the Reformation 
concept of the basis of responsible relationships between the 
privileged and the underprivileged. The transformation 
of the personal relationship between the slave and his master 
is utterly radical. But the transformation of the social struc-
ture is considered by Paul a secondary matter which will 
right itself through the permeative quiet revolution which 
evolves from the transformation of personal relationships. 
From the Christian point of view it is not common experi-
ence primarily, nor .reason essentially, nor group dynamics, 
but personal decision which provides the foundation for 
responsible relationships between persons and groups in the 
community. And personal decisions which support right re-
lationships between a man and his neighbor are founded 
upon right relationships between a man and his Creator. 
These personal decisions are basically free decisions, and 
only the accumulation of these free decisions by persons can 
support a free society where men live responsibly one with 
the other. 
There remains at least one momentous and difficult ques-
tion which derives from the very heart of any discussion on 
the educational problem of developing responsible persons: 
the problem of church and state relationship, or stated in 
more challenging terms, the problem of religion in educa-
tion. It seems inevitable, as has been mentioned before, that 
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education cannot cope with twentieth century problems un-
less it is motivated by some kind of vital faith. Responsibility 
understood in its deepest sense seems to imply that it cannot 
be separated from faith. If a vital faith is important to edu-
cation in general and to the development of responsible 
persons in particular, what kind of faith ought this to be? 
And if that faith ought to be Christian, how can it be made 
an integral part of a program of public education? At this 
point we are directly faced with the American principle of 
state and church separation. 
Protestantism in America from the beginning was extreme-
ly sensitive to the religious injustices which it had experi-
enced in the Old World. The forefathers of the new America 
were adamant in their insistence on church and state sep-
aration in order to avoid the crimes of religious imposition 
from which Americans had escaped often at great cost. It is 
therefore understandable that conservative Protestantism 
today continues to support this historical position for fear 
that once again some powerful religious organization will 
gain control of the state and eventually usurp a favorable 
position for imposing its faith through governmental power. 
But the affirmation of the principle of church and state 
separation by Reformed Protestantism involves a practical 
dilemma in relation to the pressing educational problems 
of the day. One can hardly separate Christian faith from 
the denomination which propagates it. And the Reformed 
denominations cut themselves off from an influential im-
pact upon public education by their specific affirmation of 
the validity of the principle of church and state separation. 
If education must have a faith to carry on its work effec-
tively, and Christian denominations cannot officially supply 
education with such a faith, its only legitimate procedure 
seems to involve the development of a secular faith, a non-
religious faith against which there is no law in education. 
The churches cannot promote a program within education, 
and the schools in their desperate plight can hardly wait for 
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the indirect influences of spiritual permeation from without. 
In considering this dilemma it ought to be observed that 
the historical nineteenth century development of the prin-
ciple of church and state separation in the schools did not 
take into account an unforeseen twentieth century danger 
of the inroads of a secular faith of nontheological origin 
which is literally inimical to Christian faith. This twentieth 
century development in public education suggests for Chris-
tian faith at least two momentous alternatives: either a con-
clusion that the principle of church and state separation in 
education as traditionally outlined is becoming obsolete, 
or the conclusion that Christian faith can no longer posi-
tively support the traditional American institution of public 
education. If public education needs a faith, either Chris-
tian faith must discover effective methods of supporting 
public education or it must withdraw for fear that a demo-
cratic nontheological faith shall irreparably weaken Chris-
tianity through its secular influences upon the young. 
The Roman Catholic Church in America is one segment 
of Christendom which has made its decision to withdraw 
from public education and to support a system of parochial 
schools for the purpose of nurturing and protecting the 
Christian faith of its young. Some of the conservative Protes-
tant groups, notably the Christian Reformed Church, a tra-
ditionally strong Calvinistic denomination, have come to 
the same conclusion and have started their own parochial 
systems. But Neo-Reformation Christian faith on the whole 
seems yet to be deeply concerned with the support and con-
servation of the public school. What can this faith say to 
the dilemma which it faces in its support of the traditional 
separation of the public school from Christian denomina-
tions? If the problem of education for responsibility can 
only be solved by returning to God in education, as Refor-
mation Christian faith clearly attests, how can an emphasis 
upon this theological reorientation become practical in the 
light of the present dilemma? 
CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
Education, the Community, 
and ChriStian Faith 
CHRISTIAN faith, both Reformation and Catholic, agrees 
that education cannot be neutral about faith, that education 
by virtue of its moral and spiritual tasks must have its sus-
taining faith. And from the Christian point of view an 
education for the development of free and responsible per-
sons cannot proceed upon nontheological premises. The 
modern Western world, therefore, simply cannot afford to 
neglect its Christian tradition and heritage. Neither the 
state nor education can fulfill its responsibility to our kind 
of a society without Christian foundations and Christian 
direction. Until the men of contrary opinion can demon-
strate more satisfactory alternatives, both the state and edu-
cation ought to acknowledge the positive relationship of 
Christian faith to the political and cultural vigor of a free 
community. 
This viewpoint is obviously not acceptable to any kind 
of secularism which looks for the state to increase its activity 
and influence in modern education. On the other hand 
the state today is taking account of Christian faith in a 
manner that would have been considered hardly possible 
a few decades ago. Governmental representatives are giving 
unusual consideration to the work of Christian groups, and 
often official utterances are unapologetically theological. 
America is truly concerned these days in many quarters 
about its Christian heritage. If the state decides that a vital 
Christian faith ought to be genuinely acknowledged, the 
state should also grasp the significance of the Christian wis-
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dom which repeatedly says the strength of a vigorous free 
society derives from a Christian faith and culture which 
develops upward through the family and the local com-
munity, and not through some kind of centralized program. 
This Christian insistence upon the significance of the 
family life and the wholesome community life is a generali-
zation to which both Reformation faith and Catholicism 
freely subscribe. The question of the restoration of the vigor 
of the local community is not these days any light matter. 
The present impact of communism is eloquent testimony 
to a crisis in the community. The current vigor of Marxist 
views about the meaning of the community are in one sense 
a disturbing indication of inherent weaknesses in our West-
ern kind of individualism, which at best is only partly Chris-
tian. Powerful influences in our society conspire to separate 
man from man and to shatter the basis of the lively com-
munity. Nowhere is this tragic reaction more evident than 
in our rural communities and in smaller communities of 
all kinds, where the glamour of great cities destroys the 
local morale because both young and old prefer bigness 
and excitement to the small town. Yet with all the feverish 
pursuit of excitement and the desperate attempt to skirt 
the bogs of local boredom, the searcher gasps for spiritual 
refreshment because he does not know that genuine living 
is somehow tied up with communion with others sharing 
a common faith, common interests, sufferings, and achieve-
ments. 
Christian faith has an answer to the problem of "com-
munity," although it certainly has done little in this twen-
tieth century to prove this assertion. There may come a day 
in the near future, however, when we will realize that the 
Christian answer to the problem of community is the only 
effective alternative to communism. And from the Christian 
point of view education is one important facet of this over-
all community problem. Possibly the recovery of spiritual 
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vitality waits for the "whole" household of Christian faith 
in the community to discover a practical medium in which 
it can totally relate itself to the education of the whole com-
munity. 
But if the local community is chosen as the setting for 
initial steps in the removal of some of the tensions between 
great divisions of Christian faith as they relate to education, 
we must seriously re-examine two traditional concepts which 
today defer all but the remotest hopes for success. The first 
of these traditions is the principle of the separation of church 
and state, or more specifically in this instance, the separation 
of Christian faith from public education. The second tra-
dition is the Roman Catholic policy of separatism in relation 
to education in the community. One could hardly expect, 
however, that these two principles, solidly entrenched in 
the histories of Protestantism and Catholicism, should easily 
submit to modification unless an increasing area of reciprocal 
trust gradually emerges from the past generations of conflict 
and distrust. It seems at least possible, however, to move 
toward a closer understanding as twentieth century urgencies 
are faced by both factions in their attempt to relate them-
selves constructively to education in the local community. 
In any event there are some important essentials about which 
Reformation faith and Catholic faith agree in principle and 
which offer a common starting point. 
In the first place, both Reformation faith and Catholic 
faith agree that education is a family function (or an ex-
tension of the family function) and not primarily a state 
function. Emil Brunner, for example, argues that even for 
the state schools the state should not educate, but should 
provide the framework for the cultural direction of the 
educative process. An inward separation between the state 
and education is necessary. Maritain, the Catholic philoso-
pher, agrees by saying that the state should provide the 
fullest plural expression of the cultural activities of the body 
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politic, and this pluralistic expression of the people (includ-
ing education, we presume) is a movement from the bottom 
upward. Since both Roman Catholic faith and Reformation 
faith conceive of the democratic state as the arm of the 
people which arbitrates and administers justice rather than 
participates in the cultural life of the people, it seems logical 
that the local community is the key group within which 
the cultural problem of acknowledging God in education 
ought to be realistically faced. 
Reformation faith points to the educational ideals of Pes-
talozzi, who believed that the home was the foundation of 
education and that the larger education of the community 
was an extension of that which was begun in the home. The 
Catholic outlook, too, stresses the importance of the family 
to education. The Catholic sacrament of marriage immeas-
urably accents the church's regard for the educational re-
sponsibilities of the home. Education is inseparable from the 
holy order of family existence. 
If this federalistic principle is primary to a vital com-
munity education, especially as it is faced with the problem 
of developing responsible persons, the whole question of the 
relationship of the state to education needs a critical re-
examination. If the family-of-families educational frame-
work is the essential starting point for education in the 
community and if the vigor of such an education must 
accumulate from the grass roots upward, not only should 
there be a separation between ecclesiastical organizations 
and education, but also an inward separation between the 
state and local public education. Emil Brunner points out 
that the Enlightenment separated the schools from the or-
ganized church. Now perhaps it is time for a new enlight-
enment which suggests the protection of the local school 
function from the growing dominance of the state as it 
threatens to overstep its bounds as arbiter in educational 
matters. The local community, generally composed of many 
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faiths, undoubtedly will not submit to an organizational 
church imposition, but the community ought to be equally 
aware of the danger of collectivism, which in the end could 
be as much or more devastating. These secular forms of 
centralism presently overshadowing the education within the 
local communities are a danger against which both Reforma-
tion faith and Roman Catholic faith ought to be commonly 
opposed. 
The state, according to this generally conservative Chris-
tian view, can best relate itself to public education as an 
overseer in the name of justice based on reason. J. S. Mill's 
essay On Liberty presents a concise view on the matter; the 
state, wrote Mills, should enforce education for all, but 
parents ought to be free to decide how and where. And 
Christian faith would add that the community should not 
only decide "how" and "where," but also "what." 
In the second place Catholicism and Reformation Christian 
faith are drawing closer together in their understanding of 
the permeative relationship of Christian faith to the educa-
tion of the community. Because Protestantism is historically 
separated from education, it has placed strong emphasis upon 
the principle of general spiritual permeation rather than 
direct organizational influence. But Maritain also speaks 
of the leaven of Christian faith as the church's "superior 
strength of all-pervading inspiration."1 The end of the state 
is the over-all protection and promotion of the culture 
(which ought to be a Christian culture), and the church is 
accountable for the immediate task of spiritually enlivening 
the community. The more completely a people are imbued 
with Christian convictions, the more effectively they will 
strengthen all components of the body politic, including 
the state itself. The leaven of the Gospel sets free the natural 
accumulation of human inclinations which evolve into high-
er and higher concepts of the natural law, and the natural 
law constitutes a religiously undergirded but rationally out-
1 Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago, 1951), 162. 
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linable means for ordering the cultural activities of the 
community. It is obvious, says Maritain, that the church 
cannot proceed today as it did in the Middle Ages, because 
the present church lives in a secular world and there is no 
hope for a definite ecclesiastical control over the whole of 
culture. Permeation, therefore, is to be accented, while an 
insistence on the principle of uncompromising ecclesiastical 
suzerainty needs to be held somewhat in abeyance. 
A recent statement by Pope Pius XII further indicates 
a significant trend toward moderation on the part of the 
Catholic Church in its relation to cultural problems. A 
papal voice for tolerance address, December 6, 1953, pointed 
out that God has not given even human authority "an ab-
solute and universal command in matters of faith and moral-
ity." There is a higher norm which permits in some cases 
the "toleration of error in order to promote the greater 
good."2 Even though the Catholic Church may remain un-
compromising in its theological formulations, it does often 
show a remarkable flexibility in practical matters. Because 
the Catholic Church subscribes to the idea of a necessary 
cultural development through family and community up-
ward, the time may come when this church will decide that 
the problem of "community" is urgent enough to warrant 
its co-operative support of at least one segment of community 
education in order to bolster the general defenses of Chris-
tendom against nontheological secularism. 
In the third place both Catholic and Reformation faiths 
propose that Christian faith should relate itself in a positive 
way to its cultural surroundings, although these proposals 
are based upon somewhat different philosophical and theo-
logical bases. 
Roman Catholic faith, in comparison to modern Protes-
tantism, undoubtedly has a well-balanced philosophical for-
mula for determining the relationship of the church to the 
2 Quoted by M. Searle Bates, "Crisis in Catholic Columbia," in The Chris-
tian Century, LXXI (1954), 786-88. 
184 Education and Responsibility 
world, and this formula also covers the question of the 
relationship of the church to education. The life of man 
belongs to two worlds, and God has created him to partici-
pate meaningfully in both. Man exercises his God-given 
reason in his work in the temporal community, and through 
faith the church is able to restore man's deprived spiritual 
nature, enabling him to be a citizen in the eternal kingdom 
as well as fulfilling his capacity to work toward the good 
life on earth. 
By contrast, Protestantism is more easily beset with un-
fortunate extremes as it tries to discover the right relation-
ship between the church and the world, and the Christian's 
participation in either or both. Some forms of Protestantism 
assume that the world is hopelessly evil and that Christians 
should separate themselves from the world as completely as 
possible. Other modern expressions of Protestantism tend 
toward an opposite extreme and assume that the church is 
hardly more than a natural cultural product like other world-
ly institutions and that it is not essentially different from 
the world. (Of course the Christian church from the be-
ginning has struggled with this problem, and its answers 
have varied significantly with the particular historical set-
tings.) N eo-Reformation Christian faith tries to solve this 
problem in the light of the Biblical dictum that Christians 
are in the world but not of it. A Christian is a person 
spiritually renewed, and in this respect he is separate from 
the spirit of the world; but a Christian is nevertheless in 
the world, and it is his responsibility to participate construc-
tively in the cultural life of the community in which he lives. 
The Catholic man with his two-storied nature-his ra-
tional nature and his ecclesiastically restored supernature-
is free to participate in the temporal cultural activities with-
out violating his first responsibility to God and the church. 
The Catholic believer has an outstanding advantage of solv-
ing the problem of citizenship in two worlds, because theo-
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retically there need not be any serious tension between his 
loyalty to the world, which may be his rational response, 
and his loyalty to the church, which is his response by faith. 
Man's temporal responsibilities and loyalties are quite clearly 
distinguished from his ecclesiastical and theological loyalties, 
but they are not theoretically contradictory, because rational 
activity in the world guided by natural law is not contra-
dictory to higher spiritual truth discovered in the church. 
Of course ecclesiastical loyalty must always stand over tem-
poral loyalty if there is any area of conflict. 
For Reformation faith the problem is not as simply worked 
out. Man is not essentially a two-storied creature but a single 
being who as a person is totally related to both God and the 
world. It is difficult in such a case to divide one's loyalties 
between two worlds when the temporal world is considered 
radically different from the eternal kingdom of God. Refor-
mation faith therefore tends to place the Christian in a 
paradoxical position. A Christian belongs wholly to the 
kingdom of God, but he must do with all his might the 
thing that his hand finds to do in the world where he pres-
ently lives. Yet it seems that in spite of a different approach 
to the problem, both the Catholic Christian and the Refor-
mation Christian are committed to respond in a positive 
way to the cultural demands of their communities. 
These bases for practical agreement about cultural "fed-
eralism," spiritual permeation, and the necessity for a posi-
tive Christian response to the needs of the community are 
counterbalanced by at least one overwhelming fundamental 
disagreement between Protestant and Catholic faiths as they 
relate to education, and of course this is the problem of 
authority. A great gulf of separation is involved in the 
question of the authoritative relationship of the church to 
the whole community, of which the church is a part. For 
practical purposes any community needs a final authority 
to which it turns for the proper ordering of its cultural 
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activities. The Roman Catholic Church uncompromisingly 
insists that it is the highest tribunal and that it must make 
authoritative decisions about moral aspects of the cultural 
functions (which include education) of the community. 
This position of the church does not propose to interfere 
with the democratic functioning of government. Govern-
ment is a rational function, and its structure should be 
supported democratically from the bottom upward. Persons 
who rule authoritatively should be given this privilege by 
the people. But the rational activity of government has to 
do primarily with arbitration and the administration of 
justice between the many groups and interests of the com-
munity. And this rational function of the government de-
rived from the people is not sovereign within itself but is 
conditioned by a Higher Sovereignty. The church, because 
it is the representative of this Higher Sovereignty, stands 
above the functions of government as well as the cultural 
activities of the people. The church makes known God's 
will for the eternal spiritual destiny of men, and it possesses 
an authority which moves from above downward by virtue 
of God's revelation. Governmental authorities are genuinely 
the vicars of the people under God and rightfully exercise 
temporal authority, but the final church authority is repre-
sented in the Pope, the vicar of God. Education is a cultural 
function and should be subject to the rational administration 
and authority of the vicars of the people insofar as justice 
is concerned, but it is reserved for the church to determine 
the content and the purposes of all education, because edu-
cation is inseparably connected with the eternal spiritual 
life of man and not his temporal existence only. And the 
church as the body of Christ speaks with unquestioned au-
thority on these vital matters in education. 
Reformation faith takes exception to this definition of 
the final authority of the Roman Catholic Church in relation 
to the cultural activities of the whole community. The 
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church, instead of being a "sinless organization of sinful 
men," is an organization which in spite of its supernatural 
character is also subject to the sinful perversions of all 
humanity. To invest final authority in any organization, 
including the church, is exceedingly dangerous to the body 
politic. 
For Reformation faith, final authority for the community 
can most safely be vested in the people. And one of the 
tasks of Reformation Christian faith is to develop a genuine 
sense of responsibility in the hearts of as many people as 
possible so that the authoritative voice of the people can 
most effectively represent the voice and authority of the 
eternal God. The people, of course, are not sovereign but 
stand under the sovereign God. When the people lose their 
faith in God, their democratic authority loses its validity 
and the culture suffers accordingly. The only hope for a 
continuing good authority is that the people, or at least as 
large a majority of them as possible, personally acknowledge 
God as their ultimate Authority, and the authority of the 
people tends to be good or bad according to the extent of 
loyalty of the people to God, who is sovereign over all. 
Thus the relationship of the church to education, according 
to Reformation faith, is primarily indirect and permeative. 
Yet interest in education is vital and direct because, under-
girded by godly faith, it is an important means toward 
developing responsible citizens not only for their personal 
advantage, but also for the community advantage, for such 
citizens provide the best means toward a just authority. 
The Protestant concept of authority is based upon the 
will of the people under God. But the church, in this view, 
ought not organizationally to attempt to regulate the or-
ganizational framework of the community. The church's 
task is primarily spiritual and personal, a work of faith. The 
organizational framework of the community or the state 
as a whole is primarily a rational and impersonal activity. 
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The church ought not to regulate cultural activities organi-
zationally, but should refer this task to the state or the 
community. The church indeed stands above the state and 
the culture, but the relationship is permeative. To the 
degree that a community is Christian, the church stands 
above every person in a personal and "faith" relationship, 
while in turn every person stands above the cultural func-
tions of the community by virtue of his share in democratic 
authority and also by his personal influence. The church 
does not regulate and control as "the church"; if so, it 
usurps the place of the state. Rather the church stands 
above and behind each of its members in the community, 
and each member as a citizen contributes to the formation 
of the final authority for the community insofar as regulation 
and control are concerned. 
This basic schism between Protestant faith and its de-
rivative, the American form of government, on the one 
hand, and Catholic faith with its essentially nondemocratic 
authoritarianism on the other hand, leads to an unfortunate 
state of affairs in the educational activities of the community. 
In the first instance, a member of the Catholic Church sup-
posedly has a unique philosophical and theological heritage 
which ought to enable him to solve the problem of partici-
pating influentially in the world and at the same time being 
a member of the kingdom of God. Yet his church's inflexible 
view on its authority, even about the general cultural activi-
ties of the community, separates the Catholic from his com-
munity at a critical point, so that the education of the 
children of the community is broken up into discrete un-
communicative compartments. 
For different reasons Protestantism, too, is paradoxically 
separated from the educational functions of the community. 
The traditional Protestant principle of separation of the 
churches from the schools makes it impractical for Protestant 
faith to relate itself in any effective practical manner to 
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community education, even though Reformation faith is 
definitely committed to the proposition that the church and 
Christians individually should relate themselves effectively 
to their communities for the sake of the kingdom of God. 
Protestantism historically has so vigorously protected educa-
tion against unacceptable faiths that it has quite successfully 
shielded public education even from its own Christian in-
fluences. 
Both of these forms of Christian separatism testify to 
serious weaknesses in Christian faith in its ability to address 
itself effectively to the community in distress. Somewhere 
in the vicious circle of check and countercheck within Chris-
tendom itself there ought to be a means of diminishing the 
intensity of this division as it relates to education. What 
are some of the possible courses of action? 
First of all let us consider again the Catholic position of 
separatism in education. The fundamental Catholic doctrine 
that man is a member of two worlds ought to be amenable 
to revision in its application to practical problems. And 
possibly a revision without violating the basic principle must 
turn on the question of withdrawal and return: At what 
point must faith and the church stand without compromise, 
and where may faith and the church share certain responsi-
bilities co-operatively with the whole community of which 
the church is a part? Education, for example, is a term 
which covers a tremendous scope of activity. The principle 
of withdrawal would not necessarily need to apply to the 
whole field of education, especially when the principle of 
return in some levels of education could conceivably reap 
rich dividends for all concerned. 
The whole question of withdrawal is historically signifi-
cant for the church, and currently as much as ever a crucial 
problem for Christian faith. This tendency toward with-
drawal always seems definitely in evidence where the tra-
ditional forms of the Christian faith are adhered to, whether 
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Protestant or Catholic, and this bent on the part of the 
Christian church cannot be taken lightly in the face of 
Biblical teachings and church history. Note, for example, 
this theme of separatism in the history of the Jewish people, 
as well as in New Testament faith. John Bright in his book 
The Kingdom of God carefully outlines the evidence of a 
minority acting in the capacity of a suffering servant which 
separates itself from the world at large and commits itself 
to the spiritual redemption of the whole. Today the Roman 
Catholic Church without question develops great spiritual 
force through its various practices of withdrawal and sacri-
ficial commitment. Likewise, in certain Protestant groups 
this separatist tendency is strong, and their practice of with-
drawal gives them a spiritual power which the world seems 
not to know of. 
It would seem that the Christian principle of withdrawal 
ought not to be challenged but simply recognized as a 
means toward great spiritual strength. Rather, the signifi-
cant question to be raised is this: Where should "with-
drawal" be emphasized, and where should "return" be con-
sidered? These days, more than ever, all persons in the 
community seem inevitably thrown into juxtaposition one 
way or another, although this growing trend toward more 
intricate interrelationships does not necessarily indicate great-
er genuine community. Christians have no choice but to 
share on a cultural plane the spiritual ebbs and flows of 
their community. Today it seems more difficult than ever 
for any man to build a wall around himself or his family to 
shield against unacceptable inroads of community influence. 
Because of this inescapable cultural impact, often unfavor-
able, the church faces a distressing problem. Is education, 
or at least certain levels of education, necessarily the point 
at which the church should insist on withdrawal, when the 
primary purpose of withdrawal on the educational level is 
much compromised at every turn due to the nature of the 
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modern community? Education only partly occurs in the 
schoolroom, while much vital education takes place outside 
the bounds of the formal process. When, therefore, with-
drawal appears far from being effective on the practical 
educational level, is there not at least one area of education 
which might be considered a point of "return" by the church, 
with a view toward the spiritual improvement of the whole 
community? 
Possibly a reasonable suggestion, to some extent not far 
removed from the teachings of Catholic philosopher Mari-
tain, implies not a lessening of the principle of withdrawal 
but a shift of emphasis. It would seem not at all intemperate 
or un-Catholic to center the church's emphasis upon "with-
drawal" in the stricter confines of the religious community-
the body of believers. Surely this is an area of freedom 
infinitely important to free men, that they be free to worship 
with whom they choose in the manner which they choose 
and that they be not unnecessarily entangled with the cul-
tural or secular demands of the temporal community with 
its ever present disruptive spiritual influences. The church 
community of believers through its freedom of withdrawal 
generates a spiritual power which purifies the community. 
Where education lies closest to this spiritual ministration 
of the church, that is, education in the family and education 
of the very young, it should seemingly come under the 
jurisdiction of the church. Likewise, higher education seems 
to be intimately related to the spiritual aims of the church, 
and historically the relationship between the church and 
higher education has undoubtedly proved itself outstanding. 
But for the sake of the unity and the necessary integration 
of the whole community of which all members share in the 
common but precious experience of living in freedom, there 
ought to be a level of education where all meet and all 
avenues are open for the freer interpenetration of spiritual 
vitality into the body politic. This procedure might be the 
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beginning step in providing a Christian alternative to some 
form of secular collectivism which is formed from outward 
pressure and not through inward spiritual strength. 
Of course public education cannot continue to deteriorate 
without forcing Christian groups to withdraw for sheer pro-
tection of their young against the debilitating influences of 
low morale. But this withdrawal can hardly be considered 
more than a temporary expedient. Both Catholic faith and 
Reformation faith are committed to an aggressive permea-
tion and renewal of the community. Somehow the concept 
of salvation by "withdrawal" without "return" seems incon-
sistent with the spirit of Christian faith. This idea is reminis-
cent of the story of some adventurers lost in an Alaskan 
blizzard. One of the men deserted a comrade who had fallen 
in the snow, assuming that he must save himself. The other 
man decided to lose his life if necessary helping the fallen 
man to safety. The first man eventually lost his strength 
and fell to die alone in the snow. The second man carrying 
his human burden was warmed by the life of his fellow 
human being, and both eventually reached shelter. Christian 
faith invariably counteracts the concept of withdrawal alone 
with the pronouncement that man cannot live unto himself 
alone. Christian faith in America still enjoys virtually un-
limited opportunity for withdrawal in its life of the spirit 
where it can work hard at keeping the church pure and holy 
and spiritually strong. But Christian faith needs also the 
spiritual exercise involved in the return to the life of the 
community at large, and education is one of these critical 
areas where "return" is a vital protective principle as well 
as the idea of "withdrawal" for spiritual protection. By 
withdrawal the church protects its own sensitive area from 
the corruption of the world, but also by the same token it 
withdraws itself from the opportunity to serve the com-
munity in a spiritually receptive area. 
While any serious integration of Catholic and Reforma-
tion theology seems impossible at this point, the time is 
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never too late to take seriously even the slightest shifts 
toward integration on the practical level. Obviously no kind 
of overnight solution is in sight for this whole complex 
problem. But at least some movement toward a tolerable 
solution seems terribly necessary as an alternative to cultural 
disintegration in the community. While the principle of 
withdrawal is assumed to be a necessary and valuable part 
of the history of Christian faith, it should also be noted that 
the fragmentation of the free community into unsocial, 
jealous, and tiny alien sovereignties is the beginning of the 
end of what has been taken for granted as the community 
of free persons. Although the freedom for withdrawal ought 
to be essential to free society, there must also be taken into 
account the element of accountability for responsible asso-
ciations between all groups in the community. These re-
sponsible associations must be taken into account simply 
because they cannot be avoided by the members of any 
community. An artificial separation of American citizens 
on the practical level in the community can easily degen-
erate into a case of irresponsibility. Responsibility surely 
implies responsiveness to one's neighbor. If a certain degree 
of practical responsibility does not exist between Christian 
groups in the local community, the possibilities for any 
positive and vigorous promotion of the whole principle of 
responsibility in education seems seriously handicapped 
indeed. 
The practical level for the promotion of responsible rela-
tionships in the community through education should be 
able to find its common ground in "reason," if no other. 
Reason ought to conclude that the various proponents of 
Christian faith should be commonly engaged in the spiritual 
support of public education, that there can be an educa-
tional meeting ground based upon the common essentials 
of Christian faith. It is true that faith is basic in the Chris-
tian concept of personal salvation as well as in the com-
munion of the saints, the body of believers, the church; in 
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areas of withdrawal the faith element ought to be the de-
cisive factor. But Christian faith is also vitally concerned 
with areas of return to the world, and in these working 
areas reason must be acknowledged its important assignment. 
Reason becomes significant on the practical level because 
work must be done on a co-operative basis involving many 
variations of faith. Faith working with faith often is not 
practical, because men, being sinful and turned aside with 
error and pride, do not have perfect faiths. Imperfect faiths 
find it difficult to engage on common ground, because faiths 
of any kind are the response of the whole person in absolute 
terms characterized by the principle of certainty. Thus, 
varying faiths exercised by imperfect and sinful persons can 
hardly be compromised. But reason operating in terms of 
law discovers a tolerable existence for persons in community. 
If faith were perfect, community would be perfect; but faith 
is not perfect, and reason underwritten by faith provides a 
working solution. This work of reason Christian faith ought 
to recognize. The law is man's practical answer to sinful 
fragmentative human existence, though not a Christian an-
swer to man's eternal salvation. Although faith stands above 
reason, there should not be any Christian inhibition against 
the use of reason to solve temporal community problems, 
even such spiritual problems as the necessity for acknowl-
edging God in education. Surely modern Protestantism is 
not so much a stranger to reason that its faith must preclude 
an appeal to reason for practical considerations. Likewise, 
Thomism holds itself eminently qualified to participate on 
a rational basis in the solution of temporal problems which 
beset the local community. 
The second traditional bulwark, which ought to be re-
considered from the Protestant point of view particularly, 
is the principle of church and state separation. This prin-
ciple applies to education at two critical points: first, that 
the state ought not materially to support any sectarian pro-
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gram of education, and second, that public education ought 
not to promote any sectarian religious emphasis. This dis-
cussion assumes that the first statement referring to the 
public support of sectarian educational institutions ought 
not to be subjected to any substantial changes. Sectarian 
religious groups ought to be free to promote their own pre-
ferred type of education without expectation of public as-
sistance. This principle is a safeguard to both the state and 
to the private institution. Material support ought never to 
be allowed to confuse and to attenuate the worthy spiritual 
purposes which can be most effectively worked out when 
private education remains free from political entanglements 
and the associated pecuniary temptations. Furthermore, if 
the Roman Catholic Church should ever see its way clear to 
participate in at least a part of the total community educa-
tive program, this first aspect of the problem of church and 
state separation would be somewhat minimized. The Cath-
olic Church then would no longer bear so heavy a financial 
burden educationally, as is now the case with its double 
assignment to support both parochial and public education. 
The primary concern here is the area of public education 
and its more effective relationships to Christian faith in 
general. The law as it now stands, along with notable de-
cisions of the Supreme Court, appears obsolescent and un-
cognizant of the deeper issues of the relationships of faith to 
education. Along with shifts from theological to relativistic 
foundations in all fields of knowledge, it seems thatthe law, 
too, shifted from its traditional religious foundations to a 
pragmatic basis, the relativistic nature of which does not 
give proper insight into the relation between faith and 
reason. Recent court decisions have not seemed fully to 
recognize the fact that neutrality is no longer possible, even 
for reason, or for education, or for law itself. But today 
there appears a lively hope for a counter trend in this respect, 
possibly foreshadowed by the recent decision to insert "under 
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God" in the pledge to the flag. If a real possibility exists 
for a growing recognition of God in the state, a real possi-
bility exists also for the modification of federal laws to make 
possible the freer interaction between Christian faith and 
public education. 
The relaxation of the obsolescent and artificial blockage 
which exists between faith and education is essential not 
only to Roman Catholic faith but also to Protestant faiths. 
In the first place, earlier sectarian theological conflicts are 
not nearly so disruptive today as they were a century ago. 
Now a new danger more serious than sectarian conflict has 
appeared on the educational scene, and that danger is non-
theological secularism which is apparently uninhibited by 
law and tradition to manifest its influences in the public 
school program. While a Protestant majority keeps Catholi-
cism out of the public schools, it also provides the lawful 
shield for secular faiths to work uninhibited by law. 
One of the primary revisions in this problem of church 
and state separation ought to be a re-evaluation of the proper 
relationship of the individual to the prevailing faith of the 
community. A single person, or even a small minority, 
ought not to be able to subvert an attempt by the com-
munity to undergird a program of education with basic 
Christian principles simply because he does not subscribe 
to them. Of course Christian faith ought to be devoted to 
the tenet that individuals and groups must always be free 
to withdraw from the majority in order to carry out their 
religious and educational responsibilities according to the 
dictates of their consciences and within the confines of rea-
son as designated by the state. And obviously no religion 
must ever be arbitrarily forced upon the conscience of any 
man. But on the other hand the community, too, ought to 
have its rights, one of them being the reasonable means of 
constructively basing its education upon the Christian herit-
age of the Western world if it sees fit to do so, this to be 
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accomplished free from the legal interference by either an 
individual or a minority that chooses not to accept this 
traditional Christian heritage. The day of supposed neu-
trality is gone for the Western world. The supposed rational 
conclusion that the state or education or the law or that 
any man can be neutral about faith is not a rational con-
clusion at all. And as long as Christendom nominally con-
stitutes the majority of most communities in America, it 
ought to act while there is yet time to restore the leaven of 
Christian faith at practical levels in the cultural activities 
of the community. Yet where a Christian majority exists 
and claims a right to support education with Christian faith, 
it must at the same time remember the rational assumption 
that any person and any minority must be free to withdraw 
according to the dictates of conscience. 
The actual working out of this freer support of public 
education by Christian faith ought primarily to be a com-
munity affair. In many communities this development will 
be positive and effective, while in other communities this 
movement may be negative if little vital Christian faith 
exists. But in any event the whole principle of church and 
state separation ought in some way to be relaxed in order 
to allow greater freedom for community decision about these 
matters. Communities should be less hampered in the use 
of their own ingenious and flexible proposals for the solu-
tions of their problems relating to faith and education. Let 
the state continue to supervise and maintain justice when 
necessary in local educational matters and in the protection 
of individual conscience, but also let Christian faith work 
out suitable community solutions where it has the will and 
the initiative to do so. And let the various segments of 
Christian faith in the community formulate their practical 
procedures in terms of reason, undergirded and supported 
by faith. Let communities work at the problem of spiritual 
permeation, on the one hand, and let them, on the other 
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hand, work at the establishment of their own safeguards 
against untoward ecclesiastical violations of justice and rea-
son. 
These suggestions should hardly be evaluated against some 
backdrop of perfectionism or utopianism. We live in a 
sinful world, and each generation must endure its travail 
in attempting to establish a tolerable state of affairs. This 
work, if it works at all, must necessarily be sponsored by 
Christian realists rather than by anxious advocates of per-
fectibility who insist upon all or nothing. The practical 
effort toward a stabler framework in the community seems 
urgently necessary to avert the present danger of fragmenta-
tion of communities and faiths. Of course integration should 
not (nor can it be) forced. If communities do not choose 
to reason about these matters and to commit themselves to 
an integrative course, tragedy seems the likely alternative. 
Education is a cultural activity as it deals with the tasks 
of learning arithmetic, history, geography, the social sciences, 
and so on, but these activities require a "faith" setting. Our 
communities with their Christian heritage need the faith 
which is inseparable from that heritage. But Christian faith, 
if it hopes to provide bases for the solution of the problem 
of responsibility in the education of the community, must 
first apply its eternal wisdom toward its own responsible 
conduct in the community. No immovable obstruction really 
stands in the way of practical Christian co-operation, other 
than the perversity and pride of human nature itself-and 
Christian faith has been responsibly entrusted with the 
eternal means to overcome these human impediments. 
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GENERAL REFERENCES 
A GENERAL background study for the problems with which 
this treatise is concerned commits one to an assignment which 
is never completed-a reading program which insures at least 
a beginning acquaintanceship with the classical writings of the 
Western world. A great number of books are helpful in intro-
ducing the student to these basic writings. John H. Randall's 
The Making of the Modern Mind (Boston, 1940) is a stimu-
lating and scholarly survey of Western thought and its relation-
ship to the present. Others are Ralph H. Gabriel, The Course 
of American Democratic Thought (New York, 1940); Nicolai 
Hartmann, Ethics (3 vols., New York, 1932); George H. Sabine, 
A History of Political Theory (New York, 1937); Preserved 
Smith, A History of Modern Culture (2 vols., New York, 1930); 
Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, abridged by D. C. Som-
ervell (New York, 194 7); Frederick Copleston, A History of 
Philosophy (Westminster, Md., 1950), Vol. II; W. G. Muelder 
and Laurence Sears (eds.), The Development of American Phi-
losophy (Boston, 1940); W. H. Werkmeister, A History of Philo-
sophical Ideas in America (New York, 1949); William K. Wright, 
A History of Modern Philosophy (New York, 1941); Bertrand 
Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York, 1945); 
Edgar Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy (New York, 
1925); and Maurice de Wulf, Philosophy and Civilization in the 
Middle Ages (Princeton, 1922). 
These books are a few of the references which provide a 
stimulus for reading the basic works of some of the classic 
philosophers and theologians, such as Plato and Aristotle, Augus-
tine, Aquinas, and Calvin, the writings of whom are all signifi-
cantly related to the current problems in education as elaborated 
in this book. 
General references in education which provide valuable back-
ground material are JohnS. Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of 
Education (2nd ed., New York, 1950); J. Donald Butler, Four 
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Philosophies and Their Practice in Education and Religion 
(New York, 1951); National Society for the Study of Education, 
41st Yearbook, Philosophies of Education, Part I (Chicago, 1942); 
and Robert Ulich (ed.), Three Thousand Years of Educational 
Wisdom (Cambridge, Mass., 1948). 
PROGRESSIVISM 
Books 
JoHN Dewey's Democracy and Education (New York, 1916) is 
often called the bible of progressivism. This book, although 
written almost forty years ago, continues to be outstanding in 
comparison to much of the subsequent literature on modern 
education. John Dewey was an unusually prolific writer. Out 
of the scores of other publications these books are suggested as 
an outline of his philosophy in general: The Quest for Cer-
tainty (New York, 1929), Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New 
York, 1938), Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York, 1920), 
Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1922), Ethics, with 
James H. Tufts (New York, 1908), Interest and Effort in Edu-
cation (Boston, 1913), and A Common Faith (New Haven, 1934). 
William Heard Kilpatrick is probably Dewey's most distin-
guished disciple, a kind of mediator between Dewey's theory 
and educational practice. The outline of Kilpatrick's educational 
views is neatly summarized in his latest book, Philosophy of 
Education (New York, 1951). William Clayton Bower, a pro-
gressive in the theological field, has lately been somewhat of a 
philosophical father to progressivism in action on the moral 
level in education, particularly in the experiment of the Ken-
tucky moral and spiritual values movement. In connection with 
this movement William Clayton Bower has written Moral and 
Spiritual Values in Education (Lexington, Ky., 1952). Character 
through Creative Experience (Chicago, 1930) provides a helpful 
background study to Dr. Bower's current educational views. 
John L. Childs is also an important contributor to the liberal 
emphasis in education, and possibly his most important book 
is Education and Morals (New York, 1950). 
By all means we should not neglect to mention William James. 
His books, Pragmatism (New York, 1907) and Essays on Radical 
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Empiricism (New York, 1922), provide an important philosophi-
cal foundation for the twentieth century emphasis on progressive 
education. 
Other important references to the progressive point of view 
in education include Alfred S. Clayton, Emergent Mind and 
Education (New York, 1943); GeorgeS. Counts, Dare the School 
Build a New Social Order (New York, 1932); Education Policies 
Commission, Learning the Ways of Democracy (Washington, 
1940); George Mead, Mind) Self) and Society (Chicago, 1934); 
James Mursell, Education for American Democracy (New York, 
1943); Harold Rugg, Foundations for American Education 
(Yonkers-on-Hudson, N. Y., 1947); B. Othanel Smith, William 
0. Stanley, and J. Harlan Shores, Fundamentals of Curriculum 
Development (Yonkers-on-Hudson, N. Y., 1950). 
Articles 
Progressive Education (1924- ), published in New York by 
the American Education Fellowship, The Social Frontier (1934-
1943), published by Columbia University, and Educational The-
ory (1951- ), published at the University of Illinois, are 
three periodicals notable for their commitment to the progres-
sive point of view in education. "Academic Freedom and Re-
sponsibility," an editorial in The Social Frontier> II (1936), 191-
92, is significant in its view on the problem of responsibility in 
education. These articles are also helpful: William Heard Kil-
patrick, "Moral Freedom and Scientific Determinism," in Edu-
cational Theory) II (1952), 11-19; Victor Yarros, "Toward the 
American Commonwealth," in The Social Frontier> V (1938), 
89-90. 
Two important articles written by John Dewey are, "Evolu-
tion and Ethics," in The Monist) VIII (1898), 321-41, and "The 
Evolutionary Methods as Applied to Morality," in The Philo-
sophical Review) XI (1902), 107-24. 
Bulletins and Reports 
A series of bulletins were published by the Kentucky State 
Department of Education on the moral and spiritual values 
program of that state. The bulletin entitled Moral and Spiritual 
Values in Education (Frankfort, 1950) is an informative report 
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on the Kentucky program and its basic philosophy; Moral and 
Spiritual Values in the Public Schools (Frankfort, 1952), pub-
lished by the same department, gives a digest of the summer 
school lectures of William Heard Kilpatrick at the University 
of Kentucky. 
The Educational Policies Commission has published materials 
relating to the moral problems of education, for example, Moral 
and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools (Washington, 1951). 
CLASSICAL HUMANISM 
Books 
RoBERT M. Hutchins and Mortimer Adler are two of the most 
spectacular defenders of the classical view in current educational 
circles today. Neither of these educators does an unusual amount 
of writing, although Adler is widely known for his How to Read 
a Book (New York, 1940), and three or four of Hutchins' pub-
lications are well known, including Education for Freedom 
(Baton Rouge, 1943), The Education We Need (Chicago, 1947), 
The Higher Learning in America (New Haven, 1936), and re-
cently, Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society (New 
York, 1953). Mortimer Adler wrote a series of articles which 
demonstrate the Aristotelian dialectic applied to the current 
threat of moral relativism. See below under "Articles." 
Other important books which relate to this section are: Ber-
nard Iddings Bell, Crisis in Education (New York, 1949); Ernst 
Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven, 1944); Norman Foers-
ter (ed.), Humanism and America (New York, 1930), and The 
Future of the Liberal College (New York, 1938). Werner Jaeger 
is an outstanding authority on early Greek education; his note-
worthy work in this respect is Paideia (3 vols., New York, 1945). 
I. L. Kandel has written a book which critically examines mod-
ern progressivism, entitled The Cult of Uncertainty (New York, 
1943). 
These works, too, are helpful references: Richard W. Living-
stone, Greek Ideals and Modern Life (London, 1935), and Some 
Tasks for Education (London, 1946); Jacques Maritain, Educa-
tion at the Crossroads (New Haven, 1943); Everett D. Martin, 
The Meaning of a Liberal Education (New York, 192'6); Louis 
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J. Mercier, The Challenge of Humanism (New York, 1936); 
Walter Moberly, The Crisis in the University (London, 1951); 
Paul E. More, On Being Human (Princeton, 1936); Arnold S. 
Nash, The University and the Modern World (New York, 1944); 
Jose y Gassett Ortega, Mission of the University (Princeton, 
1944); Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (2 
vols., London, 1945); Mark Van Doren, Liberal Education (New 
York, 1943); Alfred N. Whitehead, The Aims of Education (New 
York, 1929); Irving Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership (Boston, 
1924); Albert Lynd, Quackery in the Public Schools (Boston, 
1953); Gilbert Highet, Man's Unconquered Mind (New York, 
1954); Arthur E. Bestor, Educational Wastelands: The Retreat 
from Learning in Our Public Schools (Urbana, 1953). 
Articles 
Mortimer Adler applies the method of classical philosophy, 
particularly Aristotelianism, to the moral problem in "A Dialec-
tic of Morals," in The Review of Politics, III (1941), 3-31, 188-
224, 350-94. A summary of Adler's philosophy can be found in 
the article "Liberalism and Liberal Education," in The Educa-
tional Record, XX (1939), 422-36. 
T. S. Eliot has written an outstanding series of articles entitled 
"The Aims of Education," in Measure, II (1950-1951), 1-16, 191-
203, 285-97, 362-75. 
Bulletins and Reports 
Two excellent bulletins deal with the classical point of view 
in modern education. The first is the report of the Harvard 
Committee, General Education in a Free Society (Cambridge, 
1945), and the second is the Forty-First Yearbook of the Na-
tional Society for the Study of Education, Philosophies of Edu-
cation, Part I (Chicago, 1942), particularly the section written 
by Mortimer Adler. 
EDUCATIONAL RECONSTRUCTIONISM 
Books 
THE TRANSITION in education from the progressive and usually 
moderate pragmatic emphasis to the more radical views of the 
educational reconstructionists is often difficult to trace clearly. 
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Beginning with the earlier and milder revolutionaries in the 
progressivist ranks, and moving toward the current and more 
radical philosophers and sociologists, educational and otherwise, 
this list of authors is suggested: George S. Counts, Dare the 
School Build a New Social Order (New York, 1932); John L. 
Childs, Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism (New 
York, 1931); Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx (New York, 
1936), and john Dewey (New York, 1939); Harold Rugg, Founda-
tions for American Education (Yonkers-on-Hudson, N. Y., 1947); 
Harry Slochower, No Voice Is Wholly Lost (New York, 1945); 
B. Othanel Smith, William 0. Stanley, and J. Harlan Shores, 
Fundamentals of Curriculum Development (Yonkers-on-Hudson, 
N. Y., 1950); Alexander Meiklejohn, Education between Two 
Worlds (New York, 1942); Harold Laski, The American Democ-
racy (New York, 1948); Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in 
an Age of Reconstruction (New York, 1941); Kurt Lewin, Field 
Theory in Social Science (New York, 1951); and Resolving Social 
Conflicts (New York, 1948). 
Studies of Rousseau provide important background for this 
section, as, for example, The Living Thoughts of Rousseau, ed. 
by Romain Rolland (New York, 1939); The Social Contract; 
and Emile. 
Possibly today the outstanding writer on the reconstructionist 
theme in education is Theodore Brameld. Brameld's main work 
is Patterns of Educational Philosophy: A Democratic Interpre-
tation (Yonkers-on-Hudson, N. Y., 1950). Other books by Bra-
meld are Design for America (New York, 1945) and Minority 
Problems in the Public Schools (New York, 1946). Education 
and Morals (New York, 1950), by John L. Childs, is also one of 
the important recent publications which illustrates a somewhat 
more unapologetic secular support of important reconstructionist 
principles than seems to be discoverable in the earlier moderate 
progressivism of the pragmatists of a few decades ago. 
Articles 
Harold Laski, noted English ·socialist, was one of the con-
tributors to The Social Frontier, the editorial policy of which 
reveals an unmistakable leftward swing in contrast to earlier 
pragmatic views. "A New Education Needs a New World," in 
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The Social Frontier, II (1936), 144-47, by Laski, is representative 
of this trend. Frank C. Wegener has written a critical article 
entitled "The 'Ontology' of Reconstructionism," in Educational 
Theory, II (1952), 45-47. 
EDUCATION, THE CoMMUNITY, AND CHRISTIAN FAITH 
Books 
IN THE formulation of the Neo-Reformation outlook, Emil Brun-
ner is considered one of the key theologians. Brunner's most 
important works insofar as this book is concerned are Man in 
Revolt (Philadelphia, 1947), The Divine Imperative (Philadel-
phia, 1947), Christianity and Civilization (2 vols., New York, 
1948-1949), justice and the Social Order (New York, 1945), and 
The Church in the New Social Order (London, 1952). 
Reinhold Niebuhr is also considered an eminent authority 
in this field. His outstanding work in this connection is The 
Nature and Destiny of Man (2 vols., New York, 1941-1943). Other 
valuable Niebuhr books are Moral Man and Immoral Society 
(New York, 1946), Christianity and Power Politics (New York, 
1946), The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New 
York, 1945), and The Irony of American History (New York, 
1952). 
Other helpful works include John Baillie, An Invitation to 
Pilgrimage (New York, 1942), and Our Knowledge of God (New 
York, 1939); Nicolas Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man (London, 
1945), The Meaning of History (London, 1949), and Slavery 
and Freedom (New York, 1944); Martin Buber, Between Man 
and Man (New York, 1948); John Calvin, Institutes of the Chris-
tian Religion; St. Augustine, Confessions and The City of God; 
T. S. Eliot, Essays Ancient and Modern (London, 1947), and 
Notes toward the Definition of Culture (New York, 1949); T. E. 
Jessop and others, The Christian Understanding of Man (Lon-
don, 1938); S. S. Laurie, john Amos Comenius (Cambridge, Eng., 
1893); C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York, 1947); 
Malvern) 1941: The Life of the Church and the Order of Society 
(London, 1941); Wilhelm Pauck, The Heritage of the Reforma-
tion (Boston, 1950); Johann Pestalozzi, Leonard and Gertrude; 
Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era (Chicago, 1948); Henry P. Van 
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Dusen, God in Education (New York, 1951); George A. Buttrick, 
Faith and Education (New York, 1952); Walter Moberly, The 
Crisis in the University (London, 1951); Basil A. Yeaxlee, Re-
ligion and the Growing Mind (London, 1952); Howard Lowry, 
The Mind's Adventure (Philadelphia, 1950); and Cornelius 
Jaarsma, Fundamentals in Christian Education (Grand Rapids, 
Mich., 1953). 
For the Roman Catholic point of view the basic writings of 
St. Thomas Aquinas provide an almost endless source of ideas 
and background. Particularly important are the writings by 
Aquinas on the nature of man, on education and the teacher, 
and on human knowledge. These subjects are dealt with at 
length in the Summa Theologica. 
Jacques Maritain, possibly Catholicism's most eminent au-
thority on Aquinas, is considered an outstanding guide for our 
understanding of the Catholic outlook. Man and the State 
(Chicago, 1951) has been heavily drawn upon. Other works by 
Maritain which are considered significant to this section are 
Education at the Crossroads (New Haven, 1943), Science and 
Wisdom (London, 1940), and Christianity and Democracy (New 
York, 1945). 
Other important references include Frederick Copleston, A 
History of Philosophy (Westminster, Md., 1950), Vol. II; M. C. 
D'Arcy (ed.), Selected Writings of Thomas Aquinas (New York, 
1939); F. J. C. Hearnshaw, Medieval Contributions to Modern 
Civilization (New York, 1949); Hoxie N. Fairchild (ed.), Re-
ligious Perspectives in College Teaching (New York, 1952); 
Vergilius Ferm, The Protestant Credo (New York, 1953); Chris-
tian Gauss (ed.), The Teaching of Religion in American Higher 
Education (New York, 1951); Paul Blanshard, Communism, 
Democracy and Catholic Power (Boston, 1951); Gustaf Aulen, 
The Faith of the Christian Church (Philadelphia, 1948); Werner 
Jaeger, Humanism and Theology (Milwaukee, 1943); A Monu-
ment to St. Augustine, Essays (London, 1930); H. Richard Nie-
buhr, Christ and Culture (New York, 1951); R. P. Phillips, 
Modern Thomistic Philosophy (Westminster, Md., 1948), Vol. 
II; John Wild, Introduction to Realistic Philosophy (New York, 
1948). 
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Articles 
Luther A. Weigle is one of the noted authorities on problems 
of the relationship of religion to education. Vital Speeches car-
ries one of his addresses on this subject, entitled "The Crisis of 
Religion in Education," XX (1953), 147-49. Other articles re-
ferring to this same problem are: Charles P. Taft, "Religion in 
the Public Schools," in The Christian Century) LXIX (1952), 
944-46; Warren E. Gauerke, "Religion and the Public Schools: 
Some Legal Problems," in School and Society) LXXV (1952), 
401-404; Paul Elbin, "Religion in State Schools," in The Chris-
tian Century) LXIX (1952), 1061-63; and M. Searle Bates, "Crisis 
in Catholic Columbia," in The Christian Century) LXXI (1954), 
786-88. 
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